The Afghanistan of today offers a semblance of “endless wars” owing to many reasons including the inexorable supply of Afghan insurgents ready to lay down their lives for their country or religion. The recruitment stream has not dried up, be it the war against the Communist regime from 1979 to 1989, a civil war from 1990 to 1994, a Taliban surge from 1994 to 2001, or the rule of the current Kabul regime since 2002. On June 5 this year, led by President Ashraf Ghani, the ruling Kabul regime released 160 prisoners who were members of the Hezb-e Islami, a Pashtun resurgent group turned political party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Afghan warlord and Afghanistan’s former prime minister. The prisoners’ release was consequent to an agreement that took place between Hekmatyar and Ghani on 28 April 2017 in Kabul. Under the agreement, the Kabul government would resort to a phased release of prisoners belonging to the Hezb-e Islami to express the gesture of goodwill. The agreement also accorded impunity to Hekmatyar against the crime he committed in the early 1990s such as showering Kabul with rockets and claiming the lives of around fifty thousand innocent civilians. The agreement was a prodigious political move by Ghani to divide the Pashtuns politically, since the move singled out the Taliban as a resurgent group failing to reconcile itselfwith peace. The entry of Hekmatyar in the Afghan scenario in 2017 indicated that Pakistan played a role in pushing certain Pashtun militant groups to support the US-NATO peace efforts in Afghanistan. Hekmatyar was also tolerable to the US reminiscing the days of the Afghan jihad espousing the CIA-Hekmatyar anti-communist alliance. The second column of prisoners’ release has been taking place under the US-Taliban peace agreement signed on 28 February 2020 in Doha.As per the agreement, the Taliban had to offer the respite of ceasefire after which the Taliban prisoners would be released. Led by Mullah HaibatullahAkhunzada, the Taliban have so far secured the release of more than half of prisoners out of the total demand of 5000 in return for releasing one thousandsoldiers of the Afghan army. In totality, two types of prisoners are being released: one owing to the 2017 agreement between Ghani and Hekmatyar and second owing to the 2020 agreement between the US and the Taliban. Ghani appreciates the difference between dealing with Hekmatyar and Haibutullah. First, the forces of Hekmatyar were routed by the Taliban in 1994 to claim victory over south and eastern Afghanistan. Second, contrary to the non-participatory stance of the Taliban, Hekmatyar contested the recently held presidential elections. Third, opposed to the Taliban, Hekmatyar announced to be tolerant to women’s rights and education. Fourth, whereas the Taliban are still attacking the Afghan army after the peace agreement of 2020, Hekmatyar is at peace with the Kabul regime after the peace agreement of 2017. Fifth, whereas the Taliban are averse to talking to the Ghani’s government, Hekmatyar has asked the Taliban to join the Kabul regime. Despite all differences between Haibatullah and Hekmatyar on the way the post-withdrawal Afghanistan should be, the anti-media convergence of both will play a conclusive influence on the future of Afghanistan In the Ghani-Hekmatyar alliance, there has emerged a problem. On June 5, amongst the prisoners released by the Ghani’s government was a prisoner namely Abdul BasirSalangi, a former Afghan police officer who, in February 2012, had shot and killed two American army officers, Major Robert Marchanti and Lt. Colonel Loftis,who were working as military advisors in the Afghan Interior Ministry in Kabul. Salangi had launched an insider attack called green-on-blue: Afghan security personnel turning their guns at the US-NATO service members allying with them.In 2016, Salangi was captured and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Availing himself of the advantage of being a member of the Hezb-e Islami, Salangi managed his release just after four years. On the one hand, Salangi’s release has incurred the ire of the families of the slain American officers whereas, on the other hand, his release exemplifies the urgency on the part of the Ghani’s government to appease Hekmatyar. The release is a timely reminder that both the Kabul regime and the US-NATO forces are watching their own interests, even at the cost of each other’s boundaries. The US seems to be under the pressure of withdrawing its forces to permit the incumbent US President Donald Trump to triumph over his electoral detractors late this year. To achieve the objective, the US is giving concessions to the Taliban. On the other hand, Ghani has been trying to reconcile his differences with Hekmatyar to inveigle him into offering a support of the militia in case the US resorted to a hasty withdrawal leaving the Kabul regime high and dry. Both Trump and Ghani have been trying to watch their respective interests by adopting even mutually distinct policies. Hitherto, things are running smoothly. On the one hand, the Afghan peace hinges on prisoners’ swap whereas, on the other hand, the Taliban prisoners when freed may prove a source of next round of insurgency and consequent atrocities. The hidebound stance of the Taliban against women rights including their rights to education and financial independence is known. Hekmatyarfavours women rights. Nevertheless, the area where both the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami converge is the freedom of news media expressing free speech and difference of opinion. Both Haibatullah and Hekmatyar are wary of permitting a role to the media, especially the electronic media, to influence the Afghan society on liberal western lines. The underlying apprehension is that the media is poised to transform the Afghan society contravening the Afghan (Pashtun) culture and flouting the traditions of Islam. In short, despite all differences between Haibatullah and Hekmatyar on the way the post-withdrawal Afghanistan should be, the anti-media convergence of both will play a conclusive influence on the future of Afghanistan. With silencing the media, the freedom of women and minorities would also come under a strain. The power of the Afghan media to be an enabler in society is bound to come under question. It is yet to be seen how the Afghan media braces itself for the impending assault of nescience and obscurantism. Dr Tehmina Aslam Ranjha is an Assistant Professor at School of Intergrated Social Sciences at University of Lahore / Asad Aslam Ranjha is a lecturer at Faculty of Law,University of Lahore