Balochistan has been in limelight for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, the province has experienced five insurgencies and consequent paramilitary operations and, on the other, it has lately received extraordinary official attention in context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Though the province faces multifaceted problems such as illiteracy, poverty, and lack of infrastructure, its central issue is related to federalism. The problem of provincilisation had started at the very inception of Pakistani state. The founding fathers of the country had implemented a federalisation project ensconced in what renowned Pakistani political scientist Mohammad Waseem termed “migratory state”. Resultantly, the interests of units, especially of East Bengal and Balochistan, got compromised. Rather than resolving the matters politically and financially, the state, for the most part, relied on military means to maintain orderly rule. This strategy did not work well. There was partition of Pakistan in December 1971 and Baloch nationalists are still demanding their due rights. The problem persists even in the 21st century, when most nation-states are expanding their socio-economic outreach to previously neglected areas and marginalised communities. The question of Balochistan has lingered on due to divergence in interests of a variety of stakeholders such as local politicians, provincial civil bureaucracy, the military, local Jirga, and the federal government based in Islamabad. Each of these actors has its own understating of opportunities and challenges faced by Balochistan. Though local political parties are mainly nationalist in orientation but they diverge over their approach to resource distribution. However, these parties share a commonality of approach insofar as they stand for political solutions to the Baloch problem. On the contrary, the local and federal bureaucracy views the issue from colonial-era prism that is disconnected from local realities. How sad and ironic is the fact that Gwadar port is projected as the flagship project of CPEC and yet the city lacks basic facilities like sanitation, roads, railways, healthcare and education. With respect to governance, the paramilitary apparatuses believe in use of hard, rather than soft, power to prevent disorder, without realising political implications of such a policy. The fallout of Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing during the Musharraf regime is a case in point. Nawab Bugti was essentially a politician, and he had worked with the state of Pakistan in various capacities. He had disagreements with the federal government over the mechanism for resource distribution. These disagreements could have been negotiated had wisdom prevailed at the side of Pervez Musharraf. Nawab Bugti’s death ignited not only a fresh wave of ultranationalist politics and, in cases, anti-state activism but it also provided those involved in this activism with another instance to question and doubt the motives of anyone who may have a connection with Punjab. This makes me cite cases of scores of my students from Balochistan, most of them Pashtun, who have become so disappointed with the state of affairs in the province that they hardly agree with any opinion or policy emanating from Punjab. Local politics and justice regime (Jirga) further add to the problems of the province, especially for the down trodden who have little or no access to local/provincial parliamentarians and bureaucracy. It is, therefore, argued that the problem of Balochistan cannot be resolved until there is convergence of interests among (local) politicians, civil bureaucracy, judiciary and military. All these actors seriously need to rethink their approach to the issue in the larger context of Balochistan and Pakistan. In this respect, the federal and provincial governments are suggested to implement the Aghaz Haquq-e-Balochistan meaningfully. Similarly, the six-points put forth by Akhtar Mengal may also provide a roadmap to normalise the situation in the province. Moreover, it is the primary responsibility of local stake holders to get united for a larger provincial cause and urge the centre to do the needful. Last but not the least, all actors involved in the matter need to realise that divergent approaches to politics and policy making shall further destabilise not only Balochistan but also Pakistan and the South Asian region. The insurgents should understand the fact that their hard power is limited vis-à-vis the state. The latter is a powerful force with legitimate means of violence. However, the state especially the military ought to use these means only as a measure of last resort. The local and federal bureaucracy must respect the terms of 18th amendment and, in this respect, the local political elite must shun partisan agenda and work for building consensus rather than continuing confrontation. At the end of the day, the challenges Balochistan is facing can durably be solved through political bargaining by granting maximum provincial autonomy to the province in accordance with the 1973 Constitution. Any deviance will only delay our march towards a prosperous and progressive Balochistan and Pakistan. The writer is Head, Department of Social Sciences, Iqra University, Islamabad. He is DAAD, FDDI and Fulbright Fellow. He tweets @ejazbhatty