It is now widely accepted that
political transition in Afghanistan will remain inconclusive unless the reconciliation process with insurgent groups is successfully completed. Pakistan facilitated the first round of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Murree on July 7, 2015. This process came to be known as the Murree peace process. The US and China also participated in the talks as observers. During the talks, both sides presented their stances on the prevailing situation in Afghanistan and how to move forward. The second round of talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, scheduled to be held on July 30 in Pakistan, were postponed due to reports of Mullah Omer’s death. The negotiations were delayed amid fears of a split that might turn into a battle for succession among different factions of the Taliban movement. Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the deputy of Mullah Omer, was considered the most important contender to head the movement as he was appointed deputy by Mullah Omer himself and has been leading the Taliban movement for the past many years. He has been appointed as the new Taliban chief but in his first audio message he has not given any indication that the peace process should be taken to its logical end.
Dialogue with the Taliban has been the most challenging task so far. An important factor that hindered the reconciliation process from the beginning was the lack of trust among the three parties to the Afghan conflict regarding their divergent interests. The Afghan government and the US administration had diverging views on the reconciliation and reintegration process. Initially, the US agreed to reintegrate the mid-level Taliban into mainstream society but was unwilling to include top leadership in the reconciliation process, while at that time the Karzai government was willing to hold talks with Taliban leadership. The US’s unwillingness prevailed over the Karzai government’s intentions to hold talks and no development took place in this regard.
President Karzai, while highlighting the policy priorities of his government in 2009, identified peace and reconciliation as key areas of focus. To achieve this objective, the National Consultative Peace Jirga was convened in 2010, which succeeded in building national consensus on conditions under which direct negotiations between the Afghan government and the insurgent groups would take place. The jirga resolution proposed the establishment of a High Peace Council (HPC) that was established through a presidential decree in October 2011. The council was chaired by former Afghan president and prominent Northern Alliance leader Burhanuddin Rabbani. After his assassination in April 2012, his son assumed the chairmanship of the council. The HPC not just involved political actors to formulate the reconciliation strategy but also reached out to the neighbouring and regional states to get their support for the Afghan led peace process.
The failure of US military strategy to defeat the Taliban changed the US’s approach towards reconciliation with the Taliban as well and the Obama administration showed willingness to reach out to moderate elements within the Afghan Taliban. The US bypassed the Afghan government and held secret talks with the Taliban. In November 2010, direct contact between US officials and the Taliban was facilitated by German and Qatari officials in Munich, Germany. The preliminary talks started in February 2011 in Doha and came to be known as the Doha Process. The opening of a Doha office showed the willingness of the two parties to the Afghan conflict, the US and the Taliban, to negotiate. It also highlighted the desire to seek a political end to the war. Taliban representatives set preconditions for the release of five Taliban prisoners detained in Guantanamo Bay and, in return, they offered to release a US soldier, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, held prisoner since 2009. The US refusal to agree on prisoners’ release stalled the Doha process, which could not be revived until after 18 months, when the Taliban agreed to resume talks.
President Karzai always remained distrustful of the US and other western partners regarding dialogue with the Taliban and this became evident from his criticism and opposition of the Doha Peace process. He boycotted the process mainly due to the Taliban’s use of the Islamic Emirates’ flag and plaque at the Taliban office and also suspended talks over the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). As a result, the US held back on direct talks with the Taliban. The new unity government of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Dr Abdullah showed willingness to resume a constructive dialogue with insurgents and invited the Afghan Taliban to join in a peace process. President Ashraf Ghani has been vigorously pursuing the task by asking for mediation from Pakistan and other states. Initially, Taliban representatives rejected the election process and the legitimacy of the new government, and presented pre-conditions for holding talks to end the Afghan conflict.
The Murree Process raised hope for the resolution of the Afghan conflict but the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omer has created uncertainty regarding the future of peace talks. The onus is on the new Taliban leadership to decide a future course of action and play a role in reducing the suffering of Afghans.
The writer works at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and can be reached at [email protected]