Police reform debate in Pakistan is back on centre stage after the repeat of a familiar pattern; reported instances of police power misuse; citizen outcry followed by confused government response. What is not being realised by different stakeholders is the fact that this is something rooted in the unfinished police reform agenda. This needs to be seen as a direct outcome of failure in setting up a robust external oversight system after the promulgation of Police Order, 2002. Police Order 2002 was a comprehensive piece of legislation in terms of re-organising police as a modern, twentieth-century law enforcement entity. For the first time, the notions of functional specialisation, separation of watch and ward and investigation, uniformity in the chain of command and insulation from external interference were all introduced as welcome deviations from the archaic model of policing. But there were other developments which accompanied the introduction of Police Order, 2002 as part of broader governance reform agenda introduced in the early 2000s. The demise of executive magistracy was seen as a success of sort by police but it actually removed even notional oversight of police through the district administration. This was notwithstanding the fact that following Law Reforms Bill, 1996, a diluted variant of executive magistracy was allowed to function in Pakistan till 2001. Interestingly executive magistracy was abolished in 2001 but at the same time, Police Order 2002 introduced the novel idea of Criminal Justice Coordination Committee, where the district judiciary and executive arms of government (police, Prosecution, and Parole) were made to sit around one table. Blurring the boundary between district judiciary and executive through DCJCC did little to compensate for the absence of a functional external oversight system over the police. Introduction of local governance reforms through LGO 2001 saw creation of offices of District Governments. LGO 2001 made elected district mayor the direct head of over a dozen provincial government departments including the DCO. Very strangely, the police were kept totally insulated from the elected local government oversight including through elected Nazim. What it implied was near complete operational autonomy for police but without any democratic oversight. Blame for the non-existence of these oversight bodies lies equally on provincial governments and police leadership itself If this was driven by the desire to politically insulate police from “bad political interference” why were more vital human development departments including health and education made directly subordinate to the elected local governments? If political interference was bad for all-powerful District Police Officer how the more vulnerable district and tehsil officers were expected to withstand the “purported ravages” of the elected local government leadership. In terms of accountability, Police Order 2002 envisaged, three distinct institutions, including the Public Safety Commission, Police Complaint Authority and Citizen Police Liaison Committee. Seventeen years after the introduction of Police Order, 2002, there is not the remotest evidence of the existence of these crucial oversights and grievance redressal institutions anywhere in Pakistan. Blame for the non-existence of these oversight bodies lies equally on provincial governments and police leadership itself. It is sad that the police, which fiercely lobbied for putting to operation Police Order 2002, has remained institutionally indifferent when it came to operationalising external oversight provisions of the Act. This is where common citizens of Pakistan have so much to worry about. Police are happy with achieving unimaginable levels of operational autonomy but are averse to any external oversight. Civil bureaucracy, on the other hand, can be seen making repeated efforts to bring back their days of glory from the executive magistracy, be it Civil Administration Ordinance or Justices of Peace debate. But nobody seems bothered about virtual non-existence of any external and neutral safeguards for citizenry against power misuse by police functionaries. Why this issue of external oversight over the enforcement arm of the government must always degenerate in a turf fight between PSP and PAS? There can be no justification for failing to come up with a system of checks and balances for curbing misuse of authority. Many countries have already established such institutions including United Kingdom (Independent Police Complaints Commission); Europe (European Code of Police Ethics 2001) and Australia (Police Integrity Commission) can be cited. A repeat of heinous instances of power misuse must be alarming for government and police alike. Tireless efforts of many hardworking and diligent police officers go to backburner as traumatic and tragic events of excesses are flashed on media from time to time. Why the government and entire police force should earn a bad name for such acts of misuse of power? It is therefore essential for Government to simultaneously secure “operational autonomy” for police alongside establishing “robust external oversight systems” to curb misuse of Policing powers. Government needs to not succumb to pressure tactics of various vested interests on who should exercise these powers. On the last point, the government may like to know that National Public Safety Commission in Japan presently comprises of an elected politician, a lawyer, an economist – and surprisingly, an office-bearer of National Somo Association. The writer is a retired officer of Pakistan Administrative Service