The first part of my two-parter opinion on the recently released national security policy focused on commending the good start, defining and then suggesting adding national identity and national purpose to the conceived national security framework, recommending clear and succinct articulation of vital national interests and touching upon instruments of statecraft needed and the underlying national security strategy required to make the execution of the national security policy a success.
This second and final part recommends and explores more granularly the execution arm of instruments of statecraft and the national security strategy so that a wholesome framework can be built around the national security policy.
While statecraft relates to skilful management of the affairs of the state, an instrument generally refers to government departments that partake in this activity. Hence, instruments of statecraft are governmental structures and pillars of the state that run the affairs of the nation and must be tasked to execute and support not only the national security policy but also the complete national security framework including promoting the defined national identity, national purpose and national interests.
The three pillars of state are executive, legislature and judiciary. The executive should be asked not only to lead and manage the nation as per policy objectives in the national security policy but also to inspire through individual and collective conduct. The legislature should be tasked to establish laws, and related oversight, in line with not only the Pakistani constitution but also with the national security policy and established national interests. The judiciary should interpret the constitution of Pakistan to ensure that any further judgements and precedence don’t go against the national interests. Media, the unofficial fourth pillar of the state, will need to play its crucial part as well. It should ensure balance and fair reporting of the facts and limit analysis and conjecture so that they don’t threaten the policy objectives of the national security policy.
The instruments of statecraft, defined as all governmental structures and pillars of the state, are needed to support both policies under the guise of the national security strategy.
Government structures or the ministerial enclave is divided into two protection rings that will safeguard the national interests and execute the national security policy. While the primary ring includes ministries of foreign, finance and defence, the secondary ring consists of ministries of interior, information and education.
The foreign ministry will need to promote and preserve the national interests as linked with the national security policy of Pakistan. It will also need to enact a foreign policy that is in line with the national security policy and its objectives. In the annals of national security, something that is quite often overlooked is the ministry of finance. In this new paradigm set up by the released national security policy, the finance ministry will act as a strong undercurrent to achieve policy goals established by the national security policy and the foreign policy. This will be done by using economic statecraft in the form of positive or negative sanctions along with ensuring the best playing field and support being available to the local market including favourable regional and global economic conditions. The defence ministry will secure national and territorial sovereignty and integrity as per the national security policy and its related policy objectives.
The secondary protection ring is headed by the ministry of interior which will ensure the protection of citizens of Pakistan in line with the national security policy. Ministry of information will play the key role of affirming and reaffirming the policy ends of the national security policy in a way that is simpler to imbibe by the local population. The education ministry will uphold an objective and historically correct account of religious and geographical past to produce ‘thinking individuals’ capable of rationalising and aligning with the policy ends reiterated by the ministry of information.
National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) and the National Security Division (NSD) need to be tasked to prepare, present and implement a national security strategy that is in harmony with the national security policy. It needs to cover at least two big aspects – counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.
The counter-insurgency policy must take a leaf out of the recently released national security policy. I had previously suggested that Pakistan’s counter-insurgency policy can be defined as “assimilate where possible, eliminate where needed”. The broad aim of this policy will be to ensure that the insurgents are given a fair chance to be co-opted where feasible while knowing that they will be dealt with an iron fist where required. If one word was to represent this policy, it would be “reconciliation”. That is, the policy would reconcile – through assimilation or elimination – any unfavourable skewing of power between the government and the insurgents. The objectives of this policy will be threefold. One, negotiate and assimilate all willing forces and individuals. Two, defeat all non-amenable insurgents and groups. Three, win the hearts and minds of the local population to isolate militants & criminals further.
The core strategy to execute this counter-insurgency policy of reconciliation can be termed SHAPE the environment. Where each letter of the word SHAPE stands for a particular operational and tactical activity. First, stop and call off Jihad as per the definition of the extreme-right elements. Second, halt Jihadi operations and disband Jihadi groups. Third, announce amnesty for all where possible except criminals and retaliatory elements. Fourth, pursue resolute operations only against the unwilling. Fifth, enlist all amenable individuals into relevant security arms.
Moreover, I had earlier also defined Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy “to stand resolute in the elimination of, and protection from, insurgents”. This would translate into a one-word counter-terrorism policy of “resolve”. That is, the policy will espouse and ensure the resolve to confirm an end to the wide activities of insurgents and terrorists. There are three objectives of this policy. One, eradication of insurgent leadership. Two, elimination of terrorist safe havens and protection from them. Three, removing conditions that non-state actors use to cultivate resources.
For the case of the counter-terrorism policy of resolve, a POTENT strategy is to be actioned. Here, each alphabet of POTENT also stands for a specific operational and tactical action. One, a prepared government and people. Two, organised for firm action. Three, tenacious in their beliefs and ends of this strategy. Four, enabled to stand together. Five, never give an inch to terrorism and terrorists.
In the above model, both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism policies are clearly linked to Pakistan’s national security policy and national interests. Thus, ensuring alignment throughout the chain. The instruments of statecraft, defined as all governmental structures and pillars of the state that run the country, will need to be required to support both policies under the guise of the national security strategy.
Executing a national security policy is not an easy task but a good start has been made by the current administration. It should now allow further vigorous discourse on the content of this policy and assimilate constructive and wholesome suggestions to make it an improved version that reflects the need of the hour and acts as a lynchpin for the nation for years to come!
(To Be Continued)
The writer is Director Programmes for an international ICT organization based in the UK and writes on corporate strategy, socio-economic and geopolitical issues