Pak-Afghan border clashes have left many wondering how we arrived at this breaking point.
The western border was envisioned as Pakistan’s strategic depth, but how did it become an active war front, even hotter than the eastern border with arch-rival India?
The question is valid, but the answer is not obscure or a matter of political opinion subject to contestation. So much so that it would not be wrong to contend that a mere chronology of events suffices to show that Pakistan’s recent retaliatory strikes, which prompted the Taliban’s border aggression, were neither sudden nor unjustified.
These precision strikes against TTP were Pakistan’s last resort after exhausting every peaceful avenue.
When the Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021, almost every country severed ties and vacated its embassy. However, out of goodwill, Pakistan took a different path. It not only kept its embassy open but also retained a full-time ambassador. It effectively meant that Pakistan had extended de facto recognition to the Taliban regime. This policy was not driven by reciprocity or realpolitik but by a sincere wish that the Afghan people deserved peace and prosperity after a long war.
When the Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021, almost every country severed ties and vacated its embassy.
In pursuance of this policy, during post-withdrawal UN-led conferences, Pakistan consistently lobbied for the unfreezing of Afghanistan’s foreign reserves and the lifting of sanctions. Islamabad even utilised regional platforms like the Economic Cooperation Organisation ECO to push the same agenda. Pakistan’s Dr Asad Majeed Khan, the former foreign secretary and current ECO secretary general, took the lead to revive the ECO Advocacy Programme for Afghanistan EAPA. The programme aimed to mobilise regional and global support for Afghanistan. In return for all this goodwill, Pakistan expected the Taliban regime to do the bare minimum vis-à-vis Pakistan’s core security concern, the presence of the Fitna Al Khawarij in Afghanistan. There was little progress on the Afghan side. Yet again, Pakistan chose the path of patience and engagement.
Pakistan engaged with Kabul on all possible levels -religious, tribal, and official -to seek an amicable resolution.
Even when Pakistan’s relations with India were sour in the aftermath of the revocation of IIOJK’s special status, Pakistan never hesitated to compromise for the Afghans. In November 2021, amid the looming threat of famine in Afghanistan, Pakistan allowed the transport of 50,000 tons of Indian wheat and critical medical supplies via the Wagah border purely on humanitarian grounds.
Later in July 2022, an eight-member delegation of prominent ulema led by Mufti Taqi Usmani visited Kabul to persuade both TTP and TTA to halt their attacks on Pakistan. A few days later, a 17-member jirga of tribal elders travelled to Kabul.
On 22 February 2023, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif and DG ISI Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum led a high-level delegation to press for coordinated border security. More recently, in July 2025, Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Kabul to discuss joint counterterrorism mechanisms.
Pakistan’s diplomatic overtures were not merely exhortative; they carried tangible benefits. Pakistan’s special envoy, Ambassador Muhammad Sadiq, led tireless efforts that resulted in the signing of the Early Harvest Programme EHP, reducing tariffs on eight key agricultural items. It was a foundation stone of a Preferential Trade Agreement PTA leading to a Free Trade Agreement FTA. What did Pakistan get in return despite all these gestures? Over these years, cross-border Kharji attacks have constantly been on the rise. According to data compiled by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies PIPS, Pakistan had 89 attacks in 2021, 262 in 2022, 306 in 2023, 521 in 2024 and 585 till October 2025.
The greatest of all betrayals came during Pakistan’s four-day war with India. As Pakistan was engaged on the eastern front, a 40-member Kharji tashkeel, including the son of a senior Taliban official, crossed into Pakistan. Thanks to vigilant security forces, the attack was foiled. Nevertheless, the episode exposed the depth of collusion between the Taliban and India. It also puts the ongoing visit of Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India into perspective.
In this context, recent attacks on Kharji Noor Wali were a response to the Taliban’s longstanding policy. On 8 October, twelve Pakistani soldiers, including a lieutenant colonel and two majors, were martyred in intelligence-based operations against Afghanistan-backed Kharjis in Orakzai and Dera Ismail Khan districts.
Pakistan’s patience had run out.
Pakistan responded with precise strikes targeting only TTP leadership inside Afghanistan. In return, the Taliban openly came to the defence of their Kharji allies. First, they sent a group named Tahaffuz e Imarat e Islami Force TIF to attack the Police Training School in Dera Ismail Khan, martyring seven policemen. A day later, Afghanistan launched cross-border attacks.
Now ask yourself, is Pakistan the aggressor or a state defending its people?
Still, Pakistan remains open to sincere dialogue, but it has made one point abundantly clear. Pakistani lives matter and every act of terrorism carries retribution.
The writer is an independent researcher and can be emailed at [email protected]. He tweets @tequieremos