First, there was competitive name-calling between Kim Jong-un of North Korea and the US President Trump, raising fears that this might lead to an unintended and catastrophic nuclear exchange. But, mercifully, the world was spared this, at least for the time being, as a result of the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore. So much so that President Trump declared with a flourish that the nuclear threat from North Korea was now over, with the prospects of a follow up summit to, more or less, wrap up the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization. Trump’s mission accomplished rhetoric was clearly overblown even at the time. But there still was some relief that, at the very least, the ‘fire’ and ‘fury’ tenor of exchanges had disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared in the first place. Not only that, Kim seemed keen to let the world know that he had destroyed some of the missile testing site(s) as proof of his sincerity to eventually rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang had also not done any atomic testing for over a year. The Singapore summit had given Kim a sense of equation with the leader of the most powerful country in the world, even more so when a prospective second summit was promised. He seemed to loom large on the international stage thinking that he might have enough leverage to get the best outcome for his hermit kingdom. Concurrently, there was a sudden thaw in North Korea’s relations with South Korea, with their own summit between Kim and South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in. Indeed, Seoul was facilitating the US-North Korea dialogue. Trump even suspended the US-South Korea scheduled military exercises. There still was some relief that, at the very least, the ‘fire’ and ‘fury’ tenor of exchanges had disappeared as suddenly as they had appeared in the first place. Not only that, Kim seemed keen to let the world know that he had destroyed some of the missile testing site(s) as proof of his sincerity to eventually rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons Kim might have been heartened to think that as part of these trilateral developments, he could aim for the withdrawal of the US troops from South Korea. The regular US-South Korea military exercises and the US military presence in South Korea, including its implicit nuclear component, is and has been Pyongyang’s nightmare, fearing that this was part of the US strategy to overthrow the Kim dynasty. Pyongyang has sought security by developing nuclear weapons, aiming to be able to threaten the US with its, as it claims, long range missiles tipped with nuclear payload. And every time it is not taken all that seriously, it threatens to develop even bigger weapons and missiles. The subsequent Trump-Kim Singapore summit might have led Kim to believe that his strategy of upping the nuclear response could solve all his problems by tying denuclearization with prior conditions. In his televised New Year speech, Kim made it clear that any progress towards denuclearization must begin with lifting of international sanctions. At the same time, Pyongyang has kept insisting that all joint military exercises between the US and South Korea must stop; that US military presence, including access to nuclear capability, be withdrawn; and that a peace treaty, ending a state of war, (the Korean War technically did not with the 1953 armistice) be signed. All these demands are required to be met sequentially or in entirety before North Korea would start dismantling its nuclear capability. May be this will feature in another summit, though Trump seems to insist that Pyongyang must denuclearize before sanctions against North Korea are lifted. And Kim has warned that, “if the US doesn’t keep its promises” and continues “with sanctions and pressure…then we, too, have no choice but to seek a new path for our country’s sovereignty.” Interestingly, though, he has left vague what that new path might be by not mentioning re-starting nuclear testing etc. In other words, there is not much specific advance in US-North Korea relations, though the stopping of nuclear rattling is welcome in itself. In the midst of it all, Kim’s much-publicized recent China visit and his meeting with President Xi (unlike the earlier ones that were made known only after he had been back in Pyongyang) was significant for two reasons. First: because the visit took place even as a US trade delegation was in Beijing to sort out the ongoing trade conflict between the two countries. Was China, in anyway signaling that it might be able to lean on Kim to be more accommodating on the nuclear question during a possible second summit with Trump, as some sort of leverage on the tariff issues? It is hard to know. China, of course, has been supportive of the US position on the question of denuclearization and had even tightened economic sanctions against North Korea. But lately it seems to have eased some of the sanctions. And during Kim’s visit, Xi seemed understanding of Pyongyang’s position. He reportedly said that China supported US-North Korea summits and hoped the two sides “will meet each other halfway.” Which is what Kim is asking by linking denuclearization with lifting of sanctions and a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War. As it is, the US wants denuclearization first, and the rest later, with Trump loudly proclaiming that North Korea has great potential; suggesting that the follow up economic aid and investment will transform North Korea. Will Kim fall for it-denuclearization first and the rest later? It doesn’t look like. The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia Published in Daily Times, January 22nd 2019.