Russia’s surgical military intervention in the Syrian conflict by way of bombing rebel and terrorist targets, starting September 30, has bolstered up the Assad regime’s position, giving it an advantage in any kind of parleying for a political solution. Before the Russians intervened in a big way, the Assad regime was looking increasingly shaky losing territory to disparate rebel and jihadi groups, including IS. That situation has been reversed, and Damascus has recovered fair bit of its lost territory, thanks to the Russian aerial bombing and support on the ground. Having retrieved and, possibly, reversed the military situation to the Assad regime’s advantage, Moscow suddenly announced, as suddenly as they had earlier started their military intervention in September, that it was curtailing and withdrawing bulk of its military activity having largely achieved its objectives against Islamic extremists and terrorists. But that this could easily be reinstated if the situation so warranted. Indeed, Russia continued to help the Assad regime to capture from the IS the historically and strategically important area of Palmyra, which has further bolstered its position. It is interesting to note that the drawdown of Russian military activity coincided with the starting of the political process in Geneva for a possible political solution. Russia’s action seemed aimed at multiple constituencies in the Syrian conflict from the Assad regime to rebel/jihadi groups, their regional supporters like Saudi Arabia, as well as the US. Above all, it was meant to convey that Russia was a determining force in the Syrian situation intending to help the political process rather than hinder it. For instance, it seemed to convey that Russia was not simply there in Syria to support the Assad regime at any cost. It would be willing to support any viable alternative to stabilise the situation. But at the same time, it would not ditch the Assad regime to make things worse to the advantage of extremists and jihadists of varied persuasions. Moscow’s determined intervention in Syria is not the result of any kind of idealism. It is part of its policy of bringing Russia back into a global role after the cavalier fashion in which its interests have been treated since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990s. The expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation right on to its borders created the crisis in Ukraine, where it supported and fostered the rebellion in eastern Ukraine, which is still unresolved. And that has brought on Moscow a sanctions regime from the US and its European allies. In the Middle East, Russia found itself sidelined largely until it dealt itself into a determining role by intervening in Syria and virtually changing the internal balance of power in favour of the Assad regime. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union Moscow still maintained military interests and ties following from the Soviet time by way of a naval base and other strategic interests. Moscow has also been trying to cultivate Egypt’s president/dictator Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, seeking to revive, in some ways, Soviet Union’s special ties with Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, in power during the 1950s and 1960s. Putin’s Russia would like to have a broad-based Middle Eastern policy but has found its options rather limited as Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners are US’ strategic allies and they would rather prefer Moscow to ditch Syria and Iran, where Russia has created strategic stakes. As pointed out earlier, even though Moscow has scaled down its military involvement to facilitate a political solution, it is retaining the option to up scale it if necessary. And as things stand, the Geneva peace process is not making much headway. Syria’s opposition high-negotiating committee’s emphasis remains on creating a transitional political regime minus Assad, which would basically mean a political order opposed to the existing ruling system. In other words, it would mean installing some sort of a hybrid regime that is difficult to even figure out because of the disparate elements involved with varying ideological, sectarian and regional interests. And this is without even thinking how an alternative (to the Assad regime) political system will deal with the IS and other terrorist outfits that are excluded from any political solution, if a solution were possible at all. Even as the so far non-existent political permutations and combinations are imagined, the Assad regime is not willing to sign off its death warrant, and what for in any case. There is no visible alternative, even more so now that the Assad regime has further consolidated its territorial control with considerable help from Russian intervention. In this situation, even though Moscow might be willing to entertain a political transition minus Bashar al-Assad, a viable and effective alternative is not around. The US and its regional allies would very much like Moscow to facilitate a Bashar al-Assad alternative but they don’t seem to have any clear alternative. And without that, it would simply be adding further to Syrian chaos and misery. In other words, with all the will in the world, there doesn’t seem, in the foreseeable future, any resolution of the Syrian situation. The Assad regime is likely to hang around, but with continued help from Russia. As of now, having propped up the Assad regime, Moscow is in a strong position among international players. And that is so because its surgical military intervention has produced results on the ground to make the Assad regime a credible — some might even say legitimate — stakeholder. However, if Russia were to stay around long to prop up the regime, that might be counter-productive because, however strong and decisive it might appear, its economic situation is quite fragile. It continues to face a comprehensive sanctions regime from the west over the situation in Ukraine, and its major source of revenue from oil and gas exports has been hit hard with falling international prices. And to carry with it the economic burden of military intervention in Syria for an extended period of time will simply make things worse. So far Putin’s popularity at home from action in Ukraine and intervention in Syria has been quite spectacular. But if the Syrian situation drags on, as it looks more likely, Russia could find itself into a quagmire. But so far it is playing its cards well and would hope that it all ends well. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au