A certain number of self-governing territorial units may resolve to come together in a federal union, have their representatives prepare its constitution, enumerating its powers, and reserving all the rest to the federating states. This is how the United States of America came into being, and to the best of my knowledge that is the only instance of its kind in recent history. In most other cases a pre-existing central authority, having decided to become a federal union, created provinces, determined their territorial limits and functional jurisdictions. This is what happened in India and Pakistan. The federating units in Pakistan used to complain that its successive constitutions had placed excessive authority and power in the central government, which had the effect of diminishing their own political identity. They have been demanding a reduction in the Centre’s powers and an enhancement of their own. This is known as a demand for provincial autonomy. One might have thought that it had been met after the adoption of the 18th Amendment to the constitution, which transferred most if the Centre’s powers and functions to the provincial governments. Some of the autonomists contend that this measure was not enough, and that further energising of the provinces would be in order. Some of them base their case on their reading of a resolution that the All India Muslim League had adopted at its annual meeting in Lahore on March 23-24, 1940. This resolution called for the creation of Pakistan, which would be a federal union whose constituent units were to be “autonomous and sovereign”. These observers regard it as a covenant between self-governing territories. This is a mistaken interpretation. The All India Muslim League was not the ruling party in the provinces that were to compose Pakistan. The Unionist Party ruled Punjab, the Congress party ruled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and a coalition ruled Sindh. That the provinces in Pakistan were to be autonomous need not be regarded as controversial. But it should be emphasised that the word sovereign in the resolution was used loosely. Strictly speaking, sovereign is he to whom all things are possible. He may do whatever he wants within his own dominion and no one is entitled to tell him what he may or may not do. In this day and age no ruling authority is sovereign in this sense. The word sovereign in the resolution under reference may then be construed as having been merely ceremonial without having any functional import. The framers of the Lahore Resolution did not specify the dimensions of provincial autonomy. They left this task to the future constitution makers of Pakistan. It so happened that at the time this resolution was passed, and even when Pakistan was established, a ‘strong Centre’ was generally believed to be the best preserver of a federal union. With the passage of time it transpired that this had been a bad idea. Strong central governments led to the dissolution, not preservation, of federal unions in several cases (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia). It became clear that togetherness wrought by the voluntary action of the participating units is likely to be more enduring than that which has been forced upon them. The Indian constitution makes the Centre dominant over the states which are its creation. It may reorganise them, take a slice of the territory of one of them and join it with that of another. But the states make full use of the autonomy the constitution allows them. The demand for extensive provincial autonomy became a primary factor in the politics of Pakistan in the mid-1950s, when the Awami League won a sweeping victory in a provincial election. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emerged as the head of this party a few years later and he came up with his famous (or notorious) six-point model of autonomy that would transfer virtually all functions and powers to the provinces, make the central government their client and dependent upon such subsidies as they may wish to grant it. His plan, unacceptable to the provinces in West Pakistan, especially Punjab, eventually led to the country’s break-up and the emergence of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971. In today’s Pakistan, a few politicians (for instance Mr Rasool Bakhsh Palejo and at times Mr Mumtaz Bhutto in Sindh and the ‘nationalists’ in Balochistan) advocate almost the same measure of autonomy as Sheikh Mujibur Rahman did. But I do not think their advocacy has had many takers. Most autonomists would want to give the Centre charge of defence, foreign relations, currency, communications, international trade, inter-provincial transit systems and certain matters relating to the higher judiciary. With the adoption of the 18th Amendment to the constitution the issue of provincial autonomy would seem to have been settled to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. Most of the more important functions of the central government have been transferred to the provinces. The higher civil servants who used to manage them in Islamabad will now be posted in the provincial capitals. There is no reason to expect that the performance of these functions at the provincial level will be any less competent than it was when they were placed with the central government. A likely political benefit from this change should also be noted, which is that each of the provinces will now be the master of its own destiny, so to speak. That Lahore will become more prestigious as a place of residence for the high and the mighty than Islamabad may come as music to the ears of certain persons. But I wonder how they will feel when it dawns upon them that the Punjab Assembly, which is often the arena of fist fights and exchanges of colourful Punjabi vocabulary, will outrank the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan in Islamabad. It may take us all a long time to learn to live with this metamorphosis. The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, is a visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics. He can be reached at dranwar@lahoreschool.edu.pk