The Supreme Court of Pakistan has finally issued its detailed reasoning in the reserved seats review case on 2nd October 2025, bringing closure to a much-awaited constitutional controversy. In doing so, the Court has revisited important propositions of constitutional law which not only relate to electoral provisions but also bear upon the broader question of judicial jurisdiction while interpreting the Constitution. The decision carries profound implications for the future of electoral politics, party discipline, and the proper limits of judicial authority in Pakistan.
The allocation of reserved seats is specifically governed by the Constitution. Articles 51(6)(d) and 106(3)(c) clearly provide that seats reserved for women and non-Muslims in the National and Provincial Assemblies are to be proportionately allocated to political parties on the basis of the number of general seats they secure. This scheme is straightforward: unless a political party contests elections and wins at least one general seat, it cannot claim any share in reserved seats. The framers of the Constitution deliberately designed this mechanism to ensure discipline in the electoral process, to prevent post-election manipulations, and to translate electoral support into parliamentary representation in a transparent and accountable manner.
Doctrine of constitutional fidelity was without precedent either in Pakistani jurisprudence or comparative constitutional law.
This constitutional scheme is implemented by the Elections Act, 2017. Section 104 of the Act, as amended on 8 August 2024, expressly restricts eligibility for reserved seats to political parties that not only contested the elections but also succeeded in winning at least one general seat. Section 105 requires political parties to submit a priority list of candidates for reserved seats before the nomination deadline. Section 106 provides that reserved seats shall be distributed among parties in proportion to the general seats they secure, and Rule 92(6) of the Election Rules, 2017, further reinforces that no amendments can be made to priority lists after the deadline has expired. This comprehensive statutory framework complements the Constitution by setting out a step-by-step procedure which leaves no ambiguity. The constitutional and statutory texts, read together, demonstrate that entitlement to reserved seats is conditional upon prior compliance with electoral law and cannot arise from post-election maneuvers.
In this background, the claim of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) came under judicial scrutiny. In the general elections of 8 February 2024, SIC did not contest on its own electoral symbol, nor did it submit any priority list of candidates for reserved seats. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), meanwhile, also failed to contest elections on its common party symbol as required by Section 215 of the Elections Act, 2017. Instead, a large number of PTI-backed candidates contested as independents. After the elections, many of these independents announced that they had joined SIC. On the strength of this post-election alignment, SIC submitted an application to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) seeking allocation of reserved seats. It argued that since PTI-backed independents had joined SIC, reserved seats should now be proportionally allocated to SIC.
The ECP, through an order dated 1 March 2024, rejected this claim. It held that SIC had not fulfilled the constitutional and legal requirements necessary for allocation of reserved seats. The Peshawar High Court, on 28 March 2024, upheld the ECP’s reasoning and dismissed the SIC’s claim. At no point did PTI itself appear before the ECP to stake any claim. PTI also refrained from challenging the decision before the High Court or the Supreme Court. In effect, PTI’s inaction closed the door to any subsequent claim.
Despite this settled legal background, the Supreme Court on 22 September 2024, by a majority of eight to five, accepted SIC’s appeals. The Court held that SIC was entitled to reserved seats, relying primarily on Article 187 of the Constitution, which empowers the Court to do “complete justice,” and a newly articulated doctrine of “constitutional fidelity.” The majority judgment was highly legally controversial. It interpreted Article 17(2), which guarantees the right to form or join political parties, in an expansive manner that undermined the explicit preconditions laid down in Articles 51 and 106. It also relied on Article 187 to craft relief which was not only never sought by PTI but also contradicted the constitutional framework. The outcome was that reserved seats were effectively transferred to SIC and, by implication, to PTI-backed independents, despite the fact that neither party had complied with mandatory electoral requirements.
This judgment raised serious concerns over constitutional propriety, judicial neutrality, and the boundaries of judicial power. Article 175(2) of the Constitution clearly mandates that the judiciary shall exercise powers conferred upon it by the Constitution or by law. Article 187 is not an independent or unlimited jurisdictional source; it can only be invoked in aid of matters that are otherwise properly before the Court. By relying on Article 187 in the absence of any lis filed by PTI, the majority judgment disregarded the constitutional structure of electoral law. Furthermore, the so-called doctrine of constitutional fidelity was without precedent either in Pakistani jurisprudence or comparative constitutional law.
The review petitions filed against the majority decision brought these issues back before the Supreme Court. In its recent detailed reasons, the Court accepted the review and set aside the September 22 judgment. It held that Articles 51 and 106, read with the Elections Act and Election Rules, provide a self-contained and mandatory framework for allocation of reserved seats. These provisions require that a party must contest elections on its symbol, submit a priority list within time, and win at least one general seat. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, no claim can arise to reserved seats. The Court categorically rejected the argument that post-election alignments, such as independents joining SIC, could create an entitlement that the Constitution itself does not provide.
The Court further clarified that Article 187 is not a stand-alone provision. It may only be applied when the Court is already seized of a matter under Articles 184, 185, 186, or 188 of the Constitution. Even then, the power must be exercised sparingly and only to ensure that justice is done in accordance with the Constitution and law. The review bench held that invoking Article 187 to extend relief to PTI, which was not even a party before the ECP, the Peshawar High Court, or the Supreme Court, was wholly unwarranted. Similarly, Article 17(2), which protects the right to form or join a political party, could not be interpreted to override the explicit and unambiguous requirements of Articles 51 and 106 or the statutory provisions enacted by Parliament.
The review judgment restores constitutional coherence and aligns with the Court’s own recent jurisprudence in other landmark cases. In the Article 62(1)(f) disqualification reviews, the Court stressed the importance of adhering to the text of the Constitution rather than stretching it beyond recognition. In the Practice and Procedure Act 2023 case, the Court accepted legislative supremacy and acknowledged Parliament’s role in shaping judicial process. In the Article 63A defection case, the Court reinforced the principle of party discipline and legislative clarity. In the challenges to military courts and NAB amendments, the Court reiterated the need for judicial restraint and respect for the separation of powers. The review judgment on reserved seats is consistent with this emerging jurisprudential approach, which places constitutional text and legislative will above judicial improvisation.
The controversy over reserved seats had fractured judicial consensus and destabilized electoral jurisprudence. By correcting course, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that even its own authority is bounded by the Constitution. The message is clear: electoral representation must flow from the ballot box and the election schedule, not from post-election alignments or judicial innovations.
Ultimately, the review judgment underscores a central constitutional truth: the power of interpretation does not include the power of amendment. The judiciary may interpret but cannot rewrite the Constitution. Articles 51 and 106 provide a complete scheme for reserved seats. Article 187 cannot be used to circumvent that scheme, nor can Article 17 be invoked to create entitlements where none exist. The decision re-establishes that only those political parties which contest elections under a common symbol, submit priority lists within the prescribed timelines, and win at least one general seat are entitled to reserved seats. This is not only a matter of textual fidelity but also of respecting the will of the people as expressed through the Constitution and electoral laws enacted by Parliament.
By accepting the review petitions and setting aside the earlier majority judgment, the Supreme Court has restored fidelity to the Constitution and reinforced the democratic principle that legitimacy arises from compliance with law. The reserved seats controversy is thus a reminder that constitutional governance requires discipline, restraint, and respect for the boundaries set by the people through their supreme law. The Court’s detailed reasoning has now corrected the course of electoral jurisprudence and, in doing so, has strengthened both constitutionalism and democracy in Pakistan.
The writer is a practicing lawyer at Supreme Court and has served as Chairman, Federal Excise & Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and Senior Advisor Federal Ombudsman. Email: hafizahsaan47 @gmail.com