North Korea’s recent testing of its third atomic device has created alarm among its neighbours, South Korea and Japan. And it has also brought about the condemnation of the Security Council and the demand for further tightening of already tight sanctions against the regime. Its closest friend and neighbour, China, is also unhappy and has been for quite some time but is not a great supporter of sanctions, instead favouring talks, apparently in the now moribund six-party forum (including North Korea, South Korea, Japan, US, China and Russia) that Beijing had initiated. But nothing much came out of it, though it seemed hopeful at the time. Even China, which probably is its best friend, has very little leverage with Pyongyang on this issue. Beijing might be able to bring down the regime over a period if it were to cut off its essential economic lifeline, but the resultant outcome might not be what China wants. It certainly does not want that the collapse of the regime lead to a flood of refugees pouring into China. Besides, it does not want internal instability in North Korea to upset the regional balance to favour the US and Japan, as well as South Korea. Both Japan and South Korea are US allies and extremely worried about the nuclear threat from Pyongyang. Much of the world regards North Korea as a crazy country that values its nuclear toys more than its people, many of them suffering from malnutrition and, worse, hunger. It lives in a world of its own with a strongly propagated personality cult surrounding the patriarch and founder of the communist state, Kim Il-sung, and his successors, Kim Jong-il and the present leader, Kim Jong-un. Pyongyang fears that the US and its allies are engaged in a conspiracy to destroy the country. And to ward it off, it greatly needs a strong nuclear deterrent with a missile system and warheads that can reach as far as the United States. The United States was, therefore, put on notice that it was not beyond the reach of North Korean weaponry and that it would continue to do more testing and develop technologies for that purpose. That much was clear from the official North Korean news agency statement, apparently applauding “…the nuclear test that was carried out at a high level in a safe and perfect manner using a miniaturised and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive power than previously…” The message is clear that Pyongyang has mastered the technology of small and lighter atomic weapons that can be mounted on missiles to reach far and wide targets, including the United States. There are reports that a fourth nuclear test might follow. The message that Pyongyang has acquired the capability to miniaturise its atomic device makes it a more formidable enemy. Not surprisingly, it is causing concern among its neighbours, as well as in other countries. With Pyongyang raising its nuclear bar, and its neighbours, South Korea and Japan, announcing counter-measures, the situation in the region is highly combustible. Obviously, none of the regional countries want a war, especially involving nuclear weapons, but the emerging climate of brinkmanship has the potential of a war through miscalculation and/or accident, as happened with the WW1. Take, for instance, the reported statement by the chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, pledging to preemptively strike against North Korea if it showed any intent to use a nuclear weapon “even at the risk of war.” And if that were to happen so close to China’s border, it raises the potential risk of a larger conflagration involving China and, even, the United States. At the same time, Japan is also strengthening its defence capability to meet a potential nuclear threat from North Korea. It is important to remember that all this commotion, following Pyongyang’s nuclear test, is happening in the midst of an ongoing saga of China-Japan sovereignty dispute over a group of islands in East China Sea, and another one in South China Sea between China and some South East Asian countries. Against this smouldering backdrop, China might even be more inclined to strengthen its strategic connection with North Korea, notwithstanding its opposition to Pyongyang’s nuclear obsession. Clearly, China is annoyed with Pyongyang’s dangerous behaviour and taking Beijing for granted, but China’s options seem limited. Zhang Liangui, a Chinese professor of international strategic research, reportedly said recently, “North Korea has always been an untrustworthy nation, China has given it so much aid, it really is a weird state.” This is what the US and its allies opposed to North Korea’s nuclear dream hope that one day its untrustworthiness will wear out its welcome even with China and that Beijing will cut it off from its economic and strategic shield. Which is not likely to happen as long as the dynamics of China-US strategic competition/hostility are working against any great power accommodation. In that case, sanctions against North Korea remain the only real option. But they have not worked so far and are unlikely to work without China’s involvement. That, in turn, will lead North Korea’s neighbours, Japan and South Korea particularly, to further beef up their military defences, to the point of even considering a preemptive strike. It has the potential of escalating the conflict to include China and the United States, which is alarming. In their moments of reflection, Chinese leaders must feel concerned about an essentially unstable nuclear neighbour outside their restraint or control. Indeed, in the Korean peninsula, it is Pyongyang that seems to drive China’s policy. Worse still, if pressured too much by China to abandon its nuclear weapons programme, North Korea might even turn its (nuclear) gun on China, though it is most unlikely. Hopefully, they are not as suicidal. But North Korea is determined to maintain its nuclear profile as its only leverage and deterrence against a perceived hostile world. Beijing might have to live with it, hoping that a resumption of the talks in the six-party forum might eventually create a breakthrough. That is the path it has pursued and is likely to continue advocating. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia. He can be reached at sushilpseth@yahoo.co.au