The death of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the former supreme leader of Taliban, has changed the dynamics of insurgency in Afghanistan. Before his death, the Taliban had entrenched their positions in eastern and southern provinces like Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni, Paktika, Kunar and Farah. Moreover, they had also built support over social grievances; learnt to deal with ethnicity and filled in the vacuum in the local governance system. The major tactics employed by Taliban during this period against ISAF forces included Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), targeted killings and suicide attacks for public intimidation and control. According to figures gathered by different sources in 2011, more than 2700 troops of the US and its coalition partners had died in Afghanistan in the last ten years. At least twenty-six countries had reported troop casualties during this period. Nearly fifty percent of these troops were American. Moreover, more than fourteen thousand US servicemen were also wounded in action. Since the conflict began, the number of casualties has risen every year with major spikes observed in 2009. Roadside bombs had killed at least 1143 troops in Afghanistan. Small firearms had also contributed significantly to these fatalities. The southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar had the highest causality rates per province. Most of the deaths were reported in these areas, which were along the mountainous eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. The surge of the US forces during the period could not reduce the influence of Taliban in their southern and eastern strongholds. Sealing the border was not politically feasible since its responsibility would have fallen squarely in the US. Moreover, such an exercise was time-consuming and cumbersome in the face of the Taliban momentum. The human and logistic costs of any enforcement were so exorbitant that no one could bear its burden. Taliban were a cohesive force under the leadership of Mullah Omar. Reliable evidence suggests that they learned from their mistakes and were quick to exploit the weaknesses of their adversaries. They also established a parallel administration with extensive logistics and managed an effective intelligence network. Till the confirmation of the death of Mullah Omar, Taliban kept this strategy intact. In 2015, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, a relatively moderate Taliban leader, with a penchant for peace talks and had remained the minister for civil aviation during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, was declared the new Taliban supreme commander. With this choice of leadership, the command remained in Kandahar since the new Amir also hailed from the same city. However, the succession of lineage was broken. Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob, the eldest son of Mullah Omar, could not make it to the highest level due to his tender age and a lack of support from field commanders. The Taliban leadership was transferred from Gillzais to Ishaqzais, a Pashtun subtribe in Afghanistan. Dissention in the ranks of Taliban did break out once Mullah Akhtar Mansoor had become the official supreme leader of the Taliban. The peace talks were suspended, and Taliban stepped up their operations against the government and the US forces. Since Americans were drawing down their troops level in Afghanistan, a change in insurgent tactics was also observed under the leadership of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor. According to Amnesty International, insecurity also grew with the insurgency and criminal activity worsened across the country in 2015-16. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 1592 civilians killed and 3329 injured in the first six months of 2015 while seventy percent of civilian causalities were attributed to Taliban insurgent groups and sixteen percent to pro-Afghan government forces. The Taliban attacked soft and civilian targets, and in September 2015 they took control of Kunduz province displacing nearly twenty thousand people due to the conflict. Mullah Akhtar Mansour, unlike Mullah Omar, efficiently used the brutal insurgent tactics in order to demoralise Afghan forces and speed up the withdrawal of US servicemen from Afghan soil. The internal dissension did not impede the frequency of the attacks and 2015-16 remained a difficult period for the Afghan government. In May 2016, Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was killed by the US drown attack in Pak-Iran border region. The Taliban announced Mawlawi Habit Ullah Akhundzada as the new leader. Akhundzada also comes from Kandahar and belongs to Noorzai tribe. He has remained in Afghanistan for most of his life and issued religious edicts on various matters during the Taliban rule. The tactics under Akundzada are based on a discreet selection of targets and are a more focused approach than his predecessors. A legitimate question is whether different Taliban factions are supporting Mawlawi Hibat Ullah Akhunzada on account of personality, ethnicity, ideology and financial gains? This answer will make it easier for us to predict future Afghan scenario. Among different factional leaders, the most important thing perhaps is the ethnicity and financial gains. Personality and ideology do not matter a lot, though its importance cannot be overlooked. If you take out Mullah Omar from Taliban equation and keep ethnicity and financial support intact, then minor defections on the basis of ideology and leadership will not dent the insurgency. We have the example of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, wherein when a non-Mehsud was made the leader of the organisation, internal rifts developed instantly resulting into intrinsic revolt and disaffection. In Afghan social milieu, ethnicity and tribal belongingness determine your ideology and leadership. The Americans can now think about expanding counter-terrorism operations and use of drone attacks in the country. The private contractors present in Afghanistan can be tasked to alienate different Taliban commanders for financial benefits and autonomy of operation in their areas of jurisdiction. These tactics can make unprecedented fissures among different Taliban groups leading to actionable information for surgical operations against Taliban diehard field operators. Had the leadership of Taliban gone to a non-Kandhari commander, the insurgency could have been defeated easily. Another important question is related to the Haqqanis who run their own network but are affiliated with current Taliban command on multiple grounds. In the past, Haqqanis did not allow operations of other insurgent groups against the US in their area, including Hizb-e-Islami fighters. The recently signed peace accord of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hizb e Islami, with Afghan government has many connotations for the war theatre in Afghanistan. The former has already announced to support IS against Taliban in 2015. The accord will make anti-Taliban coalition strong to put extra pressure on Taliban insurgent fighters for a settlement with pro-Afghan forces. Pakistan has to foresee the situation with circumspection and concern. The facilitation process should be started tactfully keeping all options open. Moreover, the intelligence barbs from foreign agencies need to be dealt with intelligently so that future political resettlement may not cause any encumbrance to security structure in Pakistan. The writer is the Senior Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Lahore