Elections are set to take place in Pakistan; with political parties gearing up to enter the electoral arena. Finalization of candidates is underway for each constituency. Formation of alliances, possible factions breaking up and seat adjustments are being discussed everywhere. Despite a lapse of time beyond the constitutional deadline, most politicians in the arena seem to be coming to terms with the fact that they cannot come to power, let alone sustain it, without support from the mighty. One party, however, right in the midst of all these activities, seems to have landed itself in a tight spot where it can neither get out of the mess it created for itself nor accept the realities of politics in Pakistan. That one party is Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf, a party nourished, pampered, favoured and brought to power by the establishment. General Elections in 2018 had resulted in PTI and Imran Khan coming to power for the first time. Other things first seen in these elections were the use of RTS (Result Transfer System) for swift transmission of electoral results and its subsequent shutdown during the terminal stages of the counting process. It is widely believed that the shutting down of RTS played a role in skewing the numbers in favour of PTI. Nevertheless, faced with the failure to secure a majority, a deep-pocketed politician had to use his personal capital and influence to buy the loyalties of independent members of the assembly. The first three years in power saw Imran Khan managing to maintain an exemplary relationship with the establishment as he consistently claimed to have a seamless understanding of the establishment, emphasizing a unified front at all times. Imran Khan asserted that he had not allowed unnecessary interference from the establishment in his political decisions and practical wisdom. He reiterated at every moment that he was responsible for every major decision made at the national level during this period. He accepted responsibility for all state actions and shortcomings highlighted at all levels. However, the unfortunate reality is that the PTI government faced severe setbacks not only in the economic arena but also on the diplomatic front. Asad Umar, the brain behind PTI’s economic policies, had to be replaced and another candidate for the position of Finance Minister was nominated. Relations with India deteriorated to the extent that Prime Minister Imran Khan had to publicly acknowledge that Indian Prime Minister Modi does not take his calls. Despite your strong advocacy for democracy and constitutional supremacy, one must recognize that Pakistan’s specific geography necessitates a distinct perspective on the military establishment. By the beginning of 2021, the situation had escalated to the point where the establishment had given a green signal to the opposition parties to bring a motion of no-confidence against the Imran Khan government. It was also widely believed that they would not create obstacles during this entire process. The Imran Khan government made every possible effort to keep itself in power in the parliamentary halls. The tenure of Army Chief General Bajwa was extended during his service for a second term. After the emergence of the opposition’s no-confidence motion, Imran Khan’s threat that he would prove to be very dangerous was not enough to break the alliance between the opposition and the establishment. Imran Khan had to retreat, lift his diary, and return to Banigala. Pakistan’s political history of over 75 years is marked by a series of such events. The narrative here repeats itself, from Liaquat Ali Khan’s Muslim League to Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N. Politicians come and go in power, only to return or be sent back. From Ayub Khan’s martial law, where seemingly everything was behind the scenes, to subsequent eras, much has come to light in the public eye. No one, apart from General Zia’s 11 years and General Musharraf’s nine years, had the opportunity to complete a constitutional term in a proper manner. Successive governments came and went in the corridors of power. The duration between their arrivals and departures was as long as their relations with the establishment remained favourable. It is imperative to acknowledge that, despite your strong advocacy for democracy and constitutional supremacy, one must recognize that Pakistan’s specific geography necessitates a distinct perspective on the military establishment. In Pakistan, matters of defence are intertwined with foreign affairs and are controlled by the GHQ, and this reality is as clear as daylight. The Geneva Agreement following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan against General Zia’s wishes proved to be fatal for the Junejo government. Prime Minister Junejo had firmly instructed the Foreign Minister, Zain Noorani, that he should not return before the signing of the Geneva Accord. After the plane crash that resulted in the death of General Zia, the newly emerging Benazir Bhutto had to negotiate to come to power. It was agreed that Ghulam Ishaq Khan would remain in the presidency, and Lieutenant General (Retired) Sahibzada Yaqub Khan would continue in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, attempting to assert her authority, sought to control the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) and appointed retired General Shamsur Rahman Kallu as the head of ISI. However, she still struggled to keep matters within her reach. God knows best who planned and executed the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, but the fact remains that despite coming to power right after her assassination, her husband Asif Ali Zardari and her party failed to oversee an effective investigation of her gruesome murder. The political upheavals of the 1980s and 1990s in Pakistan are both fascinating and instructive. Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1988, only to be sent home in 1991 and replaced with Nawaz Sharif. In 1994, Nawaz Sharif was ousted, and Benazir Bhutto returned. In 1997, Benazir Bhutto stepped down again, and Nawaz Sharif was handed power for the second time. In 1999, General Musharraf not only ousted Nawaz Sharif, who had a two-thirds majority in parliament but also, after giving him a harsh legal sentence, forced him into exile. Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister for the third time in 2013. However, following protracted legal proceedings and an unsuccessful relationship with the establishment, he was once again forced to step down from power. After the era of General Zia, it became evident from the records that the establishment in Pakistan had acquired a status akin to an immovable rock in the political system. Anyone who attempts to collide with this rock faces a formidable challenge. On one side, there was continuous tension with India, on the other, American interest in China’s affairs, thirdly, American opposition with Iran, and then the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 followed by American intervention in 2001 – the circumstances arising from these events necessitated swift decision-making in Pakistan. It was crucial that there be no obstacles in the path of its implementation. The recent example of Nawaz Sharif chanting the slogan “Respect the Vote” is indicative that as he approaches the threshold of power, he acknowledges the reality that it is not advisable to quarrel with the Pope while living in Rome. In this entire scenario, the party that has opened its eyes to the influence is the MQM, which attempted rebellion and has now become a rolling stone. At times, it has allied with the Pakistan Peoples Party, at other times with the PML-N, and at times with the PTI. The story of the PML-Q is not much different either. The saga began with Imran Khan and his PTI, who, like Nawaz Sharif, have been planted in the garden. They are entangled in this struggle, believing that they can defeat the establishment and, as a result, their party is now emerging as highly organized and robust. If Imran Khan continues to adhere to this mindset, then his role in the future of Pakistani politics would be nowhere. The purpose of this entire debate is by no means to support giving the establishment any constitutional status or declaring it right in Pakistani politics. Not at all, but there is a strong likelihood that, with time, all might confine themselves to their constitutional role. However, pinpointing the timing for this shift remains a challenge. Those who are eager to test their fate in Pakistani politics, in the meantime, need to accept that quarrelling with the Pope while living in Rome is not feasible. Imran Khan, too, needs to realize this, and the possibility of the doors of Adiala Jail opening for him might as well increase. The writer is a veteran journalist based in Islamabad. He writes on social, political, economic, defence and strategic developments across the South Asian region. He can be reached through email at zm.journalist@gmail.com