Prime Minister Sharif’s contentious removal suggests that the one-sided tussle between ‘powerful’ generals and ‘weak’ politicians continues in Pakistan. Historically, the military’s top brass has been the source of all power, castrating the civilian leadership and making parliament ineffective. Failure to secure the subordination of the military elite to political authority has impeded the advancement of democratic institutions in the country. Consequently, Pakistan hasn’t progressed from a quintessentially praetorian state; its military sees itself on a mission to guide an unruly civilian population along the path of order, security, and development. On August 14, 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah sent a clear message to the armed forces of Pakistan: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people and you do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.” However, just a decade after Jinnah’s passing, Ayub Khan — the first self-appointed military saviour described politicians as inefficient and untrustworthy. Ayub said that the nation’s need for stability justified his takeover and the necessity for the army to play a central role. Since then, Pakistan’s generals, predominantly from Northern Punjab, have always considered themselves the guarantors of the fundamental and permanent interests of the state. They point to the superior organization, training, and leadership of military forces compared to the feeble political community. Ironically, the prestigious Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) hasn’t produced any Rommel or Guderian but more than its share of politically ambitious generals and military bureaucrats. Furthermore, half-baked political ideas like basic democracy, Islamisation and enlightened moderation concocted and imposed by past dictator Generals Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf have harmed the country’s fragile polity. Throughout Pakistan’s short history, the military’s interference in purely political matters has left an unfortunate legacy. Backed by a powerful intelligence apparatus and an effective public relations machine, the military elite has convinced a confused populace that only they can protect the larger national interest by rising above the bickering and narrow self-interest of civilian politicians The US experience is instructive for countries struggling with skewed civil-military relations. After the Union defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, President Abraham Lincoln decided to appoint the politically ambitious General ‘Fighting’ Joe Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac — the Union’s leading army. Desperate for victory, Lincoln wrote Hooker one of the most amazing letters in American civilian-military relations. Lincoln said in part, “I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a Dictator. Of course, it was not for this but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals, who gain successes, can set up dictatorships. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.” Hooker led the Army of the Potomac to defeat in the Battle of Chancellorsville, and he resigned the position just before the Battle of Gettysburg. In contrast, despite repeated military failures from Khem Karan to Kargil, Pakistan’s generals have never resigned or been held accountable. In reality, military defeats have not diminished the power and authority of the professional military over civilian authority. In the present day, Pakistan’s generals are well accustomed to power; they now possess the methods of intervention and influence that doesn’t require resorting to a coup or direct rule of the military establishment. Backed by a powerful intelligence apparatus and an effective public relations machine, the military elite has convinced a confused populace that only they can protect the larger national interest by rising above the bickering and narrow self-interest of civilian politicians. The civilian leadership too, has grown used to getting the proverbial kick up the backside from these guardians of national security. Politicians increase the military’s unwarranted influence in matters of the state, by wanting to ride the military’s fatigues to power through extra-parliamentary means whenever possible. By pursuing this self-defeating strategy, politicians act like carnivorous birds feeding on the carcass of democracy, while the military retains its illusionary aura of superiority. Nonetheless, the different variants of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ military authoritarianism, with its narrow focus on territorial integrity and national security practiced in Pakistan has failed to create a community of people defined as a nation or bring about social change. In fact, Pakistan periodically seeks reassurances from the international community that it supports the country’s territorial integrity and opposes ethnic groups that are a threat to the state. Overall, the primary obstacles to effective nation-building remain. Firstly — the military elite’s interference in ensuring the primacy of the sovereign will of the people, and secondly — the focus on holding elections while neglecting the political and participatory aspects of democracy. These barriers have hampered the broader political, cultural and institutional transformation required in the hard slog of democratisation. Indeed, democracy is set to fail, operating as it does under the shadow of the ambitious military elite and overburdened with obligations that it cannot fulfil. In spite of significant challenges, democratic reformers in Pakistan must unite in ridding the political system of military influence to ensure a better future for the country. The writer can be reached at shgcci@gmail.com Published in Daily Times, March 17th 2018.