In an era defined by geopolitical flux, with traditional alliances fraying and new power blocs emerging, the relationship between Pakistan and Türkiye stands as a beacon of resilience and ambition. Since 2010, the two nations – bound by historical camaraderie, shared heritage and a mutual yearning for regional influence – have transformed their ties into a dynamic partnership spanning military, economic, trade and diplomatic domains. What began as a bond forged in the crucible of post-colonial solidarity has the potential to blossom into a strategic partnership poised to reshape the dynamics of the region.
The military aspect of Pakistan – Türkiye relations has emerged as a cornerstone of their partnership, driven by a confluence of security concerns and technological ambitions. Pakistan has gradually turned to Türkiye as a vital supplier of advanced military equipment, driven by Türkiye’s emergence as a defence manufacturing powerhouse. Acquisitions include the $1.5 billion deal for 4 Babur Anti Submarine Warfare corvettes, significantly enhancing Pakistan’s naval capabilities. Two of the corvettes will be built in Istanbul, and the other 2 in Karachi, reflecting a co-production model that encourages technological exchange. Between 2016 and 2021, Türkiye’s STM modernized Pakistan’s AGOSTA 90B submarines, upgrading them with advanced sonar systems and weaponry. Pakistani F-16s have also been upgraded by Turkish Aerospace Industries, an additional sign of deepening technical collaboration
Beyond naval assets, Türkiye has acquired Pakistan’s Super Mushshak aircraft, while Pakistan has purchased Turkish drones, including the Akinci, Anka, and TB-2 models. Turkey’s rise as a formidable force in the global arms trade, particularly in the production of UAVs, has found a receptive partner in Pakistan. However, a $1.5 billion deal for the T129B ATAK helicopters faltered due to American reluctance on engine exports. Despite this setback, Pakistan remains interested in Türkiye’s defence platforms, such as the upcoming fifth-generation TFX Stealth Fighter.
This military partnership has the potential for further expansion. Confronted with insurgencies along its western border, Pakistan urgently needs armoured transport and mine-resistant vehicles to counter the improvised explosive devices planted by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Baloch Liberation Army. Options such as the Cobra II and Kirpi armoured vehicles, manufactured by Otokar and BMC, are on the table. Türkiye’s advanced satellite reconnaissance capabilities, developed through programs like Göktürk, could significantly enhance Pakistan’s surveillance capabilities in sensitive border areas. Other potential platforms that could be of interest to Pakistan include the T929 Attack Helicopter, the T625 Utility Helicopter, Anka III Stealth Drones, and the TF2000 Air Defence Destroyer. Moreover, both countries may collaborate on developing Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft, air-to-air missiles and armoured vehicles. Joint programs would lower development costs, enhance cooperation and help in developing indigenous industries.
Pakistan and Türkiye can become architects of a new regional strategic order.
Türkiye has expressed its willingness to embrace Pakistan as a strategic military partner, and these prospective purchases highlight Pakistan’s yearning to diversify its defence sources beyond historic suppliers like China and the US, with Türkiye emerging as a promising alternative. The potential for a robust military – technological defence partnership is substantial. Pakistan could contribute to Türkiye’s KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program, leveraging its experience with the JF-17 fighter. The two nations could also explore joint development of long – range cruise missiles, although Pakistan’s entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime – a prerequisite for such cooperation – requires approval of other members, which may be challenging given the current diplomatic climate. As a NATO member, Türkiye’s access to Western technology positions it as a critical partner for Pakistan, offering an alternative to the historically dominant roles played by the US and France, assuming Ankara maintains favourable relations with the West.
Intelligence cooperation has played a pivotal role in strengthening this partnership. Since the 2004 FACTOR treaty, Pakistan and Türkiye have shared expertise in countering terrorism, a priority that has only intensified with the rise of ISIS-K and instability in Afghanistan. The High-Level Military Dialogue Group, formalized in 2003, facilitates regular exchanges, while a 2025 MoU established a Joint Standing Committee on security and intelligence, institutionalizing collaboration. Pakistan and Türkiye can build upon this by enhancing military exchange programs, with more officers and NCOs being trained at each other’s military academies.
Joint military exercises, such as the ATATURK series, and Crescent and Star 2022 have focus on enhancing interoperability. In February 2025, the Ataturk XIII exercise, hosted by Pakistan’s Special Operations School in Cherat, involved Pakistan’s Special Services Group and Turkish Special Forces personnel. These joint exercises have become vital in honing the operational capabilities of both nations, leveraging their extensive experience in counterterrorism operations and regional instability. Training exercises also include large-scale air force exercises such as Exercise Indus Shield, hosted by Pakistan in 2024 at PAF Base Mushaf, Sargodha. This aerial warfare exercise, which involved 14 countries including Türkiye, aimed to improve multi-domain capabilities and strengthen international defence ties. Both Pakistan and Türkiye participate in various military exercises globally, enhancing their combined capabilities and amplifying their geopolitical influence. Both countries face insurgencies along their borders and could benefit from sharing military expertise on counter-insurgency operations. For instance, Pakistani military officials could offer insights into counter-insurgency strategies in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, while their Turkish counterparts could share lessons from operations in Syria. Both countries could also consider sending observers to gain expertise from each other’s operations, enhancing their operational effectiveness.
It is imperative that both countries not relegate their endeavours to the military domain. There is much potential for this relationship to foster beneficial economic ties. Pakistan and Türkiye have laid the groundwork for an economic partnership with transformative potential, though its full realization remains elusive. Bilateral trade peaked at $1.2 billion in 2022 before dipping to $1 billion in 2023 amid global economic headwinds. Turkey holds a 0.5% share in Pakistan’s imports and a 1.2% share in Pakistan’s exports. The 2023 Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) and the Strategic Economic Framework (SEF) aim to catapult this figure to $5 billion annually, a goal reiterated during the 7th HLSCC meeting in Islamabad in February 2025. Yet, overlapping export profiles – textiles dominate Pakistan’s $457 million exports to Türkiye, while Türkiye’s $700 million exports to Pakistan span machinery and chemicals, pose a structural challenge. While an FTA could boost trade, hasty adoption without consulting the business community risks undermining nascent industries, a lesson drawn from Pakistan’s trade imbalances with other countries. Diversifying exports-Pakistan’s rice and leather paired with Türkiye’s machinery and chemicals-and establishing a Karachi-Istanbul cargo line could unlock a balanced economic axis.
Turkish investments in Pakistan, totalling $2.7 billion since 2010, have catalysed growth in key sectors. Zorlu Energy’s renewable power projects, initiated in 2011, and Arçelik’s $258 million acquisition of Dawlance in 2016 exemplify this commitment. Infrastructure firms like Bayinder, Enka, and Tekser have spearheaded highway and canal projects, while Lahore’s waste management has been outsourced to Turkish companies since 2012. The proposed Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Pakistan, backed by Turkish contractors and financed through Türk Eximbank and the AIIB, promises to deepen industrial ties. Plans for a Turkish bank branch in Pakistan, announced in 2024, further signal economic intent. In terms of infrastructure linkage, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor might offer a strategic linchpin. Türkiye’s interest in linking CPEC to its Middle Corridor Initiative-a trade route bridging Asia and Europe-could position Pakistan as a pivotal junction, enhancing bilateral trade and attracting Turkish FDI in corporate farming and machinery.
Diplomatically, Pakistan and Türkiye have forged a formidable partnership, aligning on regional and global issues with remarkable coherence. Türkiye’s unwavering support for Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir, exemplified by critiques of India’s 2019 Article 370 revocation during President Erdogan’s 2020 address to Pakistan’s parliament, mirrors Pakistan’s backing of Türkiye on Cyprus and Azerbaijan. Trilateral summits with Afghanistan (2007-2012) and Azerbaijan (2021 onward) reflect a broader vision for regional stability.
The 2025 HLSCC meeting, where 24 agreements were signed, marks a diplomatic zenith. Erdo?an’s 11 visits to Pakistan, more than to most allies, underscore his personal investment, paralleled by Pakistani leaders’ frequent trips to Ankara. Likewise, Pakistan has demonstrated commitment to deepening its partnership with Turkey, regardless of which government controls Islamabad.
The trajectory of Pakistan-Türkiye relations suggests a partnership poised for exponential growth. Militarily, joint ventures in drones, missiles, and satellites could cement a technological alliance, contingent on navigating Western sensitivities. Economically, achieving the $5 billion trade target hinges on infrastructure investment and trade diversification, with CPEC as a potential catalyst. Diplomatically, their unified voice could anchor an Economic Union spanning South Asia to Central Asia, rivalling the ECO’s scope. Yet, challenges linger: logistical gaps, trade imbalances, and Pakistan’s need to balance Saudi ties, but the HLSCC’s six joint committees offer a roadmap. As President Erdo?an noted in 2025, their dialogue now transcends bilateralism, spanning global crises from Gaza to Kabul. The absence of strategic differences between the two nations leaves the door open for further collaboration, contingent on the respective policymakers’ strategic visions. With mutual effort, a fruitful partnership could materialize, with strategic and military ties serving as the foundation. Pakistan and Türkiye are not merely potential allies; they can become architects of a new regional strategic order, melding history with ambition to forge a partnership that could redefine the region’s role in a multipolar age.
The writer is a freelance columnist.