The People’s Republic of China (PRC) demonstrates notable transparency in pursuing international order reform. In the context of its endeavours, Beijing regards underdeveloped and developing states as its primary allies, recognizing health diplomacy as a crucial instrument for fostering international coalitions.
The COVID-19 outbreak has brought to light China’s capacity to engage in global actions. Beijing played a crucial role as an initial responder for third-world nations, and Chinese vaccines substantially impacted global immunization efforts despite their relatively low effectiveness rates. Geostrategic concerns primarily drove China’s contribution policy, with most donations allocated to neighbouring and critical countries involved in the BRI. The pandemic also underscored the party-state’s capacity to advance a coherent worldwide narrative through digital platforms. China has created a competing COVID-19 information bubble specifically aimed at underdeveloped nations. China is the dominant force in this story, whereas the Western world is experiencing a fall.
The commencement of the Health Silk Road (HSR) in 2015 signified the initiation of a structured, centralized, and efficient approach to health diplomacy. The stated objective of the HSR is to cultivate soft power and influence in regional and global health governance and enhance China as a prominent nation. The proposed initiatives encompass preventing and controlling infectious diseases, expanding health cooperation mechanisms, talent training and capacity building programs, Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), emergency medical assistance, health policy coordination, health system reform, health industry development, and health development assistance.
Beijing has endeavoured to link Covid relief with the BRI’s commitments to achieve development and prosperity.
The COVID-19 pandemic stimulated and expedited Beijing’s HSR outreach initiatives. In 2019, China formed and broadened health collaborations with Eastern and Central European States, ASEAN, and the Arab League through China’s regional cooperation institutions. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has also led to an increase in regional health cooperation systems in Latin America and the South Pacific. Beijing has endeavoured to link Covid relief with the BRI’s commitments to achieve development and prosperity. However, due to political difficulties, the health cooperation format became less important, illustrating that engaging in conversation does not always lead to substantial collaboration.
Concerning multilateral outreach, China’s endeavours continue to be constrained. In 2017, Beijing entered into a collaboration agreement with the WHO to investigate potential synergies with the Health Silk Road. Furthermore, it expressed that communal human rights, such as the “right to health,” hold greater significance than individual human rights. Amidst the pandemic, China voiced its disapproval of the United States government’s COVID policy on several UN platforms while keeping its voluntary donations to the WHO moderate.
However, the question at hand is to what extent has China achieved success in its Covid diplomacy? Limited polling data suggests that Beijing’s COVID-19 diplomacy efforts did not foster a more favourable perception of China among Western states. According to a survey conducted by a Singaporean institute, experts from ASEAN states acknowledge China as the primary donor of COVID-19 help. However, there persists a perception among experts that Beijing’s impact in the region is unfavourable. China is largely seen favourably across the Middle East and Africa, with favorability rates experiencing a small increase since the onset of the pandemic.
Beijing’s health cooperation was well-received by the majority of third-world states. They frequently supported important policy stances of China in regional and global contexts, such as Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Although Beijing’s policy of zero COVID is considered unrealistic, decision-makers need to recognize the extent of China’s aspiration to gain other countries’ support. Underestimating the PRC’s capacity to learn from its failures and enhance its health diplomacy would also be a mistake. Beijing recognizes the need to receive assistance from developing nations to maintain and improve the global system. Hence, China focuses on third-world countries, positioning itself as the inherent ally of the developing world.
While China adopts a strategic approach to health cooperation to acquire soft power, European decision-makers should adopt a similar approach and allocate significant resources towards enhancing visibility. Given Beijing’s emphasis on the narrative of Western decline, European decision-makers must advocate for the narrative, highlighting the West’s capacity to restore normalcy while extending an inclusive invitation to developing nations. To address the public narrative monopoly of China, it is imperative to allocate substantial resources to social media outreach initiatives in recipient nations. The European Commission and embassies can employ social media specialists with expertise in the local digital environment to promote and disseminate information regarding European health assistance. Ambassadors from EU members might highlight European health aid in the recipient states by publishing collaborative pieces in local newspapers.
It is crucial to acknowledge that third-world states have acknowledged the Chinese accomplishment of shifting from receiving aid to becoming a supplier. Western democracies will not be warmly greeted when asserting moral superiority. An elegant answer to the top-down strategy of Beijing’s HSR could involve adopting a bottom-up method. Brussels or EU member states have the option to conduct surveys in countries receiving help to identify the requirements and wants of the recipients. These surveys might then be used to develop customized health cooperation initiatives. When doing so, it is important to prioritize the tangible material interests of the receivers. Although donor countries may help recipient governments attain their internal objectives, this will not lead them to align themselves with any one ideological faction. If the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative were presented as a post-Covid economic recovery initiative, it may have a significant impact. European decision-makers may adopt a more strategic approach to health diplomacy by analyzing the interests of the recipient states and utilizing health aid as a political tool for negotiation.
European states should use a multi-level approach to emulate Beijing’s strategic outreach method. At the bilateral level, it is imperative to prioritize identifying pivotal states that have previously established health cooperation or hold significant strategic importance for Europe and China. Moreover, Western policymakers should collaborate concurrently with states that share similar perspectives. The G7 might be appropriate for initiating transatlantic health outreach initiatives targeting third-world states, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Health cooperation with China can be a mutually beneficial and low-risk collaboration area despite their differing values.
The writer works as a researcher with the Arms Control and Disarmament Center at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad and writes regularly for several national and international news outlets. Moreover, he also works as a freelance writer and blogger on many online platforms. He can be reached at abuhurrairahah@gmail.com