It is now almost two months that the US and Taliban resumed talks after a three month hiatus. Media reports suggest that both sides have been sounding positive about the forward movement in the otherwise hectic negotiations and have even indicated that a final outcome is just a few days away. In principle, there is agreement on (a) withdrawal of US troops, (b) Taliban assurances not to allow Afghan territory to be used by Al-Quida/ISIS, (c) ceasefire or reduction in violence both against US troops and Afghan security forces, and (d) intra-Afghan dialogue. But the devil is in the detail. The high point on Afghanistan came in Davos last week, where Prime Minister Imran Khan along with President Trump spoke about the hectic efforts going on in bringing peace to Afghanistan and the ensuing cooperation between the US and Afghanistan that has galvanized the process of a rapprochement between the parties. There is no doubt that Pakistan has gone extra mile to convince the Taliban about the dividends of peace in the country and the region. However, if to go by the Taliban and the US account, major issues are still in a grey area including maximalist positions held by the major stakeholders be they are Ashraf Ghani led dispensation, or Afghan opposition and ethnic groups. Women, who have emerged as a formidable voice about their rights, have entertained grave concerns if Taliban come to power, as their experience with the religious militia in the past had been a nightmare to say the least. Unless Taliban settle for a power sharing formula and shun the centuries old “victor or vanquished” psyche, peace would remain elusive in the war-torn country While skepticism amongst various Afghan politico-ethnic groups is natural and not something new, serious Afghan analysts are particularly worried about the fate of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which would ultimately provide the necessary glue to keep the country together and neutralize groups and factions vying to indulge in chaos and anarchy in the post US Troop withdrawal period. The US response is somewhat mute about the future of ANSF and its sustenance, at least for the time being or perhaps using as a bargaining chip while discussing the fate of four American bases in the country which the US wants to maintain at least for the foreseeable future to monitor Al-Qaida and ISIS although major neighbours of Afghanistan (Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran) may not be favourably disposed towards those bases. However, there is a possibility that the Taliban may agree to limited American presence to counter Al-Quida/ISIS provided the US adequately compensate for using Afghan bases and also obtain consent of the neighbours of Afghanistan. As regards ANSF, Taliban may have their own priorities which may not require maintaining a huge or sophisticated military paraphernalia. Given the Taliban’s interaction with China, Russia and Iran, there is a likelihood that Taliban would sue for neutrality in the neighbourhood which should serve as an adequate guarantee to the neighbours of Afghanistan that (a) Taliban agenda is not outward looking; (b) they would not allow Afghan soil to be used by extremists or separatists, and that(c) they would prefer to maintain a slim and trim army rather than depending on foreign sources. This should address the Indian concerns that after the withdrawal of the US troops, Taliban would be free to look for new franchises in India. Secondly, this should also address the concerns of hawkish Indian analysts (Praveen Swami) who are suggesting to Mr. Modi that in order to establish its credentials as a regional power, India may consider sending a brigade or division level contingent to Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US forces. However, on a serious note, fate of ANSF would remain a major issue to be sorted out by the US and Taliban. In all probability, Taliban may allow US troops to stay till the end of 2020 but not beyond. Afghanistan’s neighbours also seem to have consensus to this deadline.Then there is the issue of Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), which was signed by President Ashraf Ghani soon after taking power in 2014. The agreement provides immunity to the US soldiers from prosecution while performing duty in Afghanistan. Taliban are not likely to adhere to the BSA which would make US troops stay in Afghanistan further difficult, especially when the Taliban would be the major stakeholders in the country. For Pakistan, there should be no doubt that real challenges lie ahead with myriad problems not only the post-withdrawal Afghanistan is likely to face but its fallout on Pakistan. First, the factors that caused the civil war in Afghanistan and 9/11 are still there although Al-Quida may have been effectively sidelined. The threat of Daesh/ISIS is very much there and Afghans soil is very much infested with these groups. Second, although American intervention in Afghanistan has not brought about stability to Afghanistan, their withdrawal would nevertheless create a vacuum, at least to the extent of supporting the country financially. Third, Afghanistan would remain dependent on Pakistan in the foreseeable future, at least in areas of food security, refugees, health and education. Fourth, non-Pashtun factions would remain skeptical of post-Ghani dispensation, most probably dominated by the Taliban. Non-Pushtun factions would remain skeptical of Pakistan unless the latter publically maintains a “no-favourite” policy. Fifth, It is apparent that Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras are not going to give in to Taliban diktat so easily. These groups are much more organized and loaded with weapons. They are going to resist Taliban with all their might. Former Second Vice President and Hezb-e Wahdat Chief Ustad Mohaqqiq said in Islamabad two weeks ago that “we are ready to have peace provided it is based on justice and honour…. Otherwise, we are already in a state of war (with Taliban)”. Ideally, President Ghani should have been holding dialogue with the Taliban but after six years into power he has failed to provide good governance to the country or create a constituency for himself to be recognized as leader of all factions. His position has further weakened after 28 September 2019 presidential election with 12% turnout. The credibility of presidential election has become doubtful amongst major competitors; Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the closest rival to Mr. Ghani has rejected the results of the elections calling it a sham. Other political and ethnic groups have equally been critical of the electoral exercise. Therefore, in the evolving situation the foremost challenge for Afghanistan in the post withdrawal period would be a rapprochement between the Afghan factions. Unless Taliban settle for a power sharing formula and shun the centuries old “victor or vanquished” psyche, peace would remain elusive in the war-torn country. And don’t forget about the spoilers within and outside Afghanistan, who would be too happy to see Afghanistan bleed forever. The writer is a former ambassador