The post-World War II International Order is undergoing momentous changes. The recent trajectory of US-China-Russia relations suggests an intensification of strategic competition between the global hegemon and the ascending Eurasian powers. Prior to WW-II, the axis powers (Japan, Germany and Italy) challenged the established world order, which was largely controlled by Britain and the US. The Axis was determined to change the status quo that, eventually, resulted in a world war. Now, China and Russia are forging a similar strategic partnership to undermine American supremacy. The two countries are forming their own axis; seeking to break up the US-dominated world order and create a multi-polar world. Sino-Soviet relations were quite friendly in the beginning as the shared commonality of an ideological basis. Their collective strength was first demonstrated when Chinese forces supported Soviet-backed North Korea during a three-year war with its US-backed neighbour, South Korea. But Russia and China fell over ideological differences as Stalin’s eventual successor, Khrushchev, softened the Soviet’s stance toward the West; infuriating a more hard-line Chairman Mao. After growing estranged and even engaging in sporadic border clashes, their communist alliance officially expired in 1979. With the help of Pakistan, China, meanwhile, developed a working relationship with the US. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the de facto US-China understanding also ended. Subsequently, a China-Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a “constructive partnership.” In 1996, they progressed toward a “strategic partnership.” Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, Jiang Zemin, signed the 20-year Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001. While the document did not explicitly mandate that one of them use military action to defend the other and mostly focused on improving economic and diplomatic relations, it did call on Russia and China to “increase trust between their militaries” and “expand and deepen confidence-building measures in the military field.” Since then and in recent years especially, Russia and China have sought to both bolster and modernise their own armed forces while participating in joint manoeuvres and attempting to limit what they see as an expansionist US military. As an indication of their strong bond, China has purchased more weapons from Russia than from any other country, with around four-fifths of its foreign weapons coming from Russia. Meanwhile, Beijing has been one of Moscow’s major arms clients–around one-fourth of the Russian Federation’s defence exports have gone to China. Besides, the economic relationship between Russia and China also seems to be progressing. Shortly, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia announced a $400 billion deal to supply 38 billion cubic meters (BCM) gas to China annually for 30 years, beginning in 2019. The contract signed between Russia’s state-owned energy giant Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation entails the construction of a 2500-mile gas pipeline to China’s Heilongjiang province (where the two countries nearly went to war a few decades ago). Moreover, Gazprom also announced a framework agreement to deliver an additional 30 BCM gas to China’s Xingjiang Province from Western Siberia for 30 years via another new pipeline. If the “eastern” and “western” pipelines are completed as planned, the 68 BCM they deliver to China annually would dwarf the 40 BCM that Russia exports to its current largest customer, Germany. With the help of Pakistan, China developed a working relationship with the US Future of the Sino-Russian Alliance Therefore, at least six reasons are on the table to believe that the tacit partnership between Russia and China is durable. Firstly, Putin and Xi have been relying on very similar ideologies to justify their rule. They both emphasise pride in the socialist era, Sino-centrism or Russo-centrism that seeks to extend the countries’ existing internal political order outward, and anti-hegemonism. Secondly, China and Russia are underscoring their historical differences with the West and emphasising their Cold War-era divide with the US. Policymakers and analysts, in both countries, increasingly argue that the West never changed its imperialist Cold War mindset (as evidenced by its support for so-called colour revolutions in Ukraine and Hong Kong). This rhetoric implies that China and Russia are still obliged to resist its influence and help create a new international order. Thirdly, both countries have argued that the global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrates that the West’s economic and political model is on the verge of failure and inferior to their own models. Fourthly, Putin and Xi have emphasised the importance of Chinese-Russian bilateral relations in the face of outside threats. This is a corollary of both governments’ emphasis on the importance of communism, whether as the currently reigning ideology (in China) or as a positive historical legacy (in Russia). This has left both countries with few natural ideological allies other than each other. Fifthly, Russia and China have made a successful effort to stay on the same side in international disputes. Rather than clash openly over regional issues, such as Vietnam’s territorial and energy policies, China and Russia have discouraged public discussion of their differences, thus minimizing public pressure in each country to stand up to the other. At the same time, each country has trumpeted the threat of the United States and its allies in any dispute that bears on either country. Lastly, there are official campaigns underway in both countries to promote national identity. Putin and Xi have used all the resources at their disposal to mobilise their respective countries behind a political narrative that justifies domestic policies and foreign strategies. These appeals have been effective because they draw on historical grievances. The result in both countries has been the most significant spike in nationalism since the height of the Cold War. Moreover, from the perspective of Russia’s ruling elite keen to protect its interests, the rationale for partnering with China is reinforced by the complementary nature of the two countries’ economies. China is a manufacturing giant, while Russia is rich in natural resources. China has a huge pool of labour, while Russia has a severe demographic problem. Each side’s comparative advantage complements that of the other. Trade and economic relations with China do not require reforms in Russia, which essentially calls for the perpetuation of the status quo. Thus, the interests of major Russian economic actors and interest groups are not threatened by the partnership with China. To Be Continued The writer is a freelance columnist