The Timor Sea is located in the North of Australia and South of East Timor, a part of which became disputed between countries when the question of ownership and control of that part arose. There are oil and gas reserves in the disputed area and use and share of those reserves was the central reason behind the dispute. Despite several previous treaties, the definite settlement of a maritime boundary always failed to achieve. The 2018 treaty aimed to permanently settle the dispute and included some technical sharing of sea resources. The Timor Sea was the epicentre of the maritime dispute between Indonesia and Australia when the former illegally annexed East Timor in 1974-75. After nearly two and half decades, East Timor was granted independence in 2002 but no kind of permanent maritime boundary was established and recognised between Australia and East Timor. At that time, both states decided to establish a temporary boundary though East Timor later contested that the temporary establishment of the maritime boundary was unilaterally taken and forced upon them. East Timor believed that Australia had a large but unfair share of access to gas and oil fields in the disputed maritime area that had massive oil and gas reservoirs estimated to be worth billions of dollars. Those temporary arrangements were contested by East Timor in 2016 at the Permanent Court of Arbitration located in The Hague. Australia and East Timor then initiated a conciliation process, which was facilitated for almost two years under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Finally, the two countries reached the agreement in 2018. Inking of the agreement effaced the bickering spawning 45 years between Australia and East Timor over maritime boundary and resources. Six features deemed to be the most prominent in the 2018 treaty. First, it defined a southern boundary in a mid of coastal features of East Timor and Australia while observing the consistency with the modern law of the sea. Second, a straight line from south of Australian Indonesian Seabed Boundary to the median line was drawn for the western lateral boundary. Third, there were several segments in the eastern lateral boundary. These segments could be extended further to the east; thereby giving Timor East more entitlements over resources. The fourth feature was perhaps the most prominent feature that could draw some lessons for states engulfed in maritime boundary disputes. A special regime “Greater Sunrise Special Regime” was created, which included some technicalities of sharing of revenue. Both states agreed to share the upstream revenue with 80 per cent in favour of Timor East and 20 per cent in favour of Australia. With some additional developments and different scenarios, this sharing ratio would be converted into 70/30 in favour of Timor. Fifth, Timor would get 100 per cent access to upstream revenue of sea resources in future. These arrangements implied that it could accommodate further maritime boundaries if Timor decided to negotiate with Indonesia. Fishermen severely suffer from long-lasting arrests and boat confiscation when they inadvertently encroach on Pak-India disputed territory It was a kind of unique conciliation process that not only yielded productive results but also boarded on several The Greater Sunrise Joint Venture partners, such as Osaka Gas, Conoco Phillips and Shell. To break the maritime boundary impasse, Timor initiated and engaged a third party. This effort resulted in a landmark maritime boundary resolution treaty. Australia not only abandoned its opposition to Timor Sea permanent maritime boundary but also agreed to be part of the new Greater Sunrise regime. Ultimately, two countries resolved their decade-long maritime dispute; made a pathway for future mutual benefits and set the example to oblige the international maritime law and governance. Pakistan and India are geographically-connected states that have the history of long-held rivalry, wars and a number of disputes, including territorial disputes. These issues include the future of Kashmir, the delimitation of the Line of Control (LOC), and the Siachen Glacier. These are all land-based issues and have, therefore, been on the forefront in the negotiations. Unfortunately, the maritime issue between India and Pakistan has always been given less focus despite enormous implications, such as impacts on the delimitation of the interstate maritime boundary, arrests and repatriation of fishermen engulfed in maritime boundary ambiguity, and the non-cooperation and arms-race at sea. Pakistan and India are facing two different maritime issues and their resolution can be viewed from the same lens as Australia and Timor East’s dispute. The maritime territorial dispute involves a 60-mile long water strip located in the Rann of Kutch, which is a centre of conflicting ownership claims. Its name is Sir Creek and is a fluctuating tidal channel or an estuary that separate the Indian province of Gujarat from Sindh province of the southern part of Pakistan. Second and the equally important maritime issue involves a fishery, which is one of the biggest sources of food. Fishermen severely suffer from long-lasting arrests and boat confiscation when they inadvertently encroach on each other’s disputed territory. Both governments can start reconciliation by boarding on the third party to reach on an amicable solution to issues of maritime territory and food resources. They can also establish a bi-lateral regime over the use of seafood and include some designs for resources distribution. Indo-Pak maritime issues involve both territory and sea resources. Both states can agree to share resources and figure out the maritime territorial rift as did Australia and Timor East by agreeing on some technical division and drawing maritime boundaries. Undoubtedly, resolutions of disputes open up new avenues for cooperation. If India and Pakistan resolve their maritime issues, they can bring forth the potential area of cooperation in their grand design of regional cooperation. Both countries are not only suffering from sea-blindness but also investing hugely in their naval armament to maintain stability in the region. Instead of tapping the sea resources for economic wellbeing, both countries are consuming their energies and resources for naval build-up. To utilise the true potential of the Indian Ocean, both countries need to shift their focus from rivalry to cooperation and divert their resources and apparatus from arms’ build-up to maritime exploration. The writer is a lawyer at Islamabad High Court and a Research Fellow at Maritime Study Forum