The ongoing war being fought by our soldiers, policemen and military officers on the jagged stony wastes of Balochistan and the hills of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)is the longest in this country’s history. Beginning in 2002 with a simmer in the Waziristan region, these low intensity conflicts have entrenched themselves into our country. The ideological moorings for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — the most deadly insurgent group our country faces — were provided by the post 9/11 US attacks in Afghanistan as the Pakistan Army entered the Tirah Valley in 2002 to counter the influx of Al Qaeda and Taliban militants fleeing US led operations in Afghanistan. The Army’s incursion into the tribal areas was considered a hostile act by the refractory renegades, who soon galvanised the local tribes into an armed resistance, exploiting tribal and religious sentiments. By 2004, these renegades had garnered local support to establish a strong presence in FATA, edging out the leadership of tribal elders called Maliks. By 2004 — when the militants had grown strong enough in North and South Waziristan — some 200 Maliks lay dead and the bureaucracy went into a rigor mortis. The power and administrative vacuum was filled by Army and the militants when the two held peace parleys to end the strife. The famous Nek Muhammad-Lt General Safdar entente cordiale however did not last long as the inherent contradictions in two power centres played out in the destabilising presence of US drones and military operations across border. The Pakistan Army’s counter insurgency campaign was construed as a betrayal by the Taliban, as well as the renegade groups who took up arms against it. Soon a deadly mélange of crime, irredentism, and extremism raised its head, establishing a state within a state in FATA. American missile attacks in FATA which resulted in civilian casualties, especially the Bajaur Madrassah attack on October 2006, catalysed a loose agglomeration of militants into a cohesive resistance front. By the end of 2007, some thirteen militant organisations coalesced to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban under Baitullah Mehsud, in open defiance of Pakistan Army’s presence in FATA. The Afghan Taliban’s leadership initially tried to wean TTP away from a full-fledged insurgency against Pakistan by bringing together three main commanders; Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulvi Nazir, and Baitullah Mehsud in an alliance called the Shura-ul-Ittahad-ul-Musalemeen in 2009. The initiative soon petered out as the alliance fell apart due to internal differences between the militant groups. A series of operations were conducted by the Pakistan Army to quell the FATA insurgency and reclaim the tribal areas. The first major operation was ‘Operation Al Mizan’ which was conducted from 2002 to 2006, entailing major troop deployment in low intensity fighting. This alone accounted for around 1500 casualties. However, the gains were partial, with militants still ensconced in their bases inside FATA. American missile attacks in FATA which resulted in civilian casualties, especially the Bajaur Madrassah attack on October 2006, pushed a loose agglomeration of militants into a cohesive resistance front. By the end of 2007, some thirteen militant organisations coalesced to form the Tehrik-e-Taliban After some negotiated ceasefires made to convince the militants to lay down their arms fell through, another operation called ‘Rah-e-Haq’ was launched in Swat in 2008. By then, the TTP that had become even more lethal after the infamous Lal Masjid operation in 2007. Ithad extended its operations to Swat, threatening the Karakoram Highway and other settled districts of KP. The militants lost over 600 men while the security forces incurred around 36 casualties. The continual struggle between the militants and the security forces resulted in four more operations. These were called Operation Sherdil in Bajaur and Operation Sirat-ul-Mustaqeem in Khyber Agency, both in 2008; Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat and Operation Rah-e-Nijaat in South Waziristan, both in 2009. By 2012, Swat was cleansed of the militants’ presence and other than sporadic forays from across the border and occasional terror attacks, their strength had been effectively sapped. The last bastion of the militants’ presence was now North Waziristan, where a deadly cocktail of the TTP, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) held sway. Fearing blowback and discouraged by the civilian government’s lack of enthusiasm for the undertaking, then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Kayani delayed the operation in North Waziristan. The militants used this opportunity to expand their reach to the rest of the country. Attacks like the Karachi Airport Attack of 2013 convinced the Army leadership that a decisive push was needed against militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan. However, the civilian government continued to dither, conducting ‘parleys’ with the militants, which acted as obstacles in the military’s way. Eventually, the military was able to convince the civilian government to launch Operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014.The militants were driven away from their sanctuaries at the cost of 490 martyrs. There were over 3500 militant casualties. This was the watershed event in Pakistan’s long war against the insurgency that commenced in 2002. Unfortunately it did cause the civilian population to become displaced and many of their homes were destroyed. But even though the price payed was huge, the Pakistan army managed to break the back of terrorism in Pakistan. Clearance and holding were done at the cost of precious blood but progress in the rebuilding phase was slow due to a lack of civilian capacity to regain administrative control. In the absence of civilian governance structures, the war ravaged FATA region suffered numerous development delays. The void was partially filled through the efforts of Army construction arms like the FWO and other Engineer formations. The reconstruction and rehabilitation led by the Army needs to be supplanted by a potent civilian led rebuilding and rehabilitation effort. The political reforms for FATA integration in national mainstream also remain painfully slow despite the visible protestations of the local population. Appeasement of the government’s political allies like Mahmood Khan Achakzai and Fazal-ur-Rehman has kept the much needed FATA reforms unimplemented. According to a report titled “Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the ‘War on Terror” by the Nobel Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Pakistan security forces had suffered 5498 casualties from 2002 to 2013 compared to the 26,862 casualties suffered by militants. Long wars are bad for morale and no army should remain engaged in such a conflict for too long. Political resolve, governance efficacy, and the development spending in the war ravaged regions are essential to wrest away the deprivation narrative from the militants. We owe this to our Martyrs and their valiant relatives who have borne the scars of war stoically. Like the young soldier hero of the Stephen Crane’s classic “The Red Badge of Courage”, our heroes on the frontlines have endured for far too long with the red badges of courage on their blood soaked bodies. The writer is a PhD scholar at NUST; email rwjanj@hotmail.com Published in Daily Times, May 8th 2018.