The NATO supply routes through Pakistan were blocked after the Salala incident in November 2011 in which the NATO troops were involved in killing of 26 Pakistani soldiers and destruction of two border posts. A parliamentary committee on national security (PCNS) was given the responsibility to conduct a strategic review to reform the terms of engagement with the US. PCNS included members from both government and opposition, which was the right thing to do to create a consensus position on this important relationship. Last week, the draft proposals of the committee were released and have been debated in parliament since March 26. The foremost question in front of the committee was to consider how the presence of foreign forces in a neighbouring country has impacted the social, economic and security situation of Pakistan? It was reported in the media a few weeks ago that the US had signed an MOU with the Afghan government to allow the presence of its forces for another 10 years beyond 2014. Which means the next most critical question is how this would impact the balance of power in the region. Leaders are responsible to inform and educate the masses about important policy decisions to create a national consensus. Various security analysts, ex-servicemen and politicians have been projecting a view that the US has lost the war in Afghanistan and is in a rush to exit. It is far from reality. A look at the US policy discussions and facts on the ground make it abundantly clear that the NATO forces will remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. To illustrate this point further, in the Vietnam war, the US had over 58,000 (approximately10.5 percent of its total force) dead and 303,000 wounded, as compared to the Afghan war claiming the lives of 1,827 soldiers (approximately 1.4 percent of the total force) and 15,400 wounded, which is a much smaller damage although it is the longest war in US history. Going forward the only change will be in the makeover of the US forces from conventional army to special operations, estimated around 25,000 to 30,000, including an intelligence apparatus. These forces will most probably be moved to bases near the Iran-Afghanistan border away from major towns and cities. It is imperative that the Pakistani policy makers take this probability into account and build it into their strategic options. The other serious concern is the lack of unity in formulation of our foreign policy. Opposition leaders were part of the deliberation process of the draft but are now crying foul about it. If they disagreed with the recommendations then they should have raised their objections during the committee meetings and ascertained that it was not released until a consensus was reached. Two of the PML-N leaders are signatories of the draft, but still the leader of the opposition in the national assembly is objecting as if they had nothing to do with it. Similarly, Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F was a member of the PCNS committee but did not use that appropriate forum to provide his insight and wisdom in formulating the terms. He is now using it to further his party’s political interests. A country bordering with a neighbour engaged in an active war, experiences serious deterioration in its macro-economic outlook. Some of these effects are the loss of export markets due to supply uncertainty; increased cost of insurance; social disruption affecting domestic markets; reduced foreign direct investment; increased cost of maintaining law and order; and the emergence of an undocumented economy producing inflation and higher frequency of terrorist attacks. It is understood that recouping these macro-economic costs will be a part of any strategic options prepared by the affected nation. On the other hand, micro-economic benefits are discussed and negotiated at the time of signing of subsequent agreements. In other words, fees, compensation and economic advantages are a by-product of a strategic review. To give an example, the US invasion of Iraq in the first Gulf war was a strategic position, but the cost of the war was borne by Saudi Arabia. The former US secretary of state James Baker has written in his autobiography that while planning for Operation Desert Storm to expel Iraq from Kuwait, they inflated their cost of operations three times with a scratch of the finger that was accepted by Saudi Arabia without negotiation. In the same book, he states that Turkey was compensated for the macro-economic loss arising from the war in return for its support of US operations. Similarly, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 to depose Saddam Hussain will be billed to the Iraqi nation in the form of oil concessions and other advantages. The cost of the NATO operations in Libya will be deducted from the $ 130 billion of Libyan money deposited in western banks. It is understood that economic benefit is sought from a situation but it does not dictate the strategic position. The PCNS draft focuses too much on micro-economic compensation, presenting Pakistan as a ‘rentier’ state that is willing to sell itself for the right fee. The correct approach should have been to include macro-economic gains in the form of fast track approval of a free trade agreement; social sector development by allowing write-off of existing loans, access to foreign direct investment and no interest loans for infrastructure development. This is apart from any fees and taxes negotiated for transit rights agreements. (To be continued) The writer is the former President of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce-USA and member of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf. He can be reached at abdul.kundi@gmail.com Note: The views expressed are personal and not the official party position