As Pakistan struggles with a major economic crisis and an ever-turbulent political scene, the growing threat posed by Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is yet another challenge for the stressed homeland. The latest suicidal attacks in Peshawar and Karachi were the deadliest since Afghan Taliban took over Afghanistan. The lethality and the ability of the attackers to penetrate deep inside security installations, the most secure part of Karachi and Peshawar, imply that the TTP has re-constituted a critical capability of urban terrorism, signifying the ascendant trajectory presenting a major medium- to long-term challenge for Pakistan.
The TTP serves as a crucial case study due to its hidden roots with the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and various other splinter groups of militant organizations operating in Afghanistan and the Middle East North Africa (MENA). Additionally, the TTP had aligned some of its objectives with the political goals of certain Pakistani religio-political and ethnic parties, particularly a subset of Baloch and Pashtun nationalists. In recent decades, these ethnic minorities have protested allegedly discriminative and exploitative state policies of Pakistan. They are located within the Pakistan tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and serve as a support base to TTP.
The TTP’s escalating campaign of violence is a function of its growing political and material strength. It reflects in its political cohesion, expanding cadre of trained fighters, suicide bombers, and weapons/equipment. Much of the TTP’s political leadership and capability is based in Afghanistan. However, in Pakistan, the TTP has regained some territorial influence in southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, like South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Tank, Bannu and Lakki Marwat.
The TTP has re-constituted a critical capability of urban terrorism.
In spite of the Taliban’s firm strategic calculus in favour of the TTP, Afghan leadership appears to understand the importance of maintaining a functional relationship with Pakistan or at least preventing tensions from deteriorating into a full-scale conflict. The Afghan Taliban’s posture of moving forward appears like a tug-of-war, alternating between moments of tension and de-escalation. There are other foreign fighters in Afghanistan with varied regional agendas, who will find safe havens in Pakistan should the TTP make a major territorial gain. This possibility is real yet not imminent. If it was to materialise, it will raise the spectre of eroded Pakistani security, broader regional instability, and migration concerns. The key factor shaping the Pakistani response is the country’s deteriorating economy, which is on the brink of a default limit.
All this said the TTP’s main concern remains the implementation of ‘sharia laws’ in Pakistan based on its strict interpretation of Islam. The group says that it will not lay down its arms until this goal is achieved. Thus, the likelihood of a quick peace deal between the state and the TTP remains low; Pakistan cannot afford any political settlement that comes at the cost of replacing a democratic system with strict theocratic regulations. Yet, a political settlement remains the only option for both sides given to geopolitical realities.
The current economic and political crisis in Pakistan necessitates that the ‘International players’ of GWOT need to interact with Pakistan about the essentials to focus on and develop a clear counter-TTP strategy. Besides, the Government of Pakistan should initiate a comprehensive blueprint that encompasses both military and non-military measures to effectively counter the ensuing threat. The use of military force should be limited to determined hotbeds of insurgency and operations should be coordinated with other organs of the state in order to ensure an inclusive approach against the TTP. The state should also invest in socio-economic and education initiatives in the tribal areas and support programs that promote dialogue and reconciliation among communities. But, the larger question will be how Pakistan will handle the Afghan Taliban who provides a safe haven to the TTP.
Additionally, the Government of Pakistan should strengthen its international alliances against the growing threat of religious extremism and terrorism, coordinating efforts with the United Nations, the United States, and other key international partners. Furthermore, domestic efforts should focus on improving the security apparatus and ensuring effective enforcement of the rule of law. Lastly, civil society organizations should be encouraged to contribute towards conflict resolution and peace-building in the tribal belts. For this, the Government of Pakistan should seek the support of its international allies, strengthen its security apparatus, invest in developmental initiatives, and pursue efforts that promote dialogue and reconciliation.
In conclusion, while military forces may succeed in limiting the activities of the TTP, it is not a sustainable solution. A comprehensive package of both kinetic and non-kinetic operations and measures is required to effectively counter this threat. Pakistan sorely needs a new anti-terrorism policy that restricts the state institutions from differentiating not only between “good” and “bad” Taliban but between “good” and “bad” militants. In the past, several armed groups were given concessions by the authorities hoping for such groups would help the government forces to fight the anti-Pakistan militants. Not differentiating between such groups means Pakistan will have to indiscriminately act against all those involved in violent acts and disarm them without examining their loyalties.
The writer is a retired Pakistan Army officer.