“A bunch of weak people, even in numbers, aren’t strong. Get a whole bunch of confused people together and see how much clarity comes out of it. In other words, you just can’t add one more confused person to the pot, and expect to get any more clarity…One — standing outside of the confused group — who is clear, is more powerful than a million who are confused” — Abraham. This statement pretty much sums up Pakistani society and state’s confusion regarding an enemy that is small in numbers but very clear. The resolution passed by the All Parties Conference (APC) on national security amply demonstrated this confusion, in which the deaths of more than 50,000 Pakistani people and security personnel were blamed on the war in Afghanistan. The enemy, however, is very clear in its objectives and strategy. It has superior tactics and media management skills. It knows how to shape public opinion and capitalise on weaknesses in the state’s strategy and political will. Our misfortune is that the opinion leaders, political and military leadership and ordinary Pakistanis are unclear about what constitutes the red line in terms of the violation of the sanctity of citizens’ life and property since the violators use the name of Islam. We are caught up in our own narrative created during the Soviet-Afghan war in which militant proxies were propped up and deified as warriors of Islam. These proxies were used to defeat the Soviets with the generous help of the CIA and Saudi Arabia. They were later directed towards Kashmir to force India through military means, albeit without much success. Sections of these very militants have now turned against Pakistan for its perceived betrayal of the jihadi agenda, for which they were created, by joining the global war on terror. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and the religious right have voiced this sense of betrayal by calling for halting drone strikes and end to cooperation with the US in the war on terror. This is a continuation of the jihadi narrative whose target has now changed from the Soviet Union to the US. The changes the jihadi mindset wants to introduce in Pakistan’s state structure and society does not seem to bother our leaders because the jihadi narrative, with no counter-narrative to challenge it, has overpowered our better sense. The jihadi forces understand the importance of the narrative in maintaining their hold. They will lose legitimacy if their motives are challenged and their intentions exposed. Therefore, they are using all available means — mosques, madrassas, political platforms, school textbooks, media — to convert the people to their views. Anyone who has the capacity to question this narrative and present a counter-narrative is a potential threat and must be eliminated. Benazir Bhutto, Salmaan Taseer, Shahbaz Bhatti and Bashir Ahmad Bilour lost their lives because they challenged this narrative. Surprisingly, the APC resolution failed to articulate the state’s resolve to protect the constitution, the citizens and the democratic system against any aggression. Regardless of whether Pakistan’s leadership realises the gravity of the situation or not, internationally Pakistan is under the spotlight. Since the Mumbai attacks in 2008, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other Punjab-based militant groups have appeared on the international radar as a potential threat to countries other than India. A scrutiny of the Punjabi Taliban’s presence in Afghanistan and FATA, and their links with the TTP, Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda reveals they are part of a formidable force, which has consistently targeted the state and society of Pakistan. Although LeT has never attached Pakistani targets, it has a history of cooperation with al Qaeda. In 2002, one of the top al Qaeda leaders, Abu Zubaidah, was arrested from an LeT safe house in Faisalabad. This cooperation has taken on new dimensions since the revival of the Afghan Taliban. If the Pakistani authorities do not want to dismantle the jihadi infrastructure, there is very little they can do to contain or fight the militant threat to Pakistan. These forces are deeply inter-connected and share a common ideology. Although the LeT has not conducted attacks within Pakistan, it maintains active links with the TTP, which is the declared enemy of the state. The TTP has proudly claimed responsibility for the killing of Major General Sanaullah, Lieutenant Colonel Tauseef and Lance Naik Irfan Sattar when they were visiting troops in the Upper Dir district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This was an audacious attack. Imagine what would had happened if these officers had been killed in the Line of Control fire from India? How does one explain the apologetic grunts coming the political circles and the media? When it involves jihadis, even the lives of brave soldiers of the Pakistani army lose some of their value. This is the power of the jihadi narrative. The writer is a freelance journalist based in Washington, DC. She tweets at @ishrats and can be reached at isaleem@syr.edu