The Boya camp attack in North Waziristan, which killed four Pakistani soldiers and injured civilians, did not surprise anyone watching the western border. Violence there has not crept back; it has returned in force. Islamabad’s decision to summon the Afghan chargé d’affaires was therefore less a show of anger than an admission that its patience has run thin.
Pakistan has named the Gul Bahadur faction of the TTP as responsible. That attribution matters because the group operates from areas under Taliban control. Kabul’s response has been to deny, deflect, and point to Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities. UN monitoring teams, however, have already found Taliban claims of dismantling militant sanctuaries to be not credible.
This is not about reopening old arguments over Pakistan’s past choices. The question now is present tense. The Afghan Taliban run a state, collect taxes, police cities, and conduct diplomacy. A government that can do all this can also stop armed factions from using its territory to kill neighbours. Choosing not to, hence, constitutes a deliberate policy choice. Nothing more and nothing else.
That Pakistan now ranks among the most terror-affected countries in the world should be enough to end the pretence that denial and deflection are acceptable substitutes for action. Attacks have more than doubled, and fatalities are concentrated along the western belt. These statistics translate into soldiers killed at posts, families caught near checkpoints, and towns sliding back into curfews and fear.
What Pakistan needs is continuity and proof. The law already allows targeted proscription, financial tracing, and coordinated prosecution. Parliament should call for regular disclosures on cross-border threats and the steps taken to counter them, forcing institutions to work from evidence rather than emotion. Similarly, diplomacy should be tethered to the oft-repeated benchmarks of arrests, camp closures, and verifiable action, not assurances.
The Taliban’s governing bargain is visible. Allied militants are tolerated so long as they do not challenge Kabul. Pakistan should state its position plainly and take the case where it counts–UN sanctions bodies, regional forums, and capitals still inclined to take Taliban promises at face value.
Calls for a befitting reply satisfy anger but fade quickly. What lasts is a policy that narrows the space for denial and protects people on both sides of the border from becoming hostages to militancy. That is the test Islamabad must now insist on, without theatrics. *