India-Pakistan relations in the last decade have sharply been affected by factors outside the direct control of either state — more so in Pakistan’s case. Paucity of direct communication between the two states increased the role of the media, non-state actors and the US — to the detriment of the Indo-Pak relationship itself. The two nuclear neighbours are caught in a warp where the status quo in bi-lateral relations vacillates between improvement and deterioration but does not sway beyond a certain point — either way — so as to achieve anything decisive. Let us glimpse at role of the media, the non-state actors and the US. The role of the media has been starkly visible on several occasions in the last decade. In July 2001, many expectations were attached to the Agra Summit where the two sides were unable to agree upon a joint statement. Several observers point as the reason for its “failure” the meeting that President Musharraf held during this Summit with senior Indian news editors, which was broadcast live on television. The statements, questions and dynamics that developed portrayed the differences between the two positions of India and Pakistan, mainly on Kashmir. The Indian media argued that they merely reacted to Musharraf’s brashness. In 2004, Musharraf’s proposal on Kashmir caused a storm in the media on both sides of the border. Musharraf proposed that Pakistan not demand a plebiscite, and India not insist on making the Line of Control (LoC) an international border. Instead, he suggested that Kashmir should be divided into seven regions and demilitarised in a phased process after which the Kashmiris could decide their fate. The Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman chided Musharraf for not having discussed his proposal through diplomatic channels first. The Indian media highlighted Jaswant Singh’s reaction who condemned this as “Map-making…in disguise” that needed to stop. The Pakistani media accused Musharraf of a “sell out” on Kashmir. On the fourth day the Foreign Ministry of Pakistan had to clarify that this was merely a proposal to generate debate on the issue. A third example is a video-conference in November 2008 between President Asif Ali Zardari and Indian journalists. Exactly one week before the Mumbai blasts took place, President Zardari was interviewed by The Hindustan Times and asked why Pakistan would not accept the doctrine of ‘no first use’? To which he replied, “We will most certainly not use it first.” Journalists taunted Zardari on his lack of knowledge claiming, “He knows next to nothing about the issue”; he sounds “like a mystic from the heart of Sindh”, others still doubted “whether he quite understood the implication of his words”. Non-state actors constitute the second important factor that has been ‘actively’ added to the India-Pakistan equation in the last decade. Two serious and notable events in this respect were the shootings at the Indian parliament in 2001 and the attacks in Mumbai in 2008, both of which were perpetrated by non-state actors and caused major military tensions between India and Pakistan, apart from the regular relatively minor incidents of terrorism that both sides link to each other. Pakistan has never experienced such a backlash from religious enterprises as is being experienced in the current times. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal Organisation, under the Institute of Conflict Management in Delhi, “In year 2003 — when Pakistan was already being viewed as a place of instability and widespread strife — total fatalities in terrorism-related violence amounted to just 189. By 2004, this number had risen to 863, to slide marginally to 648 in 2005, but mount dramatically thereafter to the unprecedented minimum of 6,715 killed in 2008.” It is slowly beginning to dawn upon the Indian establishment that the theory that Pakistan uses terrorist violence as a useful tool, and does not eliminate terrorism because it does not wish to, is not entirely true. According to Indian-American scholars, Pakistan may be to blame for creating the jihadis but it is no longer in control of them as the jihadi organisations have now become like a “sorcerer’s apprentice” and the magic brooms in Goethe’s tale, where they have taken on a life of their own and are in a position to pursue their own policy. Indeed, the record number of bomb blasts within Pakistan in the last few years shows that the Pakistani state and the terrorists work at cross purposes. Thus there seems no absolute answer to their question: “Who will now play the role of the South Asian sorcerer and rein in the jihadis?” A strengthened joint strategy, maybe Afghanistan as part of their dialogue, with enhanced communication directly between India and Pakistan may be beneficial in dealing with issues of terrorism in the longer term. The US is significant as an active external player in the region, and is widely perceived as the most important entity that influences India-Pakistan relations and crises. The US’s role in Kargil was crucial as it decisively put pressure on Pakistan to recall its troops from Kargil. In subsequent crises the US has played a central role, including in the last crisis in Mumbai where the Indians preferred to share their data with the US first and foremost before communicating with Pakistan. Another dimension may be the US’s decision to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and go ahead with constructing missile defences, which has a negative effect on the nuclear arms race in South Asia, apart from its own strategic relationship with India. On the other hand, the US is also not credited for laying the foundations of the longest surviving backchannel of communication between India and Pakistan, the Neemrana Initiative, as Pakistan and the US are now “disenchanted allies” as per former US Ambassador Dennis Kux. There are no alternatives to sustained dialogue between India and Pakistan to improve relations — this will itself dilute negative factors preventing this sustained and fruitful communication in a regional milieu that makes this communication intrinsic. The writer is a Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. She can be reached at defence.analyst@gmail.com