In a rare exclusive 1979 interview to me, Air Marshal Nur Khan analysed the two wars clinically without reservations. The interview was in response to a questionnaire I submitted as the editor/publisher of the first generation monthly, Defence Journal (1975-1997). An intrepid fighter pilot and a soldier, Nur Khan commanded his young air force, the PAF, with remarkable tactical expertise and personal courage to pull the teeth out of the much bigger Indian force. His boys excelled from the enemy in both exemplary courage and professional excellence; one young fighter pilot squadron leader, Butch Ahmed from East Pakistan, plunged his F-85 into an enemy ammunition train to make a weird bonfire of it. One of Nur Khan’s consistent problems, all along, had been that in response to desperate calls, from the army for close support, he could not use his aircraft aggressively for deep penetration into the enemy air space to destroy his aircraft at their bases. Excerpts: Question: As C-in-C PAF, you had been connected intimately with the conduct of the 1965 war at the highest level. Do you feel satisfied with the overall strategic conduct of the war now with the benefit of the hindsight and the sense of detachment produced through years? Answer: The thing to remember about the ‘65 war is that it was never planned. I assumed command of the PAF on July 23, 1965, nearly two weeks before the Ops Gibraltar was launched. Until that time, the Air HQ was totally unaware that such a thing as the Ops Gibraltar was being planned. One of my senior officers who had been on a visit to the GHQ, on the 21st or 22nd of July on his return informed us that he had heard reports to the effect that some large-scale operation in J&K were being planned by the army. The general reaction of my principal staff officers was one of disbelief. I was myself perturbed and flew over to Rawalpindi that very day to see General Musa. General Musa confirmed the story. He said the Ops Gibraltar was planned to be launched on August 6, and that the details of this would be available with General Akhtar Malik at his divisional headquarters up in Murree. My immediate reaction was that such an operation would mean war with India. However, as General Musa did not look to be terribly alarmed, I decided to go and see General Malik at his HQ. In spite of bad weather, I flew over to Murree by helicopter the same day. Akhtar Malik briefed me on his plans and I informed him that this would mean war with India. I pointed out that even if the infiltration of some 8,000 men succeeded initially, how were they going to be maintained — fed, clothed and supplied with arms and ammunition? Malik did not think it would be a problem. My own assessment and prediction was that within just a few days, the troops dispatched across would be crying for supply drops and the only aircraft that cold do the job was the transports C-130. However, once we did that, all pretence to a local conflict would end, and Indians would have every right to attack the bases from where the aircraft operated. I returned to my HQ the same day extremely alarmed, and immediately, I started the process of putting the PAF on a full wartime alert. This process was completed by the end of August. One of the first things was to get the C-130s transport squadron to start practising night drops in simulated war conditions as well as to ensure their 100 percent serviceability. The exercise was rewarded as about the August 15, there were desperate calls from the troops across the CFL for supplies and ammunition. However, at this state, I conveyed right up to the level of the Field Marshal himself that the operation besides being hazardous would be virtually impossible to conceal. Drops could fall away from the target areas into the enemy hands. Furthermore, there could be an accident. As a result, airdrops were deferred. But by the August 23, the situation became truly desperate, and we decided to take the risk. This was the first and, perhaps, the most hazardous PAF operation throughout the war. Assessment of the operational staff was that the mission was not practical due to extremely inhospitable terrain and tricky weather conditions up north. I, however, did decide to make an attempt and accompany the first sortie to give confidence to my flying crews. The operation was launched on the morning of August 23. Two sorties were planned, one for Minimarg north of Srinagar and the other for Rajori in Jammu. Because of the clouds over the target areas, the mission to Rajori was aborted. I was on board the Minimarg-bound aircraft and despite the bad weather, it went through in the second attempt. The first had to be aborted. Supplies were dropped in the target area much to the relief of the troops on the ground. The performance of our aircrews was exceptional and extraordinary on that day, and set the pace of PAF operations for the rest of the war. I have spoken at some length about the Ops Gibraltar to indicate how limited the thinking behind the operation had been, and about the total lack of realisation that we were heading for a war with India. The main thing to remember about the 1965 war, therefore, was that there had been no discussion of operational plans or any coordinated thinking of war with India at any level — governments’ or joint chiefs’. Government continued functioning as the normal, peacetime government right up to the India invasion. PAF was brought to the operational readiness for war on its own initiative with no orders from government. Therefore, to say that there had been any overall strategic conduct of war would hardly make sense. (To be continued) The writer is a retired brigadier and can be reached at brigsiddiqi@yahoo.co.uk