Despite the increase in pitch of the anti-drone voices across the globe, drone attacks continue. As does their defence: proponents of the military programme, as well as those who recognise its adverse affects, call it the ‘lesser evil’. Is this a legitimate argument if the evil entails opening up a Pandora’s box of blowback? Drones are developing rapidly to become the new darling of the defence industry. In 2001, during the Bush era, the US possessed 50 drones. By 2012, the country could boast over 7,500. The number of states worldwide with drone capability rose from about 40 in 2005 to more than 75 in 2012. Presently, only the US, UK and Israel are known to operate ‘killer’ drones. However, given the international demand for strategic drones such as the deadlier Predator and Reaper varieties — the likes of which are seen bombing alleged terrorist hideouts in Pakistan — it is prognosticated that more countries will acquire combat UAV capability in the near to medium future. According to rigorous data compiled by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, as of 2013, 411-884 civilians were reported killed in Pakistan since the commencement of the US drone campaign in 2004. Over 300 of the total 360 US drone strikes in FATA were carried out under the Obama administration. The Bureau’s figures show that civilian casualties occur in approximately one fifth of US drone strikes in Pakistan. Ever-expanding popularity of drones can be attributed to several factors, key of which are: Little or no risk to drone pilot and UAS crew; in fact ‘no body bags’ has been a major impetus behind the expansion of the US drone campaign. Cost-effective; UAVs are seemingly cheaper than manned alternatives for military strategy. A blasted or gunned-down drone is also easily replaceable. Endurance; drones can boast the ability to stay aloft for extended number of hours and days. ‘Smart’ bombs; drones are thought to be surgically precise and not indiscriminate like cluster munitions or other types of weapon systems currently available. The perceived utility of drones in asymmetrical warfare such as hunting al Qaeda in Pakistan’s north-western terrain; The US drone programme is effective: i.e., drone attacks yield fruitful results in the tribal areas of Pakistan by weakening terrorist networks like al Qaeda. For all these reasons, and the popular notion that drone warfare is a more favourable alternative to other forms of military operations, which thus far proved less precise, far riskier, and raise logistical problems, proponents of drone warfare have often deemed it the ‘lesser evil’. However, the lesser evil argument may hold little sway when the evil in question is compounding militancy in the region, and, potentially, abroad. The argument here is that drones are worse than other forms of military operations since these lower the political cost, fuel anger and resentment against the US as well as the local government and army, making larger groups susceptible to radical ideology. Considerable collateral damage, including civilian casualties, and an augmentation in anti-western sentiment — in particular, anti-Americanism — amongst the local populace, are often the epiphenomenon of deploying drone missiles. Due to the high percentage of collateral damage, the US has little chance of winning the hearts and minds essential for a long-term peace process. Present kill ratio is two militants to 10 civilians. Developments in the US drone programme, including ‘signature strikes’, also bodes ill for the level of collateral damage. Signature strikes constitute targeting an area based on perceived patterns of behaviour that look suspicious from aerial surveillance, rather than relying on intelligence about specific militant activists. That is, unidentified people in a ‘suspicious area’ can fall victim to such a strike. Alarming too are allegations of repeat strikes — secondary strikes after an initial drone attack — that occur when medical personnel, rescuers are on the ground to help the injured. These attacks constitute a war crime. The technological advantages of UAVs might be exaggerated: the technical precision of drones has been disputed, including by companies that developed software used in targeting. An oft-cited factor is ‘latency’ — the delay between movement on the ground and the transmission of the video image to the drone pilot. Even when they are precise, damage and deaths are not necessarily confined to the specific individual or structure targeted: the blast radius from a Hellfire missile extends from 15-20 metres. According to some estimates only two percent of those assassinated were high-level terrorists. Most others constituted obscure Pakistani Taliban, low-level militants, unknown even in US counterterrorism circles. This has raised questions about the legitimacy of the drone strikes that target these men. The high level of civilian casualties invariably brings into the spotlight flawed human intelligence (HUMINT). Some interlocutors argue there is no HUMINT, and the CIA is reliant on electronic intelligence and ‘one-time’ agents (hired amongst the locals); it is dubious whether these informers are objective in providing leads. The drone campaign in the tribal areas has elicited a movement of militants from the western border to other parts of either the tribal belt or bigger cities like Karachi. This has inevitably led to a weaker security situation in the largest Pakistani city, potentially further destabilising a fragile state. Major faux pas in US/NATO military operations have resulted in serious political and economic upheaval; for example, a NATO air strike on November 26, 2011 that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and prompted Islamabad to close its borders to US/NATO supply lines to Afghanistan (for up to eight months until a formal apology was finally delivered by Washington). Many analysts have argued that drone strikes constitute a tactic, not a strategy. In 2009 terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman of Georgetown University warned: “We are deluding ourselves if we think in and of itself the drone programme is going to be the answer.” Terrorism needs to be urgently understood as an offshoot of extremist ideology, and, therefore, its resolution should involve a political will and strategy. As a military strategy, drone attacks have proved to be lacking in efficacy, as we have witnessed in Afghanistan and increasingly in Pakistan. Drones as an alluring technology are likely to have lowered the political and psychological threshold of warfare. The remote-controlled nature of piloting a drone vehicle distances the pilot and crew from the immediate mortal and psychological threats normal to conventional forms of warfare. It is likely this has paved the way for a ‘PlayStation’ mentality that renders fighting less real and, therefore, easier to engage in. Along with being cost-effective, drone warfare is seen as risk-free, far removed from the traditional image of war as an act of national sacrifice and mobilisation, bloodshed, and political and economic fallout. The issue of legality has plagued the US drone campaign since its onset; however, it is only of late that it is picking up steam. Most observers view the US strikes as ‘extra-judicial killings’. The launch of a UN human rights inquiry into US drones in Pakistan (among other countries) in January 2013, and the recent US Congress debate on the issue suggest the legal aspect bears ramifications for western governments and their human rights laws. US drone attacks are fodder for jihadi propaganda who use it as a key rallying point. Drone attacks occur daily, and every strike is a reminder of US hegemony in the region. Having continued for nearly a decade now, the US-led (and at times, Pakistan-endorsed) drone programme makes up an indelible part of the jihadi psyche. This fact is reflected in the jihadi literature (Urdu) perused by the author. The concept of drone attacks is inherent to the new jihadi narrative and has been so since the onset of any/all military operations in the tribal belt of Pakistan. As is seen time and again in war history, technological advances appear to go unbridled without an advancement of concrete ‘strategic will’. Tactical and technological advances appear to lose out on the political front. It can be argued that drones, instead of providing conventional responses to asymmetric warfare, are piloting an ‘asymmetric’ response to unconventional threats. And one that is counterproductive to winning the war on terrorism. The writer is a freelance columnist