Regional security dynamics reveal that the counterterrorism policies and plans pursued in South Asia have invariably been suffering from flaws and omissions, thus failing to achieve desired objectives. Whatever little that has been achieved is rapidly moving towards a reversal due to the incompetence of the authorities to buttress the process with the state machinery. With the continued terror attacks in the country and the subsequent fear and frustration that grips the citizenry, it becomes imperative to modify the prevalent security structure and strategy adopted by government to provide peace to the people. Initiatives taken by the government to curb militancy through operations have not proved very effective. An overview reveals that in order to defeat and diminish insurgency, the only action adopted by government so far is of military nature while according to counter-insurgency doctrine the political, economic, psychological and civic dimensions are equally significant if true success is to be achieved. History reveals that insurgency will not be defeated by just killing insurgents. Attempting to kill every insurgent or terrorist is obviously impossible and definitely counterproductive as it results in resentment, creating martyrs that motivate young recruits, thus turning into a cyclical process of revenge. Drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan are an apt example of this retaliation cycle that perpetuates despite heavy losses as they are instantaneously replenished. The COIN environment can become extensively complex as insurgents operate against varied objectives according to their personal distress; therefore, it becomes impossible to envision the ‘mosaic war’ as a coherent whole. The greatest achievement of the government so far is seen as insurgents having lost popular support of the public, which has shifted in favour of the government and the armed forces, thus lending credibility and empowerment to it, which eventually marginalises, ostracises and destabilises insurgents. This has been followed by a series of military offensives launched in the tribal areas at the government’s behest and inflicting severe blows to the terrorists, thus dismantling their strongholds. The next most important move should have been the complete isolation of the insurgents by cutting off physical support and sources that allow recuperation of power, increasing border security by vigilantly and rigorously monitoring cross-border infiltration so that it is eliminated. Social, political and economic grievances of the local populace need to be addressed so that a constant refuelling of the insurgency can be curbed. According to a study conducted on radicalised youth, socio-economic deprivation is the main cause of radicalisation in troubled areas. Almost 70 percent of radicalised youth belong to the low-salaried class. They were compelled to join the militants due to lack of job opportunities and continued social pressure. Religious factor at 59 percent may be serving as a major contributor towards the radicalisation process, but the socio-economic factor precedes the religious aspect. Compelled to join militant groups for economic reasons, these young boys are then indoctrinated to accept the significance and benefits of blowing oneself up as suicide bombers as a vital feature of jihad. Thus the economic factor becomes primary, which forms the framework upon which the edifice of militancy is built. The armed forces in the post-operations areas are already in their third phase where rehabilitation begins. However, at this stage, the presence of the civil administration becomes essential to aid and augment the development work in order to rebuild these areas. Reforms at the political, social and economic level need to be introduced, not only for the reintegration of the youth into mainstream society, but also as a preventative measure against any future radicalisation of more children. Development programmes, employment opportunities, education and awareness programmes become essential in this backdrop. The need for such programmes to be implemented on a war footing is greatly felt for reversing the influence of the militants. Since terrorism propagates on an ideological basis, the fundamental postulates upon which it operates must be made clear to people. Further, security of citizens is the cornerstone of any COIN effort, without which disorder may spread, as is the case in SWA as the military operation and sacrifices of soldiers are going to waste as the lack of law and security environment is once again turning the area into a potential militancy incubator. In order to step from the ‘clearing’ stage onto the ‘holding’ stage, it is vital for the authorities to shift from combat operation mode to law enforcement measures. Society and its infrastructure in the areas are severely ravaged, as people suffer dearly from the psychological aftermath of war and dislocation. Their self-esteem is in tatters and the cold indifference of government adds to the pile of miseries that oppresses them. This damage may take decades to repair but a need arises at this time to take rapid and swift initiatives for the restoration of law and order by the state machinery and to launch rehabilitation and development plans swiftly. Things get further aggravated when the aid process, instead of supporting the partial initiatives taken for the eradication of the menace of terrorism, hinders and reverses the gains. An apt example in this case is the faulty judicial system. The defunct prosecution system enables terrorists and criminals apprehended by the security forces to be acquitted without charges being proved. This boosts the morale of terrorists while negatively affecting the motivation levels of the law enforcers, thus turning the ordeal of investigation, interrogation, raiding criminal hideouts and arrests as futile exercises that result in nothing but renewed attacks by the same terrorists who come back with doubled capacity and increased vengeance. Since 9/11, there have been many terrorist attacks in Pakistan where targets have varied from prominent political leaders to foreigners and from government or army structures to shrines and residential areas. The judiciary has been regularly blamed for being lenient while handling terrorist cases. Government too has taken a backseat and placed the onus on the courts. The fault does not lie solely with the judiciary. The judicial system has never been completely free and to date it continues to underperform, especially when it comes to cases related to terrorism. The silence of government over such crucial matters as the serious flaws in the ant-terrorism law is of huge concern, such as negligence towards the Anti-Terror Ordinance. This is indicative of a non-action government policy that is in vogue. While the army remains busy in countering insurgents, exhausting the economy, wasting lives of soldiers and civilians, inflicting damage upon infrastructure — whereas the psychological impact of a protracted combat leaves the nation drained and shattered — the concerned authorities remain blissfully oblivious as their careless disregard serves to counter not insurgency, but to counter the COIN efforts. The writer is a lecturer in the Linguistics department of Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, and presently working on her PhD thesis in discourse analysis. She can be reached at lubena22@gmail.com