Relations between Pakistan and the US have all along gone through vicissitudes: from warm to cool and from indifference to extensive attachment. Serious American interest in Pakistan surfaced in 1954 when it was looking for collaborators in its drive to contain the Soviet Union within the areas where it had already gained influence. Pakistan joined the anti-communist alliances in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. In return it received substantial economic and military assistance, which continued to flow in until 1965 when Pakistan went to war with India without the US’s prior concurrence or knowledge. Relations between them remained at a diminished level until 1980 when the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. Pakistan then agreed to serve as a conduit for the delivery of American funds and weapons to the Afghan insurgents who were fighting to drive the Soviet army out of their country. A common misunderstanding needs to be corrected. It used to be said that Pakistan and the US were friends, that Pakistan had been acting as a good friend but the US had not fully reciprocated, and that it had left Pakistan in the lurch, so to speak, after its own interest in the area had either been achieved or abandoned. Those who speak in this vein do not understand that friendship is a relationship that develops between individuals but not between collectivities. Nations can be friendly towards each other but they cannot be friends. Governments, if they are headed by sensible persons, act to protect and advance their national interest. The ensuing interaction goes smoothly if the interests of the parties concerned are congruent, but trouble will arise if they are conflicting. American policy towards Pakistan has been guided by considerations of its interest and not by feelings of affection and friendship. Pakistan’s responses have been, or should have been, guided by similar reckoning. Another key element in the American-Pakistani relationship should be noted. It partakes of one between a patron and a client. The client adopts orientations and takes actions that the patron requires. Situations may arise in which the client is unable or unwilling to do the patron’s will, creating an irritation or a crisis in their relationship. Such was the case when Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rejected the American demand for his government to abandon its nuclear development programme. He was undaunted by Henry Kissinger’s threat that the US would make an example of him if he did not relent. For the most part, however, successive governments in Pakistan have done the errands that the US asked. Relations between these two countries have lately come under heavy strain. It used to be the case that the government on each side transacted business with the other, and while the media and selected political notables might take interest in them, the generality of people remained indifferent and aloof. For reasons that are not entirely within my reach, Pakistanis and Americans have begun to take adverse notice of each other. Recent polls show that a great majority of Pakistanis disapproves of the US and a similar majority in the US dislikes Pakistan. I should like to offer a speculation or two regarding the forces that may have generated this mutual disapproval. First, it is commonly stated that there is a ‘trust deficit’ in Pakistani-American relations, meaning that neither side believes what the other says. At a US Senate committee hearing a few weeks ago, former defence secretary Robert Gates made an interesting observation that all governments lie to one another. Each government employs its own agents to discover what the other plans to do and what its capabilities and vulnerabilities are. When a democratic government makes a false statement to the outside world, its own people hear it as well, and they will subject it to severe chastisement when the truth comes out. The government in Pakistan is not amenable to similar inhibitions. It tells lies to both outsiders and its own people without giving the matter a second thought. As a result, few — if any — believe its claims and assertions. It remains untroubled by this want of public trust. It may be punished for its unethical conduct at the next election but we will have to wait to see if that turns out to be the case. A couple of recent events need attention. Raymond Davis, an American security contractor from Texas, was doing errands for the CIA in Lahore. For reasons that have never been fully explained, he shot down two motorcyclists in broad daylight. He was placed in custody and a case against him was filed in a court. But under severe American pressure, he was released, handed over to the American embassy and allowed to leave the country. Pakistani media, leaders of civil society, and the people at large were incensed by their government’s helplessness in the face of American demands. On May 2, 2011, a group of American commandos flew from a base in Afghanistan to the compound of a house in Abbottabad where Osama bin Laden had been residing for more than five years, killed him and took his body away. As they were leaving Pakistani air space, they called President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, and General Kayani and told them what they had done. According to some versions of this event, the Pakistani officials felicitated them on the success of their mission. As the news of this operation appeared in the American and Pakistani media, severe disapproval was voiced on both sides. Pakistanis were chagrined that the Americans had invaded their territory and violated their sovereignty. American officials were distressed that Pakistani security agencies who must have known that Osama, one of the US’s most wanted foes, was living in a house less than 20 miles away from Islamabad, did not share this information with them. If Osama had been hiding in Birmingham (England) or Agra (India), American commandos would not have flown into either place and killed him. They would have asked the local authorities to arrest and try him in their courts or hand him over to American officials. They felt free to land in Abbottabad because they treated Pakistan as a client state whose territory should be open to their inspection and use. The US wants to continue to be the patron and Pakistan to be the client in their interaction. Heavily criticised by the opposition parties and some of the media barons for its subservience to the US, the present government in Pakistan has been trying to move towards a posture of self-assertion. In other words, it is trying not to be a client. This, in my view, is the basic reason for any tension that we see in the current state of Pak-US relations. The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, is a visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics. He can be reached at anwarsyed@cox.net