Afghanistan occupies a central place in Pak-US relations. It became the basis for strained bilateral ties in 2018, when Washington blamed Islamabad for going soft on cross-border terror groups. Today, growing tensions in the region have compelled both parties to come together in search for a common-ground. Taliban’s pursuit for greater political control has pushed the nation towards the brink of uncertainty, complicated U.S. military withdrawal, and heightened fears of another neighborhood conflict with disastrous consequences for Pakistan. The on-going peace talks between the U.S. and Afghan Taliban made some headway earlier this month. An eight-point joint resolution, named the roadmap to peace, confirmed both parties’ commitment towards institutionalizing Afghanistan’s Islamic system, encouraging cohesive peace, and inviting zero-interference from regional powers. But the absence of direct intergovernmental cooperation between Washington and Islamabad has complicated prospects of reaching a September “peace deal”, and evoked periodic skepticism from Kabul. In March, the Trump administration’ was accused of conspiring against the Ashraf Ghani leadership, and the Pakistani premier blamed for wilful interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. In order to limit future objection, and ensure that the intent of both powers is aligned with the expectations of Kabul, Imran Khan’s meeting with Donald Trump is of great strategic value. The encounter also reiterates the gravity of “respecting Afghan sovereignty” -a core value to which the Afghan government and the Taliban, both agree. In fact, it offers a potential basis for future convergence. What Islamabad struggles to recognize, is that any prospects of economic beneficence from the U.S. would be contingent upon satisfactory progress on the Afghan front Interestingly, agreement on a “political solution” to the Afghan crisis between Khan and Trump has paved the way for a crucial variable: Pakistan’s willingness to talk to the Taliban, and vice-versa. Islamabad’s intent comes in wake of Washington’s desire to achieve trust surplus with the Taliban – a move construed warmly by Taliban officials last week. The group’s tendency to steer towards stakeholders other than the U.S. – in a bid to welcome facilitation – gives Pakistan important space to exercise its diplomatic leverage over the Taliban, and underline the merits of a ceasefire. Initial success of facilitation efforts became evident in Pakistan’s release of Mullah Baradar last year, to assist the Doha talks. Given Islamabad’s decade-long familiarity with Taliban’s modus operandi, Washington may find itself in a slightly better position to chalk-out counter-terrorism assurances, troop withdrawals, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire. However, the key challenge for both Pakistan and United States is the degree to which this relationship can sustain its newfound revival. Some key policy differences appear evident. Firstly, the United States wants to withdraw its troops and end possibilities of a full-scale civil war, primarily to deter Afghanistan from being used as a base for future militancy. Yet, a permanent ceasefire does not necessarily mean that the Taliban would limit their pursuit for greater political control. After all, Taliban’s coexistence with the Afghan government – a key prerequisite to post-withdrawal peace – has been a red line on their end, while its ambitions of consolidating power, remain pronounced. This could directly compound Pakistan’s mirage of having a safe and secure neighborhood, in the aftermath of U.S. military withdrawal. Similarly, Khan’s three-day visit was based on expectations of a long-term engagement with the U.S. (from peace-talks, regional security to trade, defense, energy), instead of the latter’s immediate security objectives. What Islamabad struggles to recognize, is that any prospects of economic beneficence from the U.S. would be contingent upon satisfactory progress on the Afghan front. Should Pakistan succeed in getting the Taliban to talk directly with the Afghan government, promising ties seem likely. But the moment a U.S. military withdrawal begins to materialize, it may be difficult to determine what value Washington sees in bolstering cooperation with Pakistan. In light of these dynamics, the establishment of “post-withdrawal peace” in Afghanistan is far from concrete. Integral to the effort, however, is the degree of strategic common-ground achieved between Washington and Islamabad, while maintaining zero-interference in Kabul’s national reconciliation process. Whether their proposals would be acceptable to the Afghan government and the Taliban, is a crucial determiner. Especially, when both these parties appear on opposite ends of the diplomatic aisle. The writer is a political commentator for The Diplomat Magazine and LSE South Asia Centre