Historians might credit the May 1998 time frame — when both India and Pakistan overtly displayed their nuclear arsenal — as the beginning of the nuclear age in South Asia. Realistically however, the dynamics of nuclear deterrence had been set in motion way back in 1985 when both India and Pakistan, through intentionally planned leaks, had let it be known to each other that they had crossed the nuclear threshold, and were in possession of nuclear weapons, without having to resort to a nuclear explosion. This was the period of the policy of ‘nuclear ambiguity’, and many military analysts on both sides of the border have credited it with averting armed conflict between the two belligerent neighbours on more than a couple of occasions, from 1985 to 1998. In 1986, under the banner of Exercise Brass Tacks, the Indian armed forces, led by General Sunderji, had amassed a very large offensive force close to the Pakistan border in the southern sector, considered Pakistan’s soft underbelly. The threat of a full scale Indian military invasion of Pakistan was very real, and trusting the Indian’s stated intentions that the force assembly was merely a peacetime exercise in India would have been foolish, almost suicidal. Pakistan mobilised its armed forces fully, and exploiting a gap in the Indian defences in the north that had resulted because of the large scale troop redeployment for the exercise in the south, positioned its offensive formations in a manner that threatened sensitive Indian territories. This was followed by veiled threats of defending the homeland through all possible means, an indication of going for the nuclear option if necessary. The crisis was defused following what is generally referred to as cricket diplomacy, the uninvited visit of the Pakistani strongman and president, General Ziaul Haq to India, ostensibly to witness a cricket match between the Pakistan and India cricket teams. Assuming that the Indians were planning a military offensive under the garb of Exercise Brass Tacks, were they eventually deterred by Pakistan military’s conventional posture or its nuclear threat, or perhaps both? A chastised Sunderji, after retirement, published the very readable book, Blind Men of Hindoostan, where he depicts the horror and destruction that a nuclear exchange would cause to both the nations if such an eventuality does take place. Tensions along the border were raised on a couple of other occasions prior to 1998, but not on the scale of the 1986 event and on each occasion, mutual deterrence where the nuclear factor played a key role, prevented misadventures by either side. May 1998 saw both India and Pakistan take their nuclear weapons capability out of the closet by conducting nuclear explosions that removed any ambiguity about their nuclear weapons manufacturing credentials. After that, in 1999, a limited conflict was fought in Kargil, and the fact that it did not spill out of control may be credited to the nuclearisation of the region. On December 13, 2001, the Indian parliament came under attack by an armed group, which according to the Indian government, was part of a terrorist organisation that had its support base in Pakistan. Pakistan denied any involvement and condemned the attack, but an enraged Indian government, with the full backing of its public, decided to teach Pakistan a lesson through a military showdown. Full scale mobilisation of the Indian armed forces was ordered, and they were placed along the Pakistan border in an extremely offensive posture. Pakistan was served with a list of harsh ultimatums, which if it failed to comply with to their satisfaction, would result in a military invasion of Pakistan. Pakistan rejected the ultimatums and put its own forces on full alert to meet any impending Indian threat. The two forces, fully armed and ready to launch at short notice, faced each other, eyeball to eyeball, across their respective borders. A full scale conventional war between two nuclear-armed neighbours, which could easily escalate to a nuclear weapons exchange, became a nightmarish reality. The entire world sat up, alarmed at the exceedingly dangerous situation, which if not defused, could lead to a nuclear war that would affect the ecology of the entire planet. Intense diplomatic and other pressures were applied on both the belligerents to de-escalate, especially by the US, the sole superpower of the world. Mercifully, after over eight months of engaging in a dangerous game of military brinkmanship, the Indians relented and decided to disengage by pulling back their armed forces. Pakistan followed suit. A dangerous war had been averted. While the US had played a pivotal role in using its influence in the region to defuse the situation, would the US had been as concerned if the two sides were not nuclear armed? What part did nuclear deterrence play in preventing the war? Have nuclear weapons changed the complexion and nature of war between India and Pakistan? What are the limits and dangers of nuclear posturing and nuclear brinkmanship? Can the Kargil war, the 2001/2002 standoff and 2008 Mumbai attack experience lead to the suggestion that a full scale conventional war of the 1965/1971 variety has become a thing of the past, while the threat of a very limited military conflict between the two nuclear armed neighbours, which still has the potential of escalating to a full-fledged nuclear showdown, continue to loom large? If that be true, should it not lead to a doctrinal shift of Pakistan’s defence policy and a restructuring of its armed forces to meet the new challenges? Today the nation faces a serious threat to its security from non-state actors indulging in asymmetric warfare against the state. Nuclear deterrence does not work against such adversaries, and when the militancy of the rebels goes beyond the capability of the country’s law enforcing agencies to control, and turns into a full fledged insurgency, deployment of regular armed forces, where air power plays a secondary but significant role becomes inevitable. Today, Pakistan is confronted with such a scenario, and its armed forces have to be prepared and readied to handle both the conventional and sub-conventional threats to its security. These are some of the key questions that have to be understood, addressed and answered to determine if alterations in the nature, size and capabilities of the nation’s current armed forces is called for. The very nature and magnitude of destruction caused by nuclear weapons has put them in a class of their own, very different from that of conventional weapons. While conventional weapons are developed and acquired to fight wars, nuclear weapons’ primary purpose is to prevent wars, both at the conventional and nuclear levels. This implies that the nuclear warfare doctrine is a separate subject, independent of the conventional warfare doctrine, yet the two remain interlinked. Pakistan’s defence strategy, therefore, should be built on the twin pillars of nuclear and conventional/sub-conventional war dynamics. The writer is a defence analyst and director of Centre of Airpower Studies and can be reached at jamal4701@yahoo.co.uk