Suddenly, out of the blue the huge trust deficit that had marred the relations between Pakistan and the US for over a decade seems to have taken a big hit as a Canadian-American family of five was recovered from the kidnappers by the Pakistani security forces Thursday acting on the intelligence provided by the US in what appeared to be joint/co-ordinated operation. Coincidently, the successful rescue operation was conducted right when an interagency US delegation was holding preparatory talks in Islamabad with relevant Pakistani civil and military officials for preparing groundwork for the forthcoming top-level engagement between the two countries expected to take place when the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defence James Mattis would be visiting Pakistan one after the other later this month. Accusing Pakistan of playing a double game the US has been conducting terror operations inside Pakistan over the last ten years or so without taking Islamabad into confidence. The US suspected that Pakistan instead of coordinating the operation more often than not helped the targets slip out and escape the dragnet. That was why the US had conducted the operation against Osama Bin Laden without taking Pakistan into confidence. Also the drone attack that killed Mullah Mansoor while he was entering Pakistan from across the Iranian border too was a one sided operation with Pakistan caught by surprise. In the opinion of US strategists, Pakistan has been playing a tremendously important and negative role in the Taliban’s rise to power as Islamabad had helped the group to expand in the 1990s, providing massive financial and military assistance. Pakistan now needs to make it clear to the US by its actions that it no longer provides sanctuaries to these militants Thursday’s joint/co-ordinated rescue operation seems to have brought about a positive change in the circumstances under which the current engagement between the US and Pakistan is expected to be conducted hopefully sans the backdrop of trust deficit. The outcome of interactions between Pakistan’s leadership and the two top US officials would determine the future course of developments concerning war and peace in the region, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While the public performance of Khawaja Asif in the US during his first visit to that country as Pakistan’s foreign minister was decidedly impressive, the huge trust deficit that existed between Islamabad and Washington was to have provided the back-drop of the close door engagements that would continue between the two countries this month in Islamabad. This is likely to change now for the better with President Trump praising Pakistan and hoping to see ‘this type of cooperation and team work (from Pakistan) in helping secure the release of remaining hostages in our future joint counter-terrorism operations.’ The interagency US delegation currently in Pakistan is being led by Lisa Curtis, deputy assistant to the president and National Security Council senior director for South Asia and comprises acting assistant secretary of state, Ambassador Alice Wells, acting Assistant Secretary of Defence David Helvey and other senior officials from the Departments of State and Defence. In order for the trust deficit between the two countries to disappear completely both Pakistan and the US will have to increasingly share intelligence and regularly conduct without fail coordinated operations against terrorists, no matter of what hue. In the opinion of US strategists Pakistan has been playing a tremendously important and negative role in the Taliban’s rise to power as Islamabad had helped the group to expand in the 1990s, providing massive financial and military assistance. Pakistan now needs to make it clear to the US by its actions that it does not any more provide sanctuaries to the militants. According to Daniel Byman (Professor and Senior Associate Dean at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) and Steven Simon (National Security Council Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa from 2011 to 2012 and the John J. McCloy ’16 Visiting Professor at Amherst College) despite promises to the contrary, Islamabad’s support to Taliban has continued over the last so many years(Trump’s Surge in Afghanistan—why we can’t seem to end the war-published in Foreign Affairs, Sept 18, 2017). “The Trump administration is trying to shake things up by conditioning some U.S. aid to Pakistan on ending support for the Taliban, but despite Trump’s desire to force Islamabad to shape up, Pakistan is unlikely to change. “Islamabad has a strong strategic interest in maintaining a friendly government in Kabul as Afghanistan has long proved a troublesome neighbor. In addition, Pakistan’s military and security services contain anti-Western and Islamist elements that favor ignoring Trump’s demands. “Ending the Pakistani sanctuary completely would require a massive change in policy in Islamabad, as well as U.S. military operations against groups holed up there.” The two authors have listed two additional reasons why the US would not withdraw from Afghanistan in a hurry: First, fear of terrorism is said to be the primary driver keeping the United States in Afghanistan. Because the Taliban hosted al Qaeda in the years before 9/11, the concern is that they would do it again (or with other terrorist organizations), should they gain power in all or part of the country. Second, a total U.S. departure, which would essentially signal an open defeat, would boost the morale of the jihadists. Afghanistan is where they beat the Soviet Union during the war in 1979-89, and a victory over yet another superpower would provide them with a tremendous psychological boost; this could, in turn, help them enhance their recruiting and fundraising efforts. “Before the United States intervened, Afghanistan suffered a civil war for the better part of 25 years. Clearly something is deeply wrong within the country that the United States alone cannot resolve. Washington can postpone defeat, perhaps, or at least slow the Taliban’s momentum, but history suggests that a complete victory is unlikely. No ideology, political party, or charismatic leader unifies Afghans. By design and necessity, local officials hold much of the power. As such, Afghanistan never truly unified under a strong government. Rather, the country’s mountainous geography-and the strong ethnic and tribal identities in many areas-hinder national unity. “Not surprisingly, then, the government in Kabul does not engender loyalty, regardless of political leadership. Finally, the government’s failures beget further failures. Its inability to rein in corruption, establish the rule of law, provide security, or otherwise perform basic governance functions lead Afghans to turn to local rulers, militias, and the Taliban, further undermining the government’s influence.” The writer is a senior journalist based in Islamabad. He served as the Executive Editor of Express Tribune until 2014 Published in Daily Times, October 14th 2017.