“When I grew up, the Devil was a reason why I had a headache or the Devil was the reason I got mad. We always blamed the Devil. I think today when I say the Enemy, I like to make it broader. Sometimes, the Enemy can be our own thoughts.” Joel Osteen Pakistan virtually inherited the India problem. We created the Afghanistan issue along the way. Now, it is Iran joining the ranks of countries threatening Pakistan with incursions in pursuit of non-state actors’ activities. It would be an understatement to say that the situation along our borders is dreadful. Let’s get a reality check: but for China, we are surrounded by countries harbouring varying degrees of antipathy towards the state of Pakistan. The very thought is haunting. Do we attribute this to a policy of excessive security-centricity, inept and non-transparent governance, an ambivalent anti-terror mechanism, a rank failure of diplomacy, or a rare combination of all these factors? The inherent malaise of festering fault lines dates back to when Pakistan came into existence almost seventy years ago. We had little sense in accepting the reality of belonging to a region that we were physically located in and all our policies since have been smitten by this disorder. We have tried to adopt cultures and friends far removed in distance and in shared ideals and objectives and fought wars we should have shunned like plague. There may be multiple other reasons for our persistent failures in devising sustainable relations, but one major cause has been our inability to dispassionately evaluate prospective policies in terms of their suitability within the context of challenges that Pakistan has faced at given times, or was likely to face in the future. We always seem to be in a hurry – both in terms of leaving off old friends and adopting new ones. Policy-making with Pakistan has been like a wild roller-coaster ride with no destination in sight. The warriors from Afghanistan were the original crusaders who fought in Kashmir and the part of the valley that we have today is owed to their heroics. It is also a reality that, during the wars that we fought with India in 1965 and 1971, we didn’t have to station a single troop along our Western border with Afghanistan. Iran was an ally, our original strategic depth, which stood by us in our darkest hours providing tactical and logistical support that was worthy of a genuine friend. We joined the US anti-communism bandwagon. Then a time came when we realised that it was no longer tenable and the US lap not generous enough, so we started pursuing more lucrative offerings. Along came China with the consequent allure of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the prospect of billions rolling in. We jumped on hoping for an economic miracle. We espoused Saudi Arabia and its rabid and extreme form of religiosity which has never ceased to haunt us. In the process, we were virtually transformed into a lethal battleground of a proxy war which continues unabated. Gauging the effects of our countless misadventures, one of Pakistan’s starkest failures has been our inability to stand up to our espoused friends in defence of our state interests. This has particularly been the case with Saudi Arabia – a country which has cultivated the scourge of sectarianism and radicalisation on Pakistan’s soil with abandon. It has financed, and continues to do so, a vast network of seminaries that teach the fundamentals of jehad and militancy. The state of Pakistan having been rendered weak through decades of misrule, and with the financial and survival interests of the ruling mafias linked directly to the Saudi patronage, there is not as much as a whimper of protest. Instead, there is readiness to push Pakistan deeper into the alley of darkness – the joining of the Saudi-led Coalition against Terrorism being just one horrific example of this madness. This policy paralysis has been Pakistan’s deadly nemesis. At the heart of it all is Pakistan’s espousal of the cause of jehad necessitating the adoption of a discriminatory policy in countering militant organisations, some of which have been created as part of its flawed security paradigm. Of special mention is its refusal to ask the Afghan Taliban to stop using its soil as sanctuary as they continue fighting the state of Afghanistan. We tell the world that this is the reason why we have influence over the Taliban, but when we are asked to use it to bring them to the negotiating table, we flounder pitiably. The contrasting policies become even more conspicuous in the wake of a potent and effective operation that we launched to dismantle the Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP). It makes little sense that while we look upon the TTP as an enemy of the state worthy of annihilation, we continue to have a soft spot for the Afghan Taliban who are engaged in waging a deadly and relentless war against the state of Afghanistan. Internally, Pakistan is the proverbial victim of conflicting mindsets: the military mindset which is excessively security-driven and the political mindset which is intellectually-starved, inefficient and non-transparent. There is a level of deviousness that defines the relationship, or lack of it, between these two key organs of the state shrouding it in a sequence of melodramatic uncertainties. But there are things which, the ruling elite must know, have to be done. Our inability to address issues through candid introspection and pragmatic engagement with adversaries provides the swell for existing problems to deteriorate further. Reflecting a vast spectrum of fossilisation and a morbid inertia, the country has been jettisoned to the mercy of a whirlwind which is tossing it from one ill-considered espousal to the next. It is like sinking irremediably into a pit not knowing when one may hit the bottom with a bang. Pakistan stands effectively subverted and its imploding fault lines do not provision the luxury of lying in wait for a miracle. The Devil may be within us. The writer is a political and security strategist, and heads the Regional Peace Institute — an Islamabad-based think tank. Email: raoofhasan@hotmail.com. Twitter: @RaoofHasan