THE celebrations to mark the 70 years of Indo-Pak independence kick started at Wagha border with the traditional display of military bravado-ism. Soldiers of Pakistan rangers and Indian BSF exchanged sweets as well as the intimidating gestures of rival warriors. This beating retreat border ceremony is the hallmark of security dilemma that has been a primary driving force behind the foreign policy of both states since independence. The scholars of international relations (IR) define this phenomenon as ‘the result of the two states interaction in which the gain of one is the loss of the other, leading to uncertainty between them’. World politics is an inherently anarchic realm. The actors in this anarchy of global politics are selfish, behave rationally and compete each other to maximise their self-interest regardless of morality. Consequently, all states seek power and security at the expense of their adversaries. This implies that the security of states in an anarchic environment of IR is a puzzle. The tragedy is that even after seven decades of arms race and military misadventures ranging from Junagarh to Kargil, there seems to be no learning taking place Security dilemma stems from the existential crisis and insecure nature of humanity. The decision makers of the rival states lack the empathy to unravel security dilemma because of ‘the absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma’ that rests at the core of ‘the very geometry of human conflict’. The ambiguity and lack of knowledge about rival state’s intentions leads to miscalculation of threat perception. Policy makers often commit a mistake of equating the intention of the hostile state, with its actual martial capacity. This assessment error triggers the process of strategic reductionism in which the states engage in arms race and military alliances to counterbalance each other’s capabilities. Political negation and diplomacy fades out of interstate relations and the objective of achieving military deterrence or balance dominates the state’s foreign policy. These features of security dilemma are more pronounced between the two states, when one of them have predatory character, expansionist ideas and global/regional hegemonic ambitions. The weaker of the two, thus seeks to counterbalance the military capabilities of the predatory state through maintaining the deterrence in arms race and by seeking the protection of a stronger global power. The 70 years of Indo-Pak rivalry and military adventurism are the effects of strategic reductionism that stem from the existential fear of Pakistan and hegemonic ambitions of India in the region. The bloodstained process of partition left deep impact on the mindset of founding fathers of India and Pakistan. Rivalry between All India Muslim League (AIML) and Indian National Congress (INC) carved a wide gulf of distrust between the two political parties during the years of Indian freedom movement. This distrust became a dominant factor in determining the trajectory of the foreign policy of both states. The leadership of Indian National Congress could not reconcile with the idea of Pakistan. Nehru’s deeply rooted detestation for Pakistan was narrated by Professor Josef Korbel (member of first UN commission to resolve the Kashmir dispute) as follows. “We are a secular state which is not based on religion. We give to everyone freedom of conscience. Pakistan is a mediaeval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It should never have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not stood behind this foolish idea of Jinnah”. In Discovery of India, Nehru sheds light on his vision for the future role of India on the global political stage. “India, constituted as she is, cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will either count for a great deal or not count at all. No middle position attracted me. Nor did I think any intermediate position feasible”. Nehru and other Hindu leaders, exhibited the secular character of INC as a rationale for the unity of Indian sub-continent. However, under the disguise of secularism, it was an attempt to revive the imperial Hindu state of Akhund Bharat (United or Greater India) that reached its zenith during the 33-year reign of Ashoka (268-232 BCE.) of Maurya Dynasty. Nehru was an avid reader and admirer of Ashoka’s chief royal adviser named Kotliya Chanakya. Nehru developed a special relationship with Chanakya’s ancient political realism at an early stage of his political career. Hennery Kissinger in his latest publication World Order states that the ancient text of Arthshastra written by Chanakya is considered, a manual of governance, statecraft, diplomacy and strategy for the rulers of the Indian subcontinent. The text provides detailed and rich account for the formation and practical implementation of foreign policy. Arthshastra theorised and applied the concept of power as dominant reality of IR, long before Machiavelli’s work, The Prince. German philosopher Max Weber described Chanakya’s text as ‘truly radical Machiavellianism … compared to it, Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless’. It is remarkable that how this ancient text is still relevant to assess the nuances of Indo-Pak rivalry. The ancient text of Arthshastra provided a blueprint to the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, to determine the long-term goals of state’s foreign policy. An eminent scholar of Chanakya’s realism Dr Michael Liebig states that ‘Kautilya stands for quintessential foreign policy realism and realpolitik, notably his Rajamandala principle for inter-state relations – simplistically put: your enemy’s enemy is your friend’. Under the philosophy of Rajamandala the states, which share the immediate border, forming a circle around the national frontiers, are the target of territorial expansion. The ruler of India must see the immediate neighbours as hostile states. On the other hand, the states which share the border with the hostile or target states forming a second circle are allies. The evidence suggests that the principle of encirclement of the bordering/rival states remains a prominent feature of modern India’s foreign policy. Since the time of independence, India sees the bordering states of China and Pakistan as rivals. On the other hand, Iran, Afghanistan and Japan that share border with Pakistan and China (the second circle) are considered natural allies. The Arthshastar prescribes territorial expansion as one of the principle duties for the Indian ruler. After the partition, India became a prominent member of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Nehru’s attitude towards the South Asian region was far from NAM’s principles of sovereignty, non-aggression, equality, peaceful coexistence and non-interference. Nehru saw India, as a hegemonic power of the South Asian region. In his parliamentary speech on 17th March, 1950, Nehru sent a message of Indian dominance to the neighbouring states. “Apart from any kind of alliance the fact remains that we can’t tolerate any foreign invasion from any foreign country in any part of the Indian sub-continent. Any possible invasion of Nepal will inevitably involve the safety of India” By the mid-1950s Nehru had laid the ground work for the Indian intervention in Sikkim, Nepal and East Pakistan. Under the cover of neutrality, India maintained its prestigious and moralistic image, as the promoter of liberation of the third world from the colonial powers. All the while striking treaties, agreements and understandings in the South Asian region. Nehru tied the economic and security survival of the weaker states of the SAARC region, with Indian hegemonic interests, through intimidation or coercion. As per the examination of a renowned scholar of security dilemma, Dr Talat Farooq the existential fear of the state is aggravated if its frontiers are penetrable by the neighbouring state that has hegemonic ambitions and predatory character. The ill planned division of the subcontinent created the state of Pakistan with peculiar geography of two detached land masses (East and West Pakistan). The two land masses were separated by one thousand miles’ territory of hostile state of India. The Western wing is one thousand miles in length but lacks the strategic depth. The width of the western wing at several critical strategic points is only three hundred miles, which leaves Pakistan vulnerable to be split into two by the flanking movement of Indian forces. On the other hand, Indian forces have the strategic advantage of ample depth for strategic retreat before its crucial defence positions are exposed. The second largest city of Lahore and the provincial capital of Punjab is merely 15 miles from the Indian border. The frontiers of the two neighbouring states have no natural barriers of rivers or mountain range. The security dilemma driven by the Nehruvian/Chanakyan expansionism became a major factor in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy. Therefore, from the very beginning the leadership of Pakistan started to explore the options of foreign aid in the international arena to meet costly defence requirements and overcome the scarcity of economic resources Pakistan’s existential fear and threat perception from India in the east, were aggravated by its bitter start with Afghanistan in the west. Afghanistan refused to recognise Pakistan as a sovereign nation in the UN. The leadership of Afghanistan argued that Pakistan was carved out of thin air and had no historical roots. Thus, the territorial arrangement of Durand Line had been deemed invalid, as the treaty was originally concluded with British Empire. Nehru, guided by Chanakya’s philosophy of Rajamandala, instigated the policy of encirclement of Pakistan and framed friendly relations with Afghanistan. Under the umbrella of Soviet Union, both India and Afghanistan strengthened political and economic ties and became the recipient of Soviet aid. Nehru exploited the tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan and lent covert support to the rebels in the provinces of Balochistan, KP and FATA region of Pakistan. The rebels wanted to secede from Pakistan to create Pashtunistan, the demand which was politically and financially supported by Afghanistan. The antagonism started in 1947, still dominates the national security paradigm and foreign policy of both India and Pakistan. The infant state of Pakistan encountered grave security concerns and existential threat from its neighbouring states both in the West and East. The security dilemma driven by the Nehruvian/Chanakyan expansionism became a major factor in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy. Therefore, from the very beginning the leadership of Pakistan started to explore the options of foreign aid in the international arena to meet costly defence requirements and overcome the scarcity of economic resources. In the first cabinet meeting on 7 September, 1947, the first Governor General and the founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah laid the foundation of Pakistan’s foreign policy. “Pakistan [is] a democracy and Communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely, the UK and the USA, rather than with Russia”. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence department were keenly monitoring the developments in South Asia, as early as 1946. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence department were keenly monitoring the developments in South Asia, as early as 1946. US defence establishment had earmarked various locations in Pakistani cities of Karachi and Lahore as potential sites for American naval ports, air force bases and intelligence stations Hussain Haqqani’s historical account narrates that Jinnah’s attitude towards the Cold War was in sharp contrast to that of Nehru’s. Jinnah saw Pakistan as natural ally of the Western world and the bulwark against the ‘atheist’ regime of the Soviet Union. In his meeting with the US diplomat Raymond Hare in May, 1947, Jinnah formally requested US assistance to Pakistan. He assured the American emissary that Muslim states of the Middle East and Pakistan would stand against Soviet expansionism and support the US as the leader of the ‘free world’. In an interview with American journalist, Bourke-White, Jinnah said, ‘America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America’. Jinnah emphasised the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to attract American interest. ‘Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed [at] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves … Russia is not so very far away’. On the other hand, the US perceived India with its large population and vast land mass, as natural ally and potential market. The White House recognised the mass Indian freedom movement, under the leadership of Gandhi as true representation of ‘American democratic ideals’. The Roosevelt administration supported the idea of Indian independence to show American detestation towards colonialism. However, this ‘anticolonial sentiment’ did not carry any sympathy for the separatism of Indian Muslims. Strongly rejecting the notion of separate Muslim homeland, President Roosevelt branded the division of the Subcontinent as ‘the terrible idea’. However, Dr Hiltion Root in his book Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World stresses that not all was well for India and bad for Pakistan in the US establishment. The US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his successor Dean Rusk, professed India as ‘ethically compromised’ state because of Indian non-alignment policy, which they thought was a tilt towards Soviet Union. Both officials perceived the polytheist nature of Hindu religion, ‘socially exploitative’ hierarchy of cast system, as ‘morally corrupt and incompatible’ with ‘American social ideas’. Secretary Acheson saw the autocratic regimes and martial history of Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as natural allies for the US. When Pakistani leaders underlined their monotheist Islamic beliefs and history of ‘martial valour’ in the subcontinent, Acheson was deeply moved by ‘the religious and martial character of Pakistanis’. This ‘ironic dichotomy of American democratic ideals’ was clearly understood by the Indian leadership and served as one of the factors to join the NAM. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence department were keenly monitoring the developments in South Asia, as early as 1946. US defence establishment had earmarked various locations in Pakistani cities of Karachi and Lahore as potential sites for American naval ports, air force bases and intelligence stations. During the initial years after independence, priorities of Pakistani leadership conflicted with US government’s opinions about India and Pakistan. India was a much stronger and natural candidate for US alliance. However, Nehru’s constant refusal to take sides in the Cold War disappointed Americans. After India rejected US offer for defence collaboration, Eisenhower administration sent a delegation to Pakistan to open the bilateral dialogue for financial assistance and defence collaboration. The US military strategist started working on their plans to help build the new nation of Pakistan. The objective was to elevate and strengthen Pakistan, as a bulwark to contain the spread of communism and safeguard American interests in the South Asian region. The US as hegemonic power, employed the instrument of alliance formation to arm the weaker and militarily unequipped Pakistan. By 1952, the US started to allocate ample economic assistance and military aid to Pakistan. Thus, triggered the chain reaction of military alliances, arms race and insurgencies, which mitigated the solution of security dilemma to strategic reductionism. The tragedy is that even after seven decades of arms race and military misadventures ranging from Junagarh to Kargil, there seems to be no learning taking place. The historic narrative presented in this discussion demands the governments of India and Pakistan to reflect on their failures to solve security dilemma through strategic reductionism. The writer is a research student of Political Economy at Griffith University, Australia. He can be reached at adnanhafeez@gmail.com; Twitter: @abdaliaB Published in Daily Times, August 19th 2017.