This past April, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Jammu and Kashmir, the disputed state administered by India but claimed by Pakistan. He sought to strike a conciliatory tone in the restive, Muslim-majority region, where residents resent the constant presence and heavy-handed actions of Indian security forces, and where some want to become independent or part of Pakistan. In a public address, Modi, echoing the words of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the last Indian prime minister from Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), called for an embrace of three essential pillars to help Kashmir overcome its challenges: humanity, democracy and Kashmiriyat, or Kashmir’s ethos. “We have to take Jammu Kashmir to new heights,” he proclaimed.
During Modi’s visit, Mehbooba Mufti, Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, and head of its governing coalition, was similarly conciliatory. She expressed hope that under Modi’s leadership, her government would steer Kashmir toward peace. “Kashmir’s heart is in pain,” she declared. “We have to collectively find a remedy for that, so that every corner of our state will become happy and prosperous.”
Yet as recent events make clear, that remedy has never been more elusive.
This month, Kashmir has experienced some of its deadliest violence in years. After Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, a charismatic and popular young militant, on July 8, angry protesters took to the streets. Some have reportedly torched police stations and seized soldiers’ weapons. In clashes between protesters and security forces, nearly 50 civilians have been killed and more than 2,000 wounded. Indian authorities have cracked down hard, imposing curfews, banning newspapers, and deploying heavy-handed tactics, including the use of pellet guns that cause blindness, drawing international media attention and condemnation.
For Modi, development is the solution in Kashmir, at all costs. He has suggested that it can undercut local grievances, and, in time, sap the strength of pro-separatist sentiment. “No road … has done any good to you,” he told an audience in Kashmir in December 2014. “Now I am telling you that you should shun all those paths because there is only one path and that is … development. It is the solution to all your problems.” On subsequent trips to Kashmir, he announced hefty aid packages and inaugurated hospitals and hydroelectric projects.
But it would be folly to assume that development alone can resolve Kashmir’s deep-seated dilemmas. This is a region rife with young people aggrieved by the constant presence and brutal actions of a state that many of them categorically reject. Additionally, some Kashmiris, like Wani, are not simply aggrieved; they are violent jihadis. Wani belonged to Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), an organiSation that the US State Department has officially designated as a terrorist group. It has, among other things, threatened to attack Pandits, members of Kashmir’s Hindu minority. These are not people who will be cheerfully won over by development.
As a result, Kashmir, as it has many times in the past, is following a predictable pattern: Promises of development are relegated to the sidelines as festering tensions between society and state explode into violence. It’s somewhat reminiscent of the situation in the impoverished Indian states of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. There, promises of development have failed to appease local communities incensed by exploitative state-led coal-mining activities and abuses inflicted on them by pro-government paramilitary organiSations. For decades, anti-state Maoist rebels have claimed to fight on their behalf.
To this point, India’s response to the Kashmir unrest has been relatively muted. This has troubled some Indian commentators, given the seriousness of the situation. One noted Indian analyst, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, has gone so far as to write that since Wani’s killing, “In one fell swoop the legitimacy of the Indian state has been eroded.” New Delhi needs to address some delicate yet critical questions.
First, what can be done to tone down the brutal behaviour of security forces? Their repressive tactics don’t just enrage Kashmiris and exacerbate anti-state sentiment, they also may contribute to radicalisation. Wani, according to some accounts, joined HuM after he saw Indian soldiers beat his brother unconscious, even though his brother had dutifully fulfilled their demand to buy them cigarettes. Additionally, the international media headlines generated by these draconian measures threaten to tarnish India’s global image. For New Delhi, which covets recognition as a responsible rising power, this is deeply problematic. India’s government has taken some encouraging steps, such as asking security forces to use restraint when responding to protesters. Whether such requests are heeded is another matter.
Second, what are the possibilities for a dialogue process to help calm tensions and address grievances? And what would it take to get the Indian government and key parties in Kashmir to agree to launch negotiations? Dialogue may require an extended ceasefire to which few sides may be prepared to commit.
Third, how should New Delhi handle Pakistan? Islamabad fervently wants Kashmir’s territorial status to be revisited, but India is emphatic that its status has long been settled; the BJP’s 2014 election manifesto declares, “Jammu and Kashmir was, is, and will be an integral part of the Union of India.” Pakistan still openly sides with Kashmiri protesters, however, and it has lionised Wani, going so far as to declare him a martyr. Furthermore, Pakistan’s security establishment has links to HuM and other militant groups that have operated in Kashmir, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, which staged the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. In a July 20 speech, Lashkar-e-Taiba’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, who roams free in the Pakistani city of Lahore, addressed Kashmiris directly: “We will shed our blood wherever you shed your blood.” Meanwhile, HuM is believed to be based in Azad Kashmir, the Pakistan-administered region of Kashmir. Its leader, Syed Salahuddin, frequently makes public appearances there.
Not surprisingly, the Modi government has been quick to blame Pakistan for the recent violence in Kashmir and demanded that it stop meddling. Many Indians believe Pakistan directly orchestrates unrest in Kashmir. The broader question for India, however, is how much, if at all, to engage with Pakistan as it tries to address the current crisis in Kashmir. From India’s perspective, Pakistan is clearly a big part of the problem. Does engaging only cause more problems? On the other hand, can a solution ever be reached with a policy of strict non-engagement?
There are no easy answers to such difficult questions. Yet until they’re properly addressed and incorporated into policy, Modi’s quest to “take Kashmir to new heights” will likely fall far short. Instead, it is the crisis in Kashmir that could reach new heights.
A version of this op-ed first appeared in World Politics Review on July 26, 2016
The writer is the senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. He can be reached on [email protected], and on Twitter @michaelkugelman