Book Review: The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood Author: Shuja Nawaz ISBN: 978-969-872-909-7 In her seminal book, The Blind Eye, Rabia Akhtar argues that Pakistan deftly and brilliantly maneuvered its way, and navigated US’ non-proliferation policy to get a nuclear deterrent for itself. Rabia’s research-laden work attributes Pakistan getting more than what it had bargained for to the indomitable will and focus of its leaders and officials to achieve strategic parity with India. Thus, one could argue with certitude that no civil-military fissures marred Pakistan’s excursion to acquire nuclear weapons, something that turned Pakistani interlocutors into tough negotiators. Pakistan came out of that phase as a victorious Machiavellian state primarily because it had what Clausewitz called “Schwerpunkt” or Center of Gravity(CoG).That the US also had a CoG during the last decade and war of the Cold War, is the reason why Pak-US ties flourished with both eking-out what they so endeared. However, despite the success of the Afghan and nuclear projects back in the 1980s, Washington-Islamabad ties plummeted . Bouts of friendliness alternated with those of open disregard, even when both were allies, ostensibly. Recriminations and mud-slinging supplanted rapturous receptions and laudatory references. The decade gone by was perhaps one of the worst epochs in this even-otherwise topsy-turvy relationship, making it a period that merits more scholarly disquisition and research. One of Pakistan’s strategic doyens, Shuja Nawaz has dealt with this ‘decade of decadence’ in his new masterpiece entitled “The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter US Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood”. The author, bringing his vast knowledge and experience into the mix, has traced all the moving parts that went on to complete the Pak-US puzzle in the past decade. Drawing from his insights about the Pakistan Army and contacts with that institution, Nawaz has laid bare the role it has played in shaping these all-important ties. His offerings, corroborated by interviews of those who saw it all and did it all, tell a poignant yet familiar story. The civil-military imbalance both, due to the imperiousness of the military and the ineptitude of the elected rulers, muddied the waters and disturbed the CoG. Nawaz dives deep into this very issue. Interviewing all those that were in the thick of things across the civil-military divide, Nawaz identifies one of the reasons as to why ties between the two countries nosedived precipitously. Lacking unison, Pakistan’s officialdom was unable to deal with the US as a unitary actor; the CoG was displaced from the center. Inevitably, it led to a tactical mil-to-mil relationship as adroitly explained by Nawaz. The problem of an ill-defined CoG in Washington was not lost on Nawaz. Talking to those who were in the hurly burly of Af-Pak affairs , Nawaz underscores the troubles Washington created by its short-sightedness in dealing with Afghanistan , and seeing Pakistan solely through the Afghan prism. He discusses Washington’s CoG quandary by looking at how differently the White House, the Intelligence Community, and the State Department approaches Pakistan . Nawaz rightly brings this point to the fore as it is something that has time and again disturbed the equation between the two countries. Lately, the Alice Wells-led Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs at the State Department , has seemingly used a different verbiage for Pakistan than the White House. Also, the author has succinctly looked at US’ CoG dilemma through the lens of its faulty Afghan policy that lacks a strategy and is a function of a series of tactics. Nawaz turns to his favorite subject, Pakistan Army, in the latter part of his book. As an addendum to his magnum opus, Crossed Swords, Nawaz devotes two chapters to the Pakistan Army. He lucidly maps the evolution of the Pakistan Army from one trained only to fight battles and campaigns against its behemoth neighbor to a fighting force that has won the kinetic leg of Pakistan’s long-drawn war against terrorism. He also outlines Pakistan’s threat perception from its eastern flank. These two chapters are instructive in understanding the Pakistan Army and its strategic orientation. The US has to fathom that it cannot appear to be the one that hunts with the hounds and runs with the hares. The US, hence, has to grasp Pakistan’s India-centric approach rather than term it as mere paranoia. The author, bringing his vast knowledge and experience into the mix, has traced all the moving parts that went on to complete the Pak-US puzzle in the past decade New Beginnings Nawaz’s analysis could act as a manual for officials of both countries as they look to recalibrate Pak-US ties. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan and US President Donald Trump have developed an excellent rapport with each other. Dubbed a “non-politician” by Nawaz, Imran Khan has a different view of and approach to Pak-US relations. During his successful trip to DC earlier this year, Khan in his talk at the United States Institute of Peace said: “why do I think that we will now have the very best of relationship with the US? Because we’re all on the same page. Previously the Pakistan army was supposedly fighting for the US this war on terror. But, the US did not think we were doing enough. And, in Pakistan, we thought we had gone out of our way”. Khan, in his customary and extemporaneous style, also went on to say things that were surprising for keen observers in Washington to hear from a Pakistani politician. Heaping praises on the Pakistan Army, Khan said all stakeholders are on the same page. He also emphatically rebuked aid from the US, calling it as “one of the biggest curses”. Khan’s enunciations were in stark contrast to those of his predecessors who looked up to Washington to save their skins. This is a welcome departure from the past about which Nawaz writes about in this research-rich account. The Khan-Trump parleys continue and so does cooperation on the Afghan front. The US is slated to send 15 trade delegations to Pakistan next year. All this seems good from afar. However, there are broad structural issues that may impede the growth of this on-again-off-again relationship. Both countries could learn from the dark decade that has been exceptionally explained by Nawaz. One of the lessons is for the US to not see Pakistan through the Afghan or the Indian framework for that matter. The author has listed some of the steps through which fraying ties can be repaired and improved. All those prescriptions boil down to having a CoG. It appears that PM Khan and his associates have found one ; it is about time Khan’s US counterparts find one too. Nawaz’s book amplifies the pitfalls of having no CoG in the most comprehensive manner. The CoG that leads to mutual benefits and trust, is what would make Pak-US relations watchers sanguine rather than jittery. Nawaz’s stellar tells us to show cautious optimism while treading the path that can slowly but surely lead to improved ties. In the Khan-Trump bonhomie lies hope of a start of an open relationship rather than one riddled with opacity. I am as optimistic about the future of Pak-US ties after reading this book as I was after leaving the USIP auditorium after PM Khan’s talk, earlier this year. Nawaz’s new book is a must-read piece of work for scholars and practitioners alike in a bid to understand the intricacies and nuances of the battles within Pakistan, and those of Pak-US relations. The writer is a Research Associate at the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR), University of Lahore