Notwithstanding several official clarifications, curiosity continues. The repeated rejections that no deal would come out of Sharif’s visit to Washington have flaunted a certain impression. Albeit, it was already being expected that any deal would not be likely to come to fruition during Sharif’s visit and the post-dialogue preliminary reports also avowed that US officials had denied the news of negotiations with Pakistan on a civil nuclear deal akin to the one given to the Indians. Yet, it is projected by nuclear experts that dialogue may have ended up on the issue of the deal. Peter R Lavoy, a long-time intelligence expert on the Pakistani nuclear programme and currently serving in the US National Security Council, had opined that “a deal like the one that is being discussed publicly is not something that is likely to come to fruition next week and I anticipate that dialogue would include conversations between the leaders of the two countries.” The revelation about the possibility of a civil nuclear accord with Pakistan being explored by the US came to light following a recent article by David Ignatius. The undiplomatic narrative by Ignatius disclosed that the “deal offered by Obama’s administration limit the scope of Pakistan’s nuclear programme in return for civil nuclear cooperation and an entry into the NSG that regulates global trade.” These trends nullify the apprehensions that Sharif went to beg for a civil nuclear deal because if the deal were negotiated then it was offered and not demanded. Moreover, such a scenario also represents US recognition of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals being safe. Reportedly, US officials have told Congress they are increasingly convinced that most of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under good safeguard, with warheads separated from delivery vehicles and a series of measures in place to guard against unauthorised use. Conversely, even if the deal has not been negotiated, the context of few recent developments including this visit shows significant shifts in policies. After the Indo-US nuclear deal, Pakistan sought a civil nuclear deal as well. Nonetheless, following the recent reports about mainstreaming Pakistan in the global nuclear order after accepting ‘brackets’ on its nuclear programme, the policymaking body of Pakistan’s strategic programme, the National Command Authority (NCA), explicitly rejected ‘brackets’ by reiterating the “national resolve to maintain full spectrum deterrence capability”. A Pakistani official was also quoted saying “We want a nuclear deal and are candidates for NSG membership but there is no desperation for this.” If this is the first time the US has seriously made a move to discuss Pakistan’s nuclear programme, Pakistan’s confidence is also for the first time apparent in refusing any deal that is not as suitable as the one offered to India. This shift on both sides is connected with several shifts in the international security order. The probable strongholds of Islamic State (IS) in western Asia and Afghanistan has yet again underlined a reason for the US to uphold stable relations with Pakistan viewing its strategic significance in the region. On the other hand, Russia’s renaissance in the west-Asian landscape, from Ukraine to Syria, has exhibited serious challenges for the US. In addition, the multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has evidently enhanced the geostrategic importance of the region and has forced the US not to let China become the dominant strategic player in the region. Possibly, the Obama administration may also want to offer a deal to score another diplomatic blockbuster after the Iranian nuclear deal. Apart from the above mentioned diplomatic and security pressures, the timing about the deal’s revelation, just before Sharif’s visit, is also interesting. As said by a US senior official, “the idea is to try to change the dynamic, see if helping them on the NSG would be a carrot for them to act in this other area”. As the comprehensive agenda discussed during the visit predominantly demanded cooperation in counter-terrorism, such an offer could be an effort to relate strategic weapons with terrorism. Pragmatically, a civil nuclear deal offered to Pakistan would bring the US to a crossroads. A senior Indian critic on the potential US-Pak deal said “it will show how hollow is the strategic relationship between India and the US, and why it would not be wise to trust the U.S. The India-US nuclear deal will be eroded of much of its strategic importance bilaterally as a result.” Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre said: “When it comes to things nuclear, the prospects for getting Pakistan to do something are pretty slim because you cannot expect them to do something unless we are willing to treat them identically with India.” Accordingly, Pakistan will not and should not accept limits on its nuclear programme because India is purchasing nuclear technology under the Indo-US nuclear deal without limiting its nuclear programme. Pakistan is already engaged with China on civil nuclear cooperation and steadily improving its relations with Russia. Evidently, in the transforming geostrategic landscape, the carrot to mainstream a nuclear Pakistan in the international order is a ‘need’ misunderstood by the US. The writer is a member of an Islamabad based think-tank, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), and can be reached at maimuna.svi@gmail.com. She tweets at @emm_aey