Our nation experienced democratic euphoria when General Pervez Musharraf was ousted from office and, later on, when Chief Justice (CJ) Ifthikhar Chaudhry was restored. Optimism about the future of democracy reached its crescendo after the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment rousing hope that the rejuvenated legal fraternity, vibrant civil society, vociferous media and independent judiciary would work as a bulwark, against military intervention in the future. The success of the lawyers’ movement, backed by media and civil society was considered the harbinger of a new political order that would establish civilian supremacy over the military in true spirit. The first peaceful transition of power from one civilian government to another in 2013 reinforced our belief in parliamentary democracy. However, events of the recent past, especially after August 14, 2014, have exploded all myths of the sovereignty of parliament and supremacy of civilian government. The passage of the 21st Constitutional Amendment once again revived debate about the role of the army in decision-making. Some pundits termed recent developments, in the wake of the Peshawar incident, a soft coup because the civilian government has been successfully relegated to the sidelines by the army high command. General Sharif has overshadowed Prime Minister (PM) Sharif and major policy decisions regarding internal and external security issues are taken by the former. Even a cursory look at Pakistan’s chequered past reveals the existence of a deep-rooted mistrust between the political and military leaderships. We have witnessed, so far, four direct coup d’états and several soft coups, similar to the present one. The army has ruled this country directly for more than half of its national life since independence. Even during democratic interregnums, the vital issues concerning security and foreign policy were dictated to us by the army. Every time, after the ouster (or demise) of a military dictator, hopes soared high for civilian control to be established and the authoritarianism of the army to come to an end. However, the army has so far successfully defended its turf and the civilian leadership has found it prudent to leave the key areas of foreign and security policies with the army in order to avoid the wrath of the military establishment, in the form of political destabilisation. Neither the insertion of Article 6 in the 1973 Constitution deterred the army from adventurism nor its further elaboration in the 18th Constitutional Amendment will serve the purpose. Undoubtedly, we have a fine sounding constitution, envisaging the Westminster model of democracy, which in effect finds no reflection on the ground. It is the spirit not the letter that is counted. The remarks of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain after the passage of the 18th Amendment aptly summarised the constitutional predicament: the army needs two trucks and a jeep to take over and it is always available to them. Soon after assuming office, after the 2008 elections, the coalition government of the PPP tried to exert itself in key matters of security and foreign policy. The government tried to bring a paradigm shift in our relations with India, Afghanistan and the US. However, it soon realised that the security establishment is in no mood to relinquish its hold on these matters of vital importance. The widespread corruption and the inherent weaknesses of a coalition government further eroded the legitimacy of the previous government and the army regained its lost confidence, exerting its policy choices more vigorously vis-à-vis the political government. The reaction to the Kerry-Lugar Bill amply demonstrated that there is no space left for the political leadership in key areas of foreign and security policy. The government learnt its lessons well and completed its tenure by giving the military a decisive say in all matters of national importance. The memogate scandal further exploded the myth of civilian supremacy and our fragile democracy survived the onslaught by the skin of its teeth. The present government also took almost one-and-a-half years to come to terms with the not-so-changed realities of the power matrix. The trial of General Pervez Musharraf and the outrageous statements of some of its ministers along with its open support for a particular media group vis-à-vis the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) brought it into open confrontation with the military. The dharna (sit-in) of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri made the government realise just how relevant the ‘third umpire’ is in our power politics. On the other hand, the inability of the political leadership to take tough and timely decisions regarding the war against terror paved the way for the military to assume the mantle of national leadership. The present predominance of the army in policy decisions and even in their implementation springs from the indecisiveness-cum-incompetence of the political leaders to lead the war against terror from the front. As someone rightly said, when we decide what is, we close our minds to the possibilities of what could be. Westminster-type democracy, as envisaged in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, is more utopian than the Republic of Plato. Instead of pursuing a utopian model of Westminster democracy, we need to take a leaf out of Turkish political and constitutional development. Till the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, there have been two direct coup d’états, in 1960 and 1980, and one soft coup of 1971, popularly called the Coup of Memorandum. The new Turkish Constitution of 1982 provided for institutionalising the role of the military in national affairs in the shape of a National Security Council. The Constitution vested the military-dominated National Security Council with vast powers and functions in comparison to the Turkish cabinet. That power equation favouring the military remained intact till the emergence of the Justice and Development Party under the leadership of Recep Tayyep Erdogan in 2002. Through the seventh reform package passed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 2003, the wings of the military were not only effectively clipped but civilian supremacy in true letter and spirit was established. By institutionalising the role of the army in decision-making in Pakistan, the deep-rooted mistrust between the civilian and military leaderships will be removed. At present, the army is calling the shots while the blame is being put squarely on the political leadership. The institutional framework for power sharing will result in equal sharing of the blame and responsibility as well. Such a constitutional arrangement will give the political government some respite from endemic political instability and the threat of an overt military coup will be considerably mitigated in the future. The author is assistant accountant general, Peshawar