At least seven people were killed and another 17 injured on Sunday, when a remote-controlled explosive went off in Chaman, one of two major border crossing points between Pakistan and its turbulent northwestern neighbour, Afghanistan. Pakistan’s deadliest terrorist organisation, Tehreek-e-Taliban, has already claimed responsibility for the explosion; adding further credence to the speculations about group’s active rebuilding of its operational capacity following the Afghan Taliban’s political ascendency in Afghanistan. Signs of a TTP resurgence had started emerging in 2020, but the situation took a sharp turn the year after, with the TTP claiming responsibility for at least 282 attacks, most of which targeted security personnel. Pakistan’s ambivalent approach towards the TTP has only complicated the issue. Despite repeated warnings from security advisors and international bodies, the government has remained optimistic about peace talks with the unyielding TTP and still remains firm in its contentious demand for a Sharia-based semi-autonomous FATA. The most recent of these negotiations was brokered by the Afghan Taliban in Kabul earlier this year, which predictably failed to produce any significant breakthroughs. The result was a deadlock between the two parties–likely to persist, given the Afghan Taliban’s reluctance to become too entangled in Pakistan’s internal security issues. It would be naive to assume that the Afghan government has Pakistan’s best interests at hears. Its role as a reluctant facilitator has little interest in pressuring the TTP to concede to Pakistani negotiators; only emboldening the organisation’s demands and violent tactics. What is often overlooked when examining the Afghan Taliban’s approach to the TTP is that anti-Pakistan sentiment runs rampant among Afghan foot soldiers, which is at odds with the Taliban’s carefully curated media narratives depicting Pakistan as a valuable ally. Pakistan’s alignment with American security forces during the War on Terror has only amplified this hostility, which goes all the way back to Pakistan’s inception, specifically the country’s efforts to seal the disputed Durand Line. There have also been reports that TTP militants have found a safe haven in Afghanistan, which is covertly supporting the organisation in its never-ending war against the Pakistani government. Despite all the evidence which points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the Afghan Taliban cannot be trusted, Pakistan continues to seek their support in resolving its TTP issue. It is imperative that Pakistan launch a detailed military offensive against the group, much like the one it commenced in 2014. The situation calls for political courage but whether our institutions are ready to follow through remains to be seen. *