Foreign affairs or international relations are the study of the complete ambit of relations of a nation with other nations, which Hans Morgenthau called politics among nations. Three books or treatises are the magnum opus on the subject: Thucydides’s Account of the Peloponnesian War, Chanakya’s Arthashastra and Machiavelli’s The Prince. Rest of the knowledge is based on modern theories and the ever-emerging plethora of new terminologies, but the basic knowledge is almost identical, yet vibrant, revolving around the variables of history, geography and technology (as with the advent of nuclear weapons, deterrence basing upon counter-force and countervailing concept emerged, so creating a technology differential). Human behaviour since centuries is also almost predictable. Paradigmatic shifts are the real constant of the present world. Foreign policy is the mechanism through which nations accentuate these paradigmatic shifts. Foreign policy is the sum total of all the policies of a country, be they economic, security, commerce, trade or any other manifestation of national interests. Therefore, one institution (the Pakistan army) controlling the sum total, even when off the podium of power, is unbelievable. Since the last decade or so even people in the most powerful democracy on earth, i.e. the US, say that their foreign policy is being run by the Pentagon (something close enough to GHQ in literary terms) or the security establishment. The people of Pakistan are the most apolitical entity on the globe. They suffered, for over a decade, the menace of terrorism and yet no political party mentioned the need of making an anti-terrorism or counterinsurgency policy in their manifestos. Traditionally, the legislators, due to baggage of poor infrastructure and amenities, concentrate on municipal ventures rather than hardcore legislation. Debate on foreign policy issues is never heard of, making it a domain least traversed. The Foreign Office through career and non-career (political appointees) ambassadors enforce the cardinal principle of foreign policy. They are both the eyes and ears of a government. Yes, during a dictatorial rule non-career ambassadors include a substantive number of retired army officers, who may not be as good diplomats as they were soldiers. Once it is conceded that the army makes the foreign policy of this country, it is a great rebuke to Pakistan’s very competent cadre of the foreign service. Historically, the imposition of the first Emergency in 1951 by Ghulam Muhammed was a wrong lesson taught to the army. To make things worse, the orders of the High Court nullifying the Emergency were set aside by the federal court, thus paving the way for military rule and the subsequent validation through PCOs, etc. In 1954, Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO, setting the pace for becoming part of the western bloc. This gave the US permanent leeway in the internal and external politics of Pakistan. The army was structurally an easy organism to deal with as compared to politicians. The US supported military rule in other Muslim countries not as a principle but as an exception. That exception was always justified in the US Congress under the pretext of the Cold War and the growing influence of the then USSR. The same bonhomie still exists between the US and the army, as just recently in 2013, Vali Nasr in his book The Dispensable Nation writes: “There have been times when civilian politicians irked us and we saw our salvation in the military…We did not like the military’s rattling of sabers at India, but thought that the men in khaki alone could safeguard the country’s nuclear arsenal, keep jihadists at bay, and help the west against the threat of extremism…Humiliating and weakening a military that is choking democracy is not a bad thing. But Pakistan is not Spain or Argentina. The combination of ethnic tensions, extremist revolt, a sagging economy, and political gridlock with a war next door and no real institutional alternatives means that weakening Pakistan’s military could mean opening the door to the unknown.” This depiction is not something that is only a literary narration but is realpolitik. Pakistan’s foreign policy right from the time when General Gracy said no to Mohammad Ali Jinnah was India-centric with the military to play a role in consultations and proffering suggestions. Later, Kashmir became the biggest sole issue between the two countries, which unfortunately was mostly tackled in the battlefield rather than on the table. Presently, the foreign policy issues of Pakistan include Afghanistan, drones, internationalisation of the Balochistan crisis, nuclear proliferation and the global war on terror. Willy-nilly, all these issues have, primarily, security dimensions where the Foreign Office of Pakistan consults the Pakistan army for hands on information and appropriate response. It is not something unusual. The US State Department does the same and the ‘big brother’ next door actually consults its armed forces more than we can imagine. Why then are the political masters apprehensive? The answer is simple. Whichever government will take the responsibility of these issues will actually automatically wield the power to formulate, mould and steer foreign policy. In fair calculations, an elected prime minister should not have fears on this issue as the army is an institution, not an ideology. Credit goes to General Pervez Kayani who as a scholar-soldier showed his acumen of crystal ball gazing. Relations with the US are passing through a critical phase. Uncle Sam wants to have a date at some heritage hotel. Pakistan, on the other hand, wants a durable commitment. Two metaphors, the iceberg (as much visible as hidden) and the mother-in-law (appeasing Pakistan and delivering to India) are pertinent to the present situation. On June 7, the Baloch nationalists tried to table a resolution against Pakistan in the UN. China and Cuba apposed it by terming it as an improper act by an NGO against a legitimate state, but astoundingly the US and UK supported the same. It is indicative that the perpetration of terrorism and the international interest in Balochistan’s situation is going to be the first litmus test of the resolve of the new government in the sphere of foreign policy. Again, it is going to be a security-oriented problem so the foreign minister should take the army on board in its consultative role. It is reported that Sartaj Aziz and Tarek Fatimi are not ready to share the pie with each other on the tough turf of foreign policy. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif should call an all parties conference to address the foreign policy challenges for the country. Meanwhile, let the army concentrate on the internal situation by boosting the morale of soldiers; their resolve is the last line of defence. The internal flank is the pivot from where all power emanates. The recently held meeting of the defence committee of the cabinet is a good omen, but merely changing the name or even the mandate will not do. It is the resolve to fight terrorism that has to be infused at the highest decision-making level. So Mr Prime Minister, our bitter history is a pack full of stones; to sail or swim, leave the same at the shore and flow with freethinking and lateral wisdom. As the pilots of drones sitting in Florida flying over FATA say: “Hit the MAMs (military aged men, a name for non-hardcore targets).” The reply should be Oscar Kilo (OK). The writer is a defence analyst and freelance columnist based in Islamabad