Indian hypocrisy at nuclear nonproliferation regime is significantly downplayed by the international community. Indian nuclear credentials as well as their claim to be a ‘responsible nuclear weapon state’ come with its own double-standards. For instance, the alarming increase in Indian fissile material stockpiles at its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities offer a wake-up call for the International Atomic Watchdog Agency, namely International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In this regard, Indian vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation seems to have no end to it. India has remained involved in horizontal nuclear proliferation for transferring the nuclear related technology and its knowledge to states like Iran, Iraq, Egypt and North Korea. The most recent North Korean case reportedly mentioned the involvement of Indian Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) in technical training of North Koreans in missile and space programs. Similarly, the first recorded Indian vertical nuclear proliferation incident was observed when India diverted the fuel from CANDU reactor toward military purposes. Other examples of vertical proliferation include importing of illicit nuclear technology from the U.S., Japan and Europe as well. Most interestingly, the U.S. had earlier blacklisted two main Indian national organizations- Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). However, with the change in the geo-strategic interests of the U.S. in India, the U.S. is enhancing cooperation with these national organizations and also promoting preferential treatment toward India since its 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver. NSG is an informal group of 48 Participating Governments (PGs) that promote the trade of civil use of nuclear technology. The 2008 NSG waiver to India was breakthrough moment for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is ironic to see the shifting geo-political interests of the PGs to grant India such a waiver as the formation of this export cartel was in response of India’s testing of its so-called peaceful nuclear explosions in 1974. NSG should not adopt any discriminatory approach toward adding new non-Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) members in the group. It needs to recall its core contribution that helps states to achieve their respective socio-economic goals through fulfilling their nuclear energy vision Additionally, Indian officials have deliberated at several forums that India requires at least 350-400 nuclear warheads, including thermonuclear warheads. The academic literature has suggested that India is diverting its reactor-grade plutonium from its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. India also desires to utilize such fissile material in its naval propulsion program. Another study has reflected that Indian unsafeguarded nuclear fuel has the potential to add 356 to 493 plutonium nuclear warheads to its already expanding arsenal. The fast breeder reactor in India is capable of producing 144kg of weapon-grade plutonium and can assist India in developing 28 nuclear warheads per-year. With such developments, India nuclear arsenal is well on its way to become the third fastest growing nuclear arsenal after U.S. and Russia. Additionally, India has recently revealed that the world’s largest uranium reserves are found in its southern state of Andhra Pradesh. Furthermore, the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) is also planning to start 13 uranium mining projects aimed towards increasing its production by up to four times in the near future. Despite this, India aims to seek more uranium for its civil nuclear plants from Participating Governments of the NSG. As of recently, India has concluded around 14 nuclear deals with different states including Argentina, Australia, Japan, Russia, France, Germany, Kazakhstan, Canada, Czech Republic, South Korea, Vietnam, Magnolia, Nigeria and Namibia. All those PGs which will provide civil nuclear fuel to India will contribute in freeing up its national uranium reserves that can possibly be used for military purposes in future. Therefore, the strategic stability of South Asia is moving toward a dangerous path. NSG should not adopt any discriminatory approach toward adding new non-Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) members in the group. It needs to recall its core contribution that helps states to achieve their respective socio-economic goals through fulfilling their nuclear energy vision. It needs to address this issue of ‘criteria-based approach’ for all non-NPT nuclear weapons states on equal basis. Pakistan also aims to become a full member of the NSG and desires to achieve the benefits of nuclear energy as a means of achieving its energy vision 2030. Lastly, the trends of Indian nuclear (ab) normalcy needs to be addressed by the international community. Recent acts have revealed that Indian nuclear ambitions go beyond its region and hence may be complicating the strategic stability of the not just the region but the entire world. The author is a Visiting Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI)