The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) can facilitate greater intelligence sharing and cooperation in areas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises, the development of capabilities for defence against terrorist attacks and for managing the consequences of such an attack. Borders are one of the first lines of defence against terrorism. Islamabad and Kabul are working to enhance various aspects of border management and security, including addressing the challenge of cross border terrorism. Since the entire Afghan-Pakistan region is bedevilled by militancy, it is vital that both the neighbouring countries consider joint defence strategies against the common threat of terrorism and extremism. PAP-T with Afghanistan will provide an opportunity to review and invigorate the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) in the context of a wider review of the objectives and priorities of our partnership in relation to all threats and challenges to Pak-Afghan geo-political security, including terrorism. The Taliban’s Doha office has been revived with the facilitation of Pakistan. Soon, the Afghan Taliban will hold initial talks with senior Afghan government officials to chalk out a strategy and formulate plans for formal talks. In late November, 2014, Afghan Taliban representative Qari Din Muhammad travelled with Pakistani officials to Beijing to discuss a potential peace process and, in London, in December, 2014, China, the US and Afghanistan held a first trilateral meeting to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Present at the meeting was Sun Yuxi, China’s special envoy to Afghanistan. In recent months, China has made pronouncements that reveal it is willing, perhaps even eager, as a regional gatekeeper to grow its engagement with troubled Afghanistan, since its remote Wakhan Corridor abuts China’s western border. Islamabad, Beijing, Doha and Washington are positive that talks will help to bring political reconciliation to Afghanistan. The day a squad of suicide bombers stormed a police headquarters in Logar, killing 24 policemen and injuring eight others, on that very day a police station in Lahore also came under militant attack. Whereas responsibility for the attack was claimed by Jamatul Ahrar, a splinter group of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan government could not have been more vociferous about the will of peace. There is widespread acknowledgment of the profound influence that Afghanistan-Pakistan ties have on the prospect for long-term stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s longstanding conflict with India and suspicion of its regional engagement, especially in Afghanistan, has already adversely affected the security situation. While there have been encouraging recent developments between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan is weary of India threatening to entrench relations of conflict and competition at the expense of cooperation and stability. Undoubtedly, the stability of Afghanistan will depend on its neighbours agreeing to make it a centre of cooperation rather than conflict but India, Iran and Russia have reservations about such a process for fear of being marginalised. Bilateral Afghan Pakistan relations are of paramount importance in this region and Kabul has to review its border relations with India to estimate the cost of peace. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif’s visit to Kabul with the Director General (DG) ISI comes at a time when the US is in the final stages of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. He met President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dr Abdullah Abdullah, and discussed security and terrorism concerns. He also held talks with his Afghan counterpart, General Sher Mohammad Karimi, who did not seem too impressed with the desired level of comfort and confidence in Islamabad. Historically, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani had also visited Kabul two times and former Afghan President Hamid Karzai had also visited Pakistan 20 times. No matter how much effort has been and is being made, the trust deficit and blame game remains between Kabul and Islamabad. These are two primary challenges facing the Islamabad-Kabul alliance that may inhibit the development of a significant alliance role in the campaign against terrorism: the trust gap and what the intentions/perception gap. The trust gap can be best defined as the aggregate of multiple gaps relating to allegations on Pakistan for organising and conducting large-scale proxy jihadist operations. The intentions/perception gap is a less tangible concept and refers to the gap between Pakistan and Afghanistan in terms of the perception of the intentions of both the severity and level of sincerity accorded to it and the counterterrorism responses required in its management. Pakistan leads diplomatic channels and tends to favour technical responses to the problem, especially military measures, whereas Afghanistan is cautious to trust the intent and believes that Pakistan will not relinquish its support for the Taliban until regional dynamics undergo a transformation. The significance of the perception that Pakistan has not fundamentally changed its Afghanistan policy drives the dual gap problem. It acts to inhibit a cohesive alliance response to the challenge of terrorism and reinforces Afghanistan’s tendencies towards unilateralism, thus undercutting Pakistan’s response to the mutual problem. The level of threat the dual gap poses for the alliance should not be underestimated. Indeed, one can argue that it even goes so far as to suggest that dual gap is a mortal threat to the health of the alliance. Continued gaps in capabilities and severe differences of strategic sincerities between Afghanistan and Pakistan are relegating military intelligence to the graveyard of collective security irrelevance. While this may be an exaggeration in the short-term, unless measures are taken to mitigate the dual gap, the long-term survivability of the alliance and its ability to contribute to the campaign against terrorism will be severely affected. If borderland cooperation with Afghanistan is plagued by the politics of the last outrage, institutionalising support for the long-term campaign against terrorism could be the alliance’s single greatest contribution and the foundation of success in the campaign. It may be that a permanent coalition is better than a temporary one. An interoperable coalition is better than an incapable one. A value sharing coalition is better than a coalition of convenience. And an Islamabad-Kabul coalition is better than anything else. While it may appear that the decision to increase Islamabad’s role in the campaign may rest with military decision-makers, the way forward may be clearer than we think; that at least leaves some room for optimism. It is clear that Pakistan can make a significant contribution to the campaign against terrorism in four interrelated realms by facilitating diplomatic cooperation, military operations, intelligence sharing and defence cooperation. If the campaign against terrorism places a premium upon cross-border cooperation with Afghanistan in all dimensions of the campaign and upon intelligence sharing in particular, the potential for revising our military strategic policies to make a significant contribution should not be undervalued. The writer is a professor of Psychiatry and consultant Forensic Psychiatrist in the UK. He can be contacted at fawad_shifa@yahoo.com