As the global nuclear order grapples with its challenges and contradictions, there is an emerging scholarly debate regarding the issue of de facto nuclear weapons’ states and their relationship with the nuclear order. The recent Carnegie-Stimson report titled ‘A normal nuclear Pakistan’ is the second such work on Pakistan now emanating from Washington as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London was the first to generate the idea of “normalcy” for Pakistan’s nuclear status last year in an Adelphi paper written by its nuclear expert Mark Fitzpatrick. The latest Carnegie-Stimson report does not differ significantly from Fitzpatrick’s ‘Pakistan’s nuclear dangers’ as it demands similar conditions to be met by Pakistan before the international community might look at the prospect of normalising its nuclear status within the global nuclear order. The conditions laid down are signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), removing veto on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and reversing nuclear force posture currently guided by the full spectrum deterrence framework. Before dwelling on the practicality of such proposals it is important to critically evaluate the conceptual framework of normalisation itself. Like the subject of rationality in international relations, there is no standard definition of a normal nuclear country and neither should there be efforts to make such standards. The reason is that each nuclear capable state has evolved its nuclear programme, diplomacy and force postures in response to specific threat environment, which remains dynamic. With such diversity in threat perceptions, real or otherwise, it would be difficult to configure a standard for nuclear normalcy especially for states that are outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). What essentially matters regarding nuclear politics is a grand bargain that envisages a certain set of commitments in return for benefiting from advancements in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. The conditions proposed by the Carnegie- Stimson report regarding Pakistan’s case are actually a grand bargain proposal rather than a case for normalisation as such. Since there are no blank cheques in international relations, there will always be a set of conditions conceived by those framing the normalcy narrative. The first condition in the report relates to Pakistan’s declaratory policy shift from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence. The report’s argument is that Pakistan should declare sufficiency as it has achieved the requirements for deterrence purposes. The problem with this condition is the hypothesis underlying the condition: how is it determined that Pakistan has acquired the desired deterrence level? The issue here is not about terminologies or advocating an arms race as it could continue even under the “strategic deterrence” declaration. The real issue here is about declaring sufficiency, which would be inconsistent with the policy of doctrinal ambiguity that appears to serve Pakistan well and has kept its enemies guessing. The second condition in the report relates to Pakistan committing itself to a recessed deterrence posture i.e. having enough separation between the warheads and delivery systems, especially the Nasr missile system. Two issues can be raised here: first is the proposal’s linkage to “normalising” Pakistan’s nuclear status with its nuclear force posture, which is built upon threat perceptions and not for a diplomatic bargain. Second, and more importantly, is the fact that declaratory force postures may not be the same as the ones made public. We may never know what exactly Pakistan’s nuclear force posture is for peace and for war time but it would make sense if Pakistan reconsiders its nuclear force readiness given its prevailing security environment. Therefore, it would be imprudent for Pakistan to tie its hands and close potential options. The report has mentioned reciprocal actions from India and non-deployment of short-range missiles within 100 kilometers of the borders but it is abundantly clear that India would not like to limit its options as well, which is understandable. The third and fourth conditions are linked to Pakistan signing the CTBT without India doing so and removing its objections to FMCT negotiations. There is a need to break the international logjam first over the treaty with the US ratifying the treaty. Secondly, Pakistan went along with the CTBT in the CD and voted positively for the CTBT in the UN General Assembly in 1996 but it held back its decision to join the treaty due to India’s refusal to do so and that situation has not changed even now. India specifically turned down US demands to commit to sign the CTBT or even accept a moratorium on nuclear testing as recently as 2008 at the time of signing of the US-India nuclear deal. Moreover, the report refers to Pakistan’s potential in making approximately 240 to 350 nuclear warheads in the next 10 years by picking up available estimates from open sources. However, India’s significant fissile material production potential (thanks to the Indo-US nuclear deal) is left to mere lack of political will. There is no explanation as to what are those political decision making indicators that have led to such a conclusion on Indian intentions. India links its nuclear weapons’ programme with both Pakistan and China, has resisted any regional strategic restraint proposals, has kept eight Candu type reactors out of safeguards besides its fast breeder reactors and is reportedly expanding its uranium enrichment programme — indicators enough to suggest otherwise. Lastly, the report implicitly reflects a larger geopolitical tone as well, which is that Pakistan should facilitate India’s growth by easing pressures on it. Some of the normalcy conditions outlined in the report could lead to easing that pressure. Therefore, this academic report appears to indicate a larger geopolitical bargain as well, which puts Pakistan at a disadvantage in the region. The Carnegie-Stimson report reflects the view of its authors and certainly there is no guarantee that even if hypothetically Pakistan chooses to act on these conditions, it will get the deal it desires. This brings us to the important question of what is it that Pakistan seeks when it talks about mainstreaming itself in the global nuclear order and under what conditions. Does it want the global nuclear order to be normalised or seek a pragmatic and conditioned inclusion within the current framework? Outlining a new blueprint or a framework by Pakistan in this regard will enrich the existing international debate on Pakistan’s nuclear programme away from misinformed fears and speculations. The writer is a freelance columnist