Discussing the reasons for war, Immanuel Kant wrote that ‘anything’ can lead to it. His view is appropriate to explain the India-Pakistan relationship. The two countries do not need any reasonable cause to fight a war. ‘Anything’ — even a statement by a non-state actor — can lead to a state of war between them. In his book India-Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation? Stanley Wolpert has rightly analysed that in 1947 India and Pakistan were born to remain in conflict. The question arises: why do the two countries behave so? The answer lies in the partition of India in 1947, and its memories and versions of what happened. It developed hatred for the ‘other’ in the minds of the two major communities: Hindus and Muslims. When I say hatred and mistrust exists for the other, I am talking about the majority of the population on both sides of the border, and not about the few who are trying hard to establish peace between the two countries. Things have not changed even after 66 years of a bloody partition. Unfortunately, unlike behaving like rational nations, India and Pakistan are not ready to move away from their barbaric history of the partition. Until this happens, relations between them will remain as they are. Since 1947, at intermittent gaps, India and Pakistan have engaged in war, clashes, skirmishes and political-cum-military tensions. They have also engaged in talks and dialogue, but the memory of the effect of those is limited because of their results (or lack of them). In the recent incident of acrimony at the Line of Control (LoC), five Indian soldiers were killed by some Pakistanis. This is not a new thing. In the past too, soldiers from both sides engaged in killing and decapitation of their ‘enemy’s’ bodies. This sort of incident either precedes or succeeds bilateral dialogues. They are being carried out by the stakeholders of India-Pakistan enmity who have an effective presence on both sides of the border. There are also external actors who, sometimes, help the stakeholders to derail the peace process. Like in the past, the recent unfortunate incident at the LoC has given a much-awaited reason to hawks to start uttering cries against bilateral talks and the proposed meeting between Dr Manmohan Singh and Nawaz Sharif in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September. In Pakistan, the Sharif-led civilian government is in power, but the army decides on most of the issues related to foreign policy. Among all, India is Pakistani army’s favourite ‘foe’. It does not want any civilian government to take a step regarding India without a green signal by the army’s top brass. Due to its chequered political history, a tug-of-war for power between civilian governments and the army is normal in Pakistan. Besides a standoff with the civilian government, the army as an institution is also facing challenges from within. The Islamisation process started during General Ziaul Haq’s tenure, and the presence of a large number of personnel from regions where terrorist groups are very strong, have led to the intrusion of elements sympathetic towards radical groups. The post-9/11 engagement of the Pakistan army against terrorist groups have led to the emergence of an enemy within. As a result, there have been attacks on defence personnel, and also some within the premises of the security forces. These could not be possible without the logistical information and help by insiders. Although the army is trying to cleanse its house, the roots are so deeply entrenched that it may take years. This could also be a reason why it is not united over the question of improving bilateral ties with India. Those having a stake in continuation of tensions take steps to derail any move to improve bilateral relations. The recent incident at Poonch is an example of that mindset. In this situation, what are the options for the governments of both the countries? Of course they should conduct talks and the two prime ministers must meet. Despite the knowledge that talks and meetings will not yield very positive results because of general elections in India in 2014, they are essential to iron out suspicions. In India there are some who want that the government should engage with the Pakistan army instead of talking to the civilian government. This thinking is against the spirit of democracy, and would be tantamount to disrespect of the mandate given by the Pakistani citizens to its elected civilian leadership. Still the complexity of India-Pakistan bilateral relations is such that nothing can be perfectly analysed or predicted about one’s behaviour towards the ‘other’, the reason for which I have talked about at the beginning of this article. Is there a way to reduce conflicts? Yes there is. Despite all sorts of problems, the channels of dialogue must remain open. In the past too, I had written that the success of talks depends upon the nature of the bilateral relationship. As both countries do not enjoy a fair relationship, brokering any deal between them is no easy feat. The political leaderships of both countries are not mature enough to make certain compromises and adjustments to resolve bilateral conflicts. Hence conflicts are likely to continue. Instead of trying to resolve them, it is better to have a mechanism to manage them so that a number of awful incidents can be reduced. To conclude: the future ties between the two countries depend upon the time Indians and Pakistanis take to come out from memories related to the partition of India in 1947. Until then, efforts must be taken to manage their bilateral conflicts. The writer is a New Delhi-based freelance columnist