Pakistan’s gas supply comes from Sindh (50 percent), Balochistan (15 percent), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (10 percent), Punjab (2 percent), and imported Regasified Liquefied Natural Gas (RLNG) (23 percent). Balochistan’s natural gas contributes 15 percent to the country’s national gas mix, while provincial consumption is 5 percent. The geographical vastness and security problems contribute to less consumption. The remaining 10 percent of natural gas is sold to the other provinces. Balochistan has been grappling with sub-nationalist-induced violence for decades, characterized by attacks on critical infrastructure, armed forces, and the civilian population. The sub-nationalists attribute Balochistan’s militancy to multiple factors. However, this analysis critically examines their claims of unfair exploitation of natural resources by the federal government, missing persons, and low human development. The reason for dissecting these three issues is that militants manipulate and exaggerate them to muster public support and justify militancy. Understanding that a comprehensive approach is necessary to address these issues is imperative. Firstly, the sub-nationalists claim that the federal government is unduly exploiting Balochistan’s natural resources of Saindak, Reko Diq and Sui. Let’s empirically analyse these claims. The grievances of Balochistan, a critical issue, serve as a facade for geopolitical contestation, highlighting how socioeconomic challenges are exploited to justify militancy. Saindak is operated under a lease agreement between Metrological Construction Company of China (MCC) and Saindak Metals Limited (SML) of Pakistan. As per lease agreement 2022-37, the net profit is distributed as 47 percent for MCC, 37 percent for SML and 16 percent for Balochistan. Moreover, Balochistan receives 6.5 percent as royalty on sales value and 6.5 percent as corporate social responsibility on net profit. Sub-nationalists supported by foreign actors exaggerate narratives that spread through social media to manipulate public perception. Reko Diq gold and copper mine is currently 50 percent owned by Barrick Gold Corporation, 25 percent by federal enterprises, and 25 percent by Balochistan. The province is getting 25 percent profit from Reko Diq with only 15 percent provincial investment besides local employment. Pakistan’s gas supply comes from Sindh (50 percent), Balochistan (15 percent), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (10 percent), Punjab (2 percent), and imported Regasified Liquefied Natural Gas (RLNG) (23 percent). Balochistan’s natural gas contributes 15 percent to the country’s national gas mix, while provincial consumption is 5 percent. The geographical vastness and security problems contribute to less consumption. The remaining 10 percent of natural gas is sold to the other provinces. Balochistan is getting its due economic dividends from provincial natural resources. After the 18th Amendment, Balochistan fully controls all natural resources except oil and gas. Therefore, the so-called exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources by the federal government is more propaganda than reality. Secondly, the sub-nationalists claim that law enforcement agencies are allegedly involved in enforced disappearances. They claim that more than 5,000 persons are missing in Balochistan. However, it contradicts the report of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances formed in 2011. In Balochistan, 2,284 persons out of 2,752 have returned to their homes, and the whereabouts of only 468 persons are unknown as of January 2024. In some instances, militants are also registered as missing persons. Often, such missing persons are found dead in terrorist attacks. For example, Tayyab Baloch, who had reportedly gone missing in April 2024, was involved in the suicide attack on an FC camp in Bela on 26 Aug 2024. Similarly, Karim Jan attacked the Gwadar Port Authority complex on 20 March 2024. Abdul Wadood Satakzai, a missing person, attacked Mach City on 30 January 2024. Saleem Baloch was killed during the Ziarat operation in July 2022. Contrary to claims, enforced disappearances are sometimes exploited as a pretext to join militant organizations. Furthermore, the issue of missing persons is often framed as a human rights concern, potentially serving to discredit state institutions. Thirdly, Balochistan faces multifaceted health, education, and socioeconomic challenges. For this, the federal government started multiple development projects in the last two decades. Moreover, Balochistan’s share of the NFC Award 2010 has also increased from 5.11 percent to 9.09 percent. Owing to this increased funding, several educational and health facilities and road infrastructure have been built in Balochistan. However, Balochistan’s human development index (HDI) is still the lowest among all four provinces. In the past two and half decades, the HDI score has gradually increased to 0.473. Even though Balochistan’s development indicators are positively progressing, the instability and insurgency are still rooted. Terrorist incidents and deaths have also increased, especially after the development of Gwadar Port and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This contradiction implies that socioeconomic grievance cannot be regarded as the sole reason behind terrorism. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate the linkage between CPEC and increased violence post-CPEC, as this could provide valuable insights into the complex dynamics of the conflict. The success of development projects under CPEC is directly linked with peace and stability in Balochistan. Data indicates that the number of killings in post-CPEC terrorist activities has doubled. This will deprive the general Baloch population of the economic dividends of CPEC and keep the provincial resources entangled in security issues. Historically, the unrest in Balochistan was concentrated in the northern part of the province around Dera Bugti and Kohlu. However, terrorism-related incidents have declined in Dera Bugti and its surroundings post-CPEC. At the same time, such incidents have increased in Gwadar and Khuzdar. This shift in militancy from north to south, along the route of CPEC, is a clear indication of the changing dynamics of the conflict. It shows that the militants’ narrative of so-called unfair exploitation of natural resources, missing persons, and low human development does not reflect the causal factors behind militancy in Balochistan. If that were the case, militancy should have decreased with development packages and improved HDI. It means that scuttling CPEC is one of the main objectives of militancy. This instability obstructs Balochistan from fully utilizing its resources and fosters a strategic advantage for external actors like the US and India. For the US, an unstable Balochistan hinders the successful implementation of CPEC, thereby impeding Pak-China joint geoeconomic interests. Likewise, it is in India’s geopolitical interest to counterbalance Pakistan and China through supporting militants. The arrest of an Indian naval officer, Kalbushan Jadev, shows that Balochistan has become a battleground for geopolitical contestation. Thus, the unrest in Balochistan serves the strategic interests of external powers aiming to counter China/CPEC. In sum, the grievance narrative serves as a façade to cover the geopolitical contestation in Balochistan. Sub-nationalists supported by foreign actors exaggerate false narratives that spread through social media and other means to manipulate public perception. It is also essential to recognise that relatively low HDI is a significant issue that needs to be addressed. Therefore, a comprehensive and whole-of-nation approach is required to address the geopolitical problems at the strategic level and carry out socioeconomic development at the tactical/ operational level. A mix of non-kinetic and kinetic actions can bring peace to Balochistan. The writer is a policy researcher and can be reached at abdulraufiqbal@gmail.com