Our policy towards Afghanistan is based on utter ignorance. Despite hosting millions of Afghans as refugees for the last four decades and helping the country get rid of Soviet occupation as well as helping the UN-mandated international coalition forces under the aegis of the US to bring about democratic changes and reconstructing the war-ravaged country to achieve an honourable place in the comity of nations, Pakistan earned the hatred and ill will. Our dealings with the country are a litany of missed opportunities and miscalculations.
The reasons are obvious. Our whole narrative is India centric leaving no place for thinking otherwise and thus viewing Afghanistan through that prism of narrow diplomatic and administrative or, to be more correct, operational lenses. The result is absolute wastage of energy and expenses. Had it been Jihad years or afterwards during the US-led occupational period, we did not care for our abiding interests than to cater to American interests.
India is wiser. They harped the right strings and put a hand on right Afghan pulses from day one. British colonialists left all their files of Indian Political Intelligence about Afghanistan in view of which they dealt with Afghan landscape manipulating the decisions of the Loya jirgas, tribal jirgas, as well as of the inner decision-making process of Royal households. Pakistan lacks that asset and remains mired in ignorance about the Afghan ethos and milieu. The staff of our policy-making bodies and policy recommending outfits do not understand the languages spoken and written in Afghanistan and so, they remain utterly clueless about Afghanistan and its grass root knowledge. They are all hamstrung. They scratch the surface. Their thinking is faulty. Afghans are adept at manipulating Pakistani opinion and easily hide their in-depth thinking.
India is wiser. They harped the right strings and put a hand on right Afghan pulses from day one
Historically, Pakistan has always missed opportunities and in the end, created a problem for itself. Late President Daoud Khan was the architect of anti-Pakistan policy and a proponent of Pakhtunistan movement. He thought in the fashion of old Sardars who always remained at loggerhead with one another; demanding the share of the rival Sardar; capturing one of the Centres of Afghanistan, i.e., Herat, Kandahar, Peshawar and Turkestan etc. He considered Peshawar as one of those centres to be ruled from Kabul. But when the misadventure against Pakistan, in league with Wali Khan-led National Awami Party, flopped miserably during the seventies of the last century, he was all-out for rapprochement with Pakistan. He wanted his military officers to be trained in Pakistan while foregoing his irredentist claim on Pakistan, openly recognising Duran line as an international border and agreeing to the confederation proposal with Iran and Pakistan till he purged communist elements from his regime, that military coup against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto put a brake on it.
Bhutto was overthrown by a military coup in July 1977 and Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Zia, paid a friendly visit to Kabul in October 1977 and agreed to release the incarcerated high profile Pakhtun-Baluch leaders and disband the notorious Hyderabad Tribunal. President Daoud was adamant to mend fences with Pakistan. On the one hand, demanding training of his military cadres until then trained by the Soviet Union and India, he expressed his willingness to openly declare on Pakistani soil that Afghanistan was ready to recognise Duran Line as international boundary during his return visit to Pakistan in March 1978. Sadly, Zia ul Haq did not agree as he wanted the same declaration when he visited Kabul. According to General Faiz Ali Chishti, then corps commander of the central corps, he was in favour of that declaration to immediately take place, but when Zia visited Kabul, Zia forgot about that promise. But to my knowledge the visit never took place as in April President Daoud was toppled in a communist coup. Pakistan missed a golden opportunity and the main irritant between the two countries was left to continue. And that light-headedness guided our relationship with Afghanistan afterwards.
I remember when UN-sponsored proximity talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the aegis of US and Soviet Union reached conclusion and the Accord was going to be signed in Geneva on 11th April 1988 as decided between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the Afghan foreign minister, Abdul Wakil, at the eleventh hour refused to put signature on it despite the insistence of Soviet advisor, Kozyrev. Gorbachev flew to Tashkent and called President Najib to himself and asked him to prevail upon his foreign minister to abide by the deadline. Wakil brushed aside prodding of his President and remained adamant on his refusal. Failing, Najib came back to Kabul and the Politburo decided to replace foreign minister.
In the meantime, Gorbachev sent his envoy Yuli Voronsov to Geneva to probe the matter. Voronsov straightway goes to Intercontinental Hotel where Wakil and his delegation were staying and asked Wakil the reason for his refusal. Wakil objected to the non-interference clause of the Accord which indirectly signified as if Afghanistan was affixing signature upon the validity of Durand Line. Voronsov appreciated his stance and went to George Schultz, US Secretary of State, staying in Geneva to prevail upon Pakistani counterpart, Zain Noorani, to change the wording of the clause and, thus, instead of the 11th, the Accord was signed on 14th April. And the Kabul regime, which had decided to replace him, enhanced the image of Wakil and asked Ajmal Khattak to lead a procession against Durand Line, which Ajmal did.
The Bonn Agreement was another occasion to rectify this historic anomaly, but policymakers against stumbled and agreed on everything the US wanted them to do. Now when a new critical phase of Afghan reconciliation has reached and Pakistan is willingly following US wishes, it must not forget about this historic incongruity to tie the sides to insert in any agreement reached between them the recognition of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all regional countries under the existing borders. Mind it the Pakistan bashing and deep hatred entertained in Afghanistan stem from this single issue which does not figure in Afghan grievances.
The writer has spent 20 years in Afghanistan during President Daud’s and the Communist time and was one of the participants spearheading the sabotage movement from Afghanistan into Pakistan. He is author of his famous autobiography, “Faraib I Natmaam” in Urdu