Last week, in Kot Radha Krishan, a man and his pregnant wife were set on fire by a mob for alleged blasphemy. The act hardly comes as a shock. The real shock is that we have learnt to live with cruelty in the name of religion. Violence in the name of religion is rampant here. And yet, in almost all the cases, there is a political or economic motive where some influential used religion as a pretext to serve vested interests. On every act of such savagery, liberals blame the violent tendencies of religion to assert their point. The religious leaning point at the ulterior motive to dissociate the role of religion from the incident. And yet, in this polarised debate, the paramount questions remain: why has religion acquired such a status where any act of savagery can be carried out in its name without any fear of consequences and why has the state become so toothless against this tide of religious fervour that it cannot assert itself when acts against the state and humanity are carried out, challenging its very writ? This process of state surrender has been gradual. The Objectives Resolution under Liaquat Ali Khan was the hallmark incident of religion entering the state. Though it did set a wrong precedent the use of religion in polity by men on top was mostly political maneuvering and was hardly an act of imposition of personal beliefs. The first incident of incorporation of personal spiritual beliefs to influence state policy can be attributed to Qudrat Ullah Shahab. Shahab’s rise to power in Pakistan’s administration coincided with his spiritual transformation. And, at some point, he started mixing the two. Shahab’s cult had very broad intellectual resonance among administrative officials and intellectuals. In the process, ‘Shahabists’ started defining the state of Pakistan in the mould of a divine mission. It may not have been Shahab’s intention, but this led to something very dangerous. It gave people in administration a passport to serve their vested interests, linking them to divine missions. Shahabists, for the most part, were non-violent and adhered to the version of Islam that was moderate but they emphasised the superiority of those with similar faith over others and with men in powerful positions having this belief, it started reflecting in the state’s policy. The big buzz came in the form of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). The JI was different from the religious orthodoxy prevalent. For one, unlike Sufi, Deobandi or Barelvi movements that were more interested in regional impact, it was the first pan-Islamic movement in the region (the difference between the Deoband and JI in some ways is similar to the difference between the Taliban and al Qaeda with the former being region focused). Secondly, it was opposed to the creation of Pakistan and thus was at odds with the state during the early years. Third, it adhered to a stricter interpretation of religion and had more room for stiffer actions to Islamise the state. Around the late 1960s, with the rise of leftist politics in East and West Pakistan, the established order saw benefit in collaborating with the JI. Under General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi and Altaf Gohar, the JI became an ally of the established order. The period of the 1970s is marked by the bonding of Shahabists and the JI. If one tracks Shahab’s own spiritual journey, its very root makes him a contrarian to JI ideology. And yet there were similarities between the two. One was superiority of those with a similar faith. And both were very anti-secular. This marriage of Shahabists and Jamaatists culminated in the birth of Ziaists in late 1970s. Zia, himself, was an amalgam of Shahbists and Jamaatists. Inspired by Maulana Tufail, the head of the JI, Zia had a strong Sufi tinge to him as well. He would be a regular at the shrine of Hazrat Ali Hajveri and yet his policies were closer to more strict JI interpretation. Under Zia, the doctrine of putting religious beliefs over the call of duty became official in Pakistan’s administration and this led to the erosion of the state’s authority. Seeing the opportunity, the vested interests, too, jumped onto the bandwagon and thus religion became a tool of political, social, and economic achievement. Post 9/11, it became evident that the pan-Islamic hardline flare was detrimental to the established order’s interests. This was an opportunity for the state to divorce the religious beliefs of individuals from the state’s policy. Rather, what the dominant part of the state chose was to break the bond between Shahabists and Jamatists. So, rather than ensuring that state officials carry out their duty under the law rather than their personal spiritual beliefs, the state only limited the acceptance of such beliefs to moderate beliefs. So now, Hizbut Tahrir’s penetration in state institutions will be quelled and ISIS will be cracked down on but the persecution of those of different faiths and other criminal acts in the guise of religious beliefs will be overlooked. In recent years, even the JI is transforming to seek approval of more moderate elements in the established order. It is neither religion alone nor the manipulation by people to further their interests that is the core problem. The fundamental problem is that the state, thanks to the personal beliefs of its officials, has ceded its authority to anything and everything in the name of the religion. Allowance of religious beliefs of individuals to supersede needs of statecraft will continue to lead to Kot Radha Krashan like incidents. We are heading towards a complete collapse of the state and society on this route. One should continue to grow on the spiritual path as an individual but mixing it with the state’s duties makes the collapse inevitable. Rather than focusing on decoupling the bond between moderate and hardline, the state needs to set its eye on the new age, a futuristic age of the state’s authority and sanctity of written law and social contract, an age of diversity and tolerance. The author can be reached on twitter at @aalimalik