The government has unveiled the initial draft of its new National Internal Security policy (NISP) at a time when Pakistani forces are conducting surgical strikes against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) hideouts in North Waziristan. The impression emanating from this coincidence reflects the incumbent government’s readiness to transform the policy perspective of its future counterterrorism strategy into action. The government is seeking the support of major political parties and stakeholders for bringing consensus to finalise the NISP. A comprehensive counterterrorism policy incorporates dialogue as an integral part, but one that has not produced the desired results, at least for the time being. Force and the threat of use of force, therefore, persist as a plausible option along with talks in counterterrorism efforts. Gauging the magnitude of the internal security problems, one anticipates the first ever national security manual to be a comprehensive document covering all important aspects of the internal security’s modus operandi. The interior minister, Chaudary Nisar, has outlined the initial draft of the NISP, its objectives and its different aspects before parliamentarians. As enunciated by the interior minister, the three-pronged security policy incorporates secret, operational and strategic aspects as a comprehensive plan to address internal security challenges. The secret part of the policy has not been revealed due to the sensitivity attached. However, the operational and strategic aspects have drawn nationwide attention and are constantly under discussion. The operational part of the policy revealed so far outlines a detailed programme, which includes enhancing the operational capacity of the law enforcement agencies and provides comprehensive mechanisms to maintain law and order in cities and towns. The government is also planning to deploy a 500 personnel Rapid Response Force (RRF) under the police initially in the federal capital and later in the provinces as an integrated specialised counterterrorist force. The training and operational aspect of this force has not yet been elaborated. However, Pakistan’s armed forces have already been collaborating with provincial police commandos’ training and capacity building, which could also be helpful in the training and capacity building of the RRF. The third aspect is strategic, which includes the Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA), and it will be the central organisation for forming strategy, coordinating efforts and overseeing the execution of the NSP. The heads of the armed forces have been included as members of NACTA. All the intelligence agencies have also been synchronised under NACTA to expedite intelligence sharing and enhance much needed coordination at the national level. The NISP also seeks to integrate the religious seminaries and mosques into the national education system while undertaking legal reforms to develop national consensus on its counterinsurgency strategy in the coming months. One can also sense urgency on the part of the government to reverse the flow of extremism and terrorism at the earliest. The Anti-Terrorism Ordinance of October 2013 and the anti-terror law under the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) approved by the standing committee on interior seems a coordinated politico-legal effort to bring a broad-based national structure against terrorism. However, amid all these efforts there are a few very important aspects that need clarity vis-à-vis the NISP. Pakistan’s internal security threats are indeed a litmus test for the effectiveness of the NISP. First and foremost is regarding the civil-military harmony over the content and intent of the NISP. As the military is in the forefront of dealing with terrorists, therefore their consent over this policy’s objectives and operational aspects are imperative. Military patient support to talks with the Taliban and later successfully employing surgical strikes on militant hideouts in FATA reflect good chemistry germinating between the civil-military leadership. These strikes have been instrumental in compelling the otherwise adamant TTP to announce a one-month ceasefire. So, talks backed by requisite force seem to be the working formula in the counterterrorism strategy at the moment agreed to by the civil-military leadership. Secondly, the real test of the proposed NISP lies in its implementation. Terrorism, insurgency and extremism are nontraditional security threats that require an altogether different solution. These threats are as evasive as their solution, which requires a persistent understanding and strategic doctrine. Apart from the terrorist sanctuaries in FATA region, the problem related to the political economy of terrorism has engulfed the whole country. This requires a tougher approach to neutralise converging interests such as extortion, ransoms and other criminal activities abetting the spread of terrorism. A common national ideological narrative supported by major religious schools is something that must be envisaged by the NISP to address the ideological aspect of extremism. In this regard, the intelligentsia, media and educational institutions must also be brought in for a meaningful national discourse against ubiquitous extremism. Thirdly, synchronisation of intelligence agencies under a single directorate requires extreme care. It should be remembered that intelligence agencies vary in their function, expertise and domain. Some perform highly sensitive activities, more than others. Therefore, it would be a real test to segregate the overlapping of activities while maintaining secrecy of information. Civil-military intelligence under a single directorate will also question the security of intelligence emanating from the military agencies, which is more sensitive in nature. The real question would be regarding the rationale to place the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under this directorate, having some special tasks to perform. Certainly, placing the ISI under a joint intelligence directorate would be a tricky affair, which has to be well gauged before implementation. All these questions are somewhat important aspects that would come under scrutiny to gauge the effectiveness of the NISP as a comprehensive response to counterterrorism. Furthermore, the NISP as a policy document should also explain how conflict resolution at the national level should be initiated. Should dialogue be channelized, is military action needed to be initiated or should dialogue, along with military action, go hand in hand? No doubt, the incumbent government has shown urgency in addressing the internal security challenges, fully supported by the armed forces. The government should carry all the stakeholders onboard before bringing the final policy into discussion, making it a national effort against terrorism. The NISP should act as an instrument in setting the national agenda to address the commonality of cause against the menace of extremism in all its manifestations. The writer is a PhD scholar at the National Defence University, Islamabad