Recently, Pakistan decided not to intervene in Yemen despite urgent messages from Saudi Arabia. The news promptly resulted in a harsh response — almost a warning — by UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Dr Anwar Muhammed Gargash. Gargash might be a mouthpiece for the Saudis or his own government but this response was to be expected. Pakistan’s decision will not please the heads of state of kingdoms/princedoms. This decision might also be considered unexpected since ‘requests’ from Saudis are usually fulfilled promptly.
Let us try to understand why this conflict must be avoided by Pakistan. Houthis are essentially Shias. While this revolt has many nuances (some more important than others) the sectarian aspect is also one that is of significance to Pakistan, which has a large population of Shias. Under the influence of Wahhabiism, exported by the Saudis during and after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, segments of our predominantly Sunni population have already taken to targeting our Shia brethren. To many such animals, what could be interpreted as an intervention in support of Sunnis against Shias in Yemen, could be interpreted as an official ‘license to kill’ in Pakistan. Already suffering from internecine sectarian conflict by terrorists, Pakistan cannot afford to be seen as opposing Shias in Yemen.
However, as many a journalist has pointed out, this is not merely a sectarian conflict. And, as some have also pointed out, many Sunnis are fighting alongside the Houthis in Yemen. Even as the Arab Spring was being suppressed in Yemen and other countries, I pointed out two aspects of that suppression in my articles. These were: populist movements seeking representative governments might be suppressed but would re-emerge and al Qaeda, which had become irrelevant due to these populist movements, would regain strength. Not only has al Qaeda regained its relevance and become stronger, an even worse face of Islamic Sunni extremism has emerged in the form of Islamic State (IS). And the revolt in Yemen is the re-emergence of the Arab Spring, thus its popular support.
Pakistan can afford to displease the current rulers of Arab states but it cannot afford to permanently alienate the many people of these states. Why does no one refer to the fact that, despite the ongoing conflict in Yemen, hundreds of deaths and the fact that so many countries have entered this fray, the UN has only passed a resolution “condemning” the Houthis dissolution of parliament? Why is there no more? The UN charter mandates all member states to support democracy. Could that mandate be interpreted as legitimising such populist revolts?
Even if not, this is a changing world and the mosaic is continuously shifting. M K Bhadrakumar interprets the Turkish and Pakistani positions as the success of Iranian diplomacy. I think he errs. Iran’s isolation by the US-led west was unnatural and in violation of geopolitical realities. It had to end. Based merely on its geostrategic location, Iran is far more a natural ally of the US and the west than the Saudis. The latter are merely oil rich. Nor should Pakistan alienate Iran to appease the Saudis. Not only do we share a long border with Iran, we have common interests, not the least of which are our power woes that Iran is prepared to help out with. Then there is Afghanistan. We paid a heavy price alienating Iran when we failed to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980. We were apprehensive of annoying the US-Saudi alliance that backed the invasion. Today, the US is finally seeking a rapprochement with Iran despite the fact that it annoys the Saudis and Israel. Does that not say something to us? The Turk-Pakistani position is a statesmanlike assertion of recognising emerging realities as well as a response in accordance with their own national interests.
Of all the articles I have come across on this conflict, Juan Cole’s ‘What’s really behind the Saudi attack on Yemen’ seems the most comprehensive. Cole begins by highlighting the fact that, under the new Saudi King, Salman, his country is engaged in four major struggles “to reshape the Middle East”. He then goes on to explain why the Saudis acted thus precipitately, violating their normal behind-the-scenes subtlety. The rest of his article deals with a historical perspective. Although Cole makes no reference to the Arab Spring, his “populist movement” and the desperation with which the Saudis responded only serve to reinforce my assertion that this movement threatens the future of kingdoms and princedoms, unless these states become representative.
After all, the UK is still a monarchy but a representative one, as are many other countries in Europe. Why not in the Middle East? Why not Saudi Arabia? The House of Saud, as well as its supporters, should accept these realities as well. No one wants Saudi Wahhabiism to flourish. Nor will appeasing Israel pay the dividends vis-à-vis the US that it might have done in the past for the Saudis. It is also unlikely that kings and princes can continue to appease their people by largesse whenever threatened. The time for more permanent steps towards representative government is here.
I am quite certain that the Arab people of all states will have no objection to being members of kingdoms or princedoms so long as two conditions prevail within these states: an institutional, equitable distribution of wealth and political empowerment. Why not purchase the support of the people by voluntarily giving this to them, rather than making implacable enemies of them by suppressing them? Give this to them yourself or the people will take it from you. Throughout history this has been a constant. The people have always won.
The same lesson applies to our own leadership as well. If they have the sense to avoid joining a disastrous venture for the reasons I have enunciated, they should be aware that their own political future depends on their ability to ensure an institutionalized, equitable distribution of wealth and political empowerment. Do it now before the people make you do it.
The writer is a retired brigadier. He is also former vice president and founder of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)