The Origins of the Latest Dispute On the evening of August 23, 2023, at 5 o’clock, in the Skardu City police station in Pakistan, an FIR (First Information Report) numbered 51457 was filed. The person filing the FIR did not mention their name anywhere in the request but instead mentioned their organizational position as the “General Secretary of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat Gilgit-Baltistan.” The FIR was filed by SHO (Station House Officer) and Inspector Ghulam Ali under sections 295-A, 298, and 298-A of the Pakistan Penal Code. The application submitted to include the FIR stated that Agha Syed Baqir al-Husseini, the President of the Imamia Association of Gilgit-Baltistan, used derogatory language against the companions of Prophet Muhammad in his speech at Jamia Masjid Skardu, causing severe emotional distress to Muslims. This act is seen as a conspiracy to spread sectarian strife in the country, and it amounts to treason against Pakistan by indirectly inviting Karmalik. Maintaining Gilgit-Baltistan’s separate status from the rest of Pakistan serves a strategic purpose, bolstering Pakistan’s position in the United Nations concerning the Kashmir issue. Therefore, the Ahle Sunnat organization of Gilgit-Baltistan demands immediate action by reporting it as an insult to the nation and the country, so that no one can escape the reach of the law. The news of the FIR filed in Skardu City spread throughout Gilgit-Baltistan like wildfire. Unraveling the Region’s Sensitivities Gilgit-Baltistan, covering an area of 72,971 square kilometres, is located in the northern part of Pakistan. According to the latest population census, it is home to over 1.5 million people. This region was once part of united Kashmir. It shares borders with China on one side, India on the other, and Pakistan on the third. Historically, it was connected to China through a Silk Road route during the era of United India. After resisting the Indian army following Pakistan’s creation, the people here declared their affiliation with Pakistan. Initially, it was granted special status in Pakistan’s constitution as the ‘Northern Areas,’ but in the 1990s, a decision by Pakistan’s Supreme Court conferred constitutional rights on the population. Interestingly, the same political party in power in Islamabad autonomously forms the government here. Maintaining Gilgit-Baltistan’s separate status from the rest of Pakistan serves a strategic purpose, bolstering Pakistan’s position in the United Nations concerning the Kashmir issue. In the event a plebiscite vote is called for, Pakistan can leverage the votes from this region to support its claim of accession. Another intriguing aspect is India’s objection to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Gilgit-Baltistan. India argues that China’s investment in this disputed area could potentially complicate matters, as India aspires to regain control over it. The Religious Landscape of Gilgit-Baltistan Gilgit-Baltistan has a Shia majority, while Sunni Muslims make up the majority in the rest of Pakistan. In the Skardu district of Gilgit-Baltistan, the majority of the population is Shia, but Diamer and Astore are two regions where Sunni Muslims constitute the majority. Ganche has a Noorbakhshi population, and Ghizar has an Ismaili Muslim majority. According to a survey conducted in 1948, Gilgit-Baltistan had a population consisting of 85 per cent Shia and Ismaili communities. However, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime encouraged the migration of people from other provinces to Gilgit-Baltistan in order to exert some control over the Shia and Ismaili majority. Almost all major political parties of Pakistan have active branches in Gilgit-Baltistan, but local religious organizations maintain their influence. This is why the region, with its Shia majority and Sunni minority, often experiences clashes and is known for its volatile situation. Tracing the FIR Filed on August 23 On January 17, a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami party presented a legislative proposal in the Pakistan Senate. This proposal suggested increasing the punishment for blasphemy against the Prophet, blasphemy against the family of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt), and blasphemy against the companions of the Prophet from the existing three years of imprisonment to ten years. Maulana Chitrali argued that if a member of parliament were to commit blasphemy, their punishment would be five years in prison, but the blasphemy against these sacred figures would only result in a three-year sentence. He proposed amending the law to increase the punishment to ten years. Consequently, the punishment was increased to ten years. The Historical Roots of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws The process of legislating on blasphemy-related issues in Pakistan began during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime when he assumed power, overturning leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq, in an effort to diminish the influence of progressive politicians like Bhutto, shifted his focus toward religious elements. He took measures to align with religious leaders who were easily influenced by the Zia regime’s Islamic slogans. General Zia-ul-Haq organized large conferences of religious scholars and quickly gained their support. He introduced fundamental changes to the constitution to infuse it with an Islamic character, and regrettably, these changes were approved by Pakistan’s parliament following the 1985 general elections. Consequently, Pakistan gained international recognition as a staunchly conservative state, with religious elements becoming increasingly influential. They now possess the ability to exert pressure and impose their demands on the government and civil administration at their discretion. It was during the Zia-ul-Haq era that legislation related to blasphemy was enacted, solidifying Pakistan’s image as an overly conservative state. The extreme religious elements exploited this legislation, transforming Pakistan into a perceived irresponsible state where religious groups wield substantial influence, often leveraging the government and civil administration to conform to their demands. It’s important to note that during the Zia-ul-Haq era, as Imam Khomeini overturned the throne of Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979 and Shia religious elements gained power in Iran, a similar phenomenon unfolded in Pakistan. In this environment, when Pakistan’s Shia population drew inspiration from Iran, Saudi Arabia began supporting Sunni religious elements. Consequently, Pakistan found itself caught in the crossfire between Iran and Saudi Arabia. These proxy conflicts, aside from inflicting economic losses and deteriorating living conditions, claimed numerous precious lives. The Events of January 17, 2023 With this background, it’s noteworthy that on January 17, 2023, Maulana Abdul Akbar Chitrali, a member of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, presented a legislative proposal in the National Assembly of Pakistan. This proposal sought to increase the penalties for blasphemy, specifically blasphemy against the Prophet and blasphemy against the family of the Prophet (Ahl al-Bayt), elevating the punishment from three years of imprisonment to ten years. During his address on this occasion, Chitrali articulated: “The punishment for insulting a member of parliament is five years, whereas the penalty for insulting sacred personalities stands at three years. This, in itself, is an affront,” Chitrali declared before the assembly. “May this bill serve as a means to our salvation, and may Allah bestow upon our leaders the capacity to enforce this legislation in both letter and spirit.” (To Be Continued) The writer is a veteran journalist based in Islamabad. He writes on social, political, economic, defence and strategic developments across the South Asian region. He can be reached at zm.journalist@gmail.com